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Counter

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS). It is not intended to turn
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related professionals into lawyers. Many of the topics discussed
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Foreword by Joel Anderson
OVPR and Development
Director
Foreword to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems
by
Joel D. Anderson, Colonel USMC (Ret);
Development Director Office of Research
Development/Office of the Vice President for Research Kansas
State University
I am pleased and honored to recommend Counter Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations for your use as both
an educational text and practical reference for the student and
practitioner alike.
Within the text you will find a logical and data rich foundation for
current, emerging and yet unforeseen applications, considerations/
approaches and practices relevant to the ever-unfolding world of
unmanned autonomous systems. The evolution of work found in
both the First and Second Editions of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets
(Nichols & et.al, 2019) and now this sister textbook covering Counter
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations (C-UAS)
underscores one profound yet enduring theme:
Technology is changing the landscape at a rapid if not exponential
rate. The ability to respond and mitigate known and unknown
challenges

remains

an

integral

factor

in

our

education,

understanding and collective ability to remain relevant.
In that context, the authors have striven to provide a valuable
xiv | Foreword by Joel Anderson
OVPR and Development Director

understanding of the “as-is” environment while endeavoring to
maintain an enduring framework of practices and insight necessary
to respond to the unfolding “to-be” environment of the future. I
think you will find this sister edition, as with the previous two, of
immense value and insight. In it, you will find its organization into
sections on:

• CUAS operations as a Concept,
• Technologies and Processes,
• Counter C-UAS, and
• Legal and Administrative Issues to be logically and
informatively laid out.

Within the respective sections and nested chapters, the authors
lay the foundation for logical and enduring insights. Insights
beneficial to our collective ability to learn, assess, understand and
respond with relevance–now and into the future. The chapters of
the text provide a framework of intuitive understanding of both
related technology/material solutions and important/enduring
approaches necessary for conceptual planning, response and legal
considerations. I am confident that the nature of this text will
remain a directional beacon over time providing a holistic, realistic
and tangible framework in understanding and addressing current
and long-term needs.
My involvement with “drones” began in the mid-1980s when the
Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was delivered to Camp
Pendleton, California. Shortly afterwards, my unit was asked to
support an operationally relevant environment test of a system
called the Pointer UAV, then a small Styrofoam system thrown by
hand and carrying a small video sensor. The intent was to assess the
utility of a system that could be used for close in reconnaissance; to
see what was on the “other side of the hill.” As a technical solution,
Foreword by Joel Anderson OVPR and Development Director | xv

these “systems” were not necessarily new but the maturity of drone
technology then, created an environment where operationally, they
would become an integral part of military framework across what
is now referred to as multi-domain operations. The emergence of
unmanned systems technology created a number of dilemmas for
planning, employment, airspace coordination and de-confliction.
The widespread use of unmanned systems today are just an
expanded manifestation of those considerations only a much wider
scale. Then, as now, their introduction was not without controversy,
nor challenges with integrating them into a complex technical
framework that is non-trivial at the local, regional, national and
international levels.
A challenge, then as now, is that technology development just may
be the easy thing. It is the nature and impact of emergent often
times disruptive technology that presents challenges in response.
The response factor coupled with time latency in understanding
intended and unintended consequences arguably presents a lagging
approach and relatively long lead time in putting context to
necessary considerations and approaches.

I believe that the

authors of this text get in front of the “boom” of technology by
supporting a comprehensive and integrated approach to factors and
considerations far too often ignored.
As we look forward, Pillar II of the current National Security
Strategy (NSS) discusses the importance of leadership in “Research,
Technology, Invention and Innovation.” Undoubtedly, UAS will
remain part of that innovation ecosystem well into the future.
Globally, we are witnessing rapid technical change and use of these
systems in a myriad of context that also influence an increasingly
complex top to bottom security environment. Nested within the
NSS our National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls for agility in
responding to both the technical and security challenges in our
future by integrating and adapting at “The Speed of Relevance.”

xvi | Foreword by Joel Anderson OVPR and Development Director

This context is important on three levels.

1. First. Platform development and use has become pervasive as a
major economic technology powerhouse globally. Unmanned
aerial systems are in fact becoming ubiquitous.

2. Secondly. Because technology has matured to a point where
unmanned systems have become a fully integrated reality of
commercial use and applications within the National Air Space,
they must be addressed holistically.

3. Finally. We are experiencing introduction of newer
technologies daily. Their usage will continue to challenge our
understanding of the materials and manufacturing space and
our collective ability to respond to change. Counter UAS will be
a critical enabler as we move forward.

On the latter point, this sister edition provides exceptional insight
and practical understanding into a technology domain that is
experiencing development at break-neck speed, disruptive use
across

an

unanticipated

expansive

application

implications

in

domain,

their

and

yes,

development,

even
usage,

employment and ramifications therein.
Today, the challenges, gaps and opportunities of assessing
platforms, sensors, communications, information technology, cyber
and use cases for surveillance and reconnaissance require a
foundation for legal and ethical insight, knowledge and best
practices.
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The value of this sister edition is that it provides a long term
and enduring foundation and fundamental framework of insights,
best practices and considerations for “Counter Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Technologies and Operations” that can and will serve the
reader well.

Joel D. Anderson
Colonel USMC (Ret)
Development Director
Office of Research Development (ORD)
Office of the Vice President for Research
Kansas State University
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Preface
As the quarter-century mark in the 21st Century nears, new
aviation-related equipment has come to the forefront, both to help
us and to haunt us. (Coutu, 2020) This is particularly the case with
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[1] These vehicles have grown in
popularity and accessible to everyone. Of different shapes and sizes,
they are widely available for purchase at relatively low prices. They
have moved from the backyard recreation status to important tools
for the military, intelligence agencies, and corporate organizations.
New practical applications such as military equipment and
weaponry are announced on a regular basis – globally. (Coutu, 2020)
Every country seems to be announcing steps forward in this
burgeoning field.
In our successful 2nd edition of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in
the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets (Nichols,
et al., 2019), the authors addressed three factors influencing UAS
phenomena. First, unmanned aircraft technology has seen an
economic explosion in production, sales, testing, specialized
designs, and friendly / hostile usages of deployed UAS / UAVs /
Drones. There is a huge global growing market and entrepreneurs
know it. Small UAS companies have been reproducing like rabbits.
Only the FAA has been a stumbling block trying to balance UAS
safe integration into the National Airspace against hundreds of
thousands of new recreational and commercial operators testing
their meddle in the skies. FAA’s best efforts surround its decision
to register UAS and provide a process for Part 107 Certification.
(Nichols, et al., 2019) Certification[2] brings sanity and education
into a chaotic public market in the US.
Second, hostile use of UAS is on the forefront of DoD defense
and offensive planners. They are especially concerned with SWARM
behavior. Movies like “Angel has Fallen,” where drones in a SWARM
use facial recognition technology to kill USSS agents protecting
Preface | xix

POTUS, have built the lore of UAS and brought the problem
forefront to DHS. The author presented at several international CUAS conferences which were attended by commercial, educational
and military organizations for the purpose of hardening USA air
assets against hostile drone activities.

These were serious

conversations and workshops – many of them – behind closed doors
and interacting with military brass. (Nichols, et al., 2019)
Third, UAS technology was exploding. Everyday our team reads
/ discusses new UAS developments in navigation, weapons,
surveillance, data transfer, fuel cells, stealth, weight distribution,
tactics, GPS / GNSS elements, SCADA protections, privacy
invasions, terrorist uses, specialized software, and security
protocols. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Our team has followed / tracked
joint ventures between military and corporate entities and
specialized labs to build UAS countermeasures. The number of
professional C-UAS conferences around the world are significant.
This is a growing field like INFOSEC was a predictable offshoot to
cybercrime.
As authors, we felt compelled to address at least the edge of some
of the new C-UAS developments. It was clear that we would be
lucky if we could cover a few of – the more interesting and priority
technology updates – all in the UNCLASSIFIED and OPEN sphere.
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Technologies and Operations
is the companion textbook to our 2nd edition. The civilian market
is interesting and entrepreneurial, but the military and intelligence
markets are of concern because the US does NOT lead the pack
in C-UAS technologies. China does. China continues to execute
its UAS proliferation along the New Silk Road Sea / Land routes
(NSRL). It has maintained a 7% growth in military spending each
year to support its buildup. (Nichols, et al., 2019) [Chapter 21]. They
continue to innovate and have recently improved a solution for
UAS flight endurance issues with the development of advanced
hydrogen fuel cell. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Reed and Trubetskoy
presented a terrifying map of countries in the Middle East with
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armed drones and their manufacturing origin. Guess who? China.
(A.B. Tabriski & Justin, 2018, December)
Our C-UAS textbook has as its primary mission to educate and
train resources who will enter the UAS / C-UAS field and trust it will
act as a call to arms for military and DHS planners.
Step up the U.S. defense game (spending) or teach your children
to learn Chinese.[3] If you have been asleep at the wheel for a
while, you might want to look into WeChat, a super social media
app designed by Tencent, a Chinese tech company. You can do
everything on your phone. Everything. It has 850 million users. The
Chinese government uses it to keep an eye on all its citizens, censor
public posts , chats and banned words, alert police to potential
riot conditions or just unacceptable group gatherings. It is used to
create a “social credit score” to impose restrictions on those citizens
that have breached some “trust.” (Deutsche Welle, 2017) Trust is
defined by the Chinese government. What’s the connection? China
uses surveillance drones to augment this people control strategy for
not only its own citizens but those they have military or economic
agreements with along the NSRL from the South China Seas, Asia,
Europe, and Africa [the newest testing playground for UAS / C-UAS
technologies for several nations.] (Nichols, et al., 2019)
Here is the condensed outline of topics in our sister textbook:
SECTION 1: Counter-UAS (C-UAS) Operations as a Concept
Chapter 1:
decisions,

The Role of Information Technologies (Automated
Artificial

Intelligence

(Weak

and

Strong),

Communications, Networking, Remote Sensing)]
Chapter 2: Understanding C-UAS Purpose and Process
Chapter 3: Developing a C-UAS Strategy, Goals, Options, Target
Analysis, Process Selection, Operational Metrics, Approaches to
Countering UAS Activities (First Principles)
Chapter 4: Planning for Resiliency and Robustness Expecting
pushback, When Secrecy is Needed, How to Shield Operations
SECTION 2: C-UAS Technologies and Processes
Chapter 5: Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Preface | xxi

Chapter 6: C-UAS Evolving Methods of Interdiction
Chapter 7: UAS Area / Airspace Denial
Chapter 8: Emerging Interdiction Technologies
Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW, CW, DE, SCADA
Defenses
SECTION 3: Counter C-UAS
Chapter 10:When the Other Side Fights Back – Cyberwarfare,
Direct Energy Weapons, Acoustics, Integrating C-UAS into Planning
Chapter 11: Thinking Like the Enemy: Seams in the Zone
SECTION 4: Legal and Administrative Issues
Chapter 12: C-UAS Regulation, Legislation & Litigation from A Global
Perspective
SECTION 1 Enumerates the concepts of Counter Unmanned
Aircraft Systems. It is concerned with the role of information
technology, the Strategy, Goals, Options, Target Analysis, Process
Selection, Operational Metrics, and Approaches to Countering UAS
Activities.
SECTION 2 looks at the C-UAS technologies and processes. To
wit: Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Evolving Methods of
Interdiction; UAS Area / Airspace Denial; Emerging Interdiction
Technologies; and Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW, CW, DE,
SCADA Defenses.
SECTION 3 broaches the sensitive subject of Counter C-UAS and
current research into Cyberwarfare, Direct Energy Weapons,
Acoustic / IFF defenses; Integrating C-UAS into Planning and
Thinking Like the Enemy.
SECTION 4 puts our work into a global legal framework: C-UAS
Regulation, Legislation & Litigations.

We trust our newest book will enrich our students’ and reader’s
understanding of the purview of this wonderful technology we call
C-UAS.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
Abbreviations: Acronyms [Rev 66A]
The following terms are common to the UAS industry, general
literature or conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone systems.
A2 / AD

Anti-access / Area Denial

A /Aref

Amplitudes of source and reference points, see

Eq-20-6,7
AA

Anti-aircraft / Adaptive Antennas

AAA

Anti-aircraft artillery

AAIB
AAM

Air Accidents Investigation Board
Air-to-air missile

AAV

Autonomous air vehicle

ABI

Aviation Block Infrastructure

A/C
ACAS

Aircraft
Airborne collision avoidance system / Assistant Chief

of the Air Staff
ACL

Agent communication language / Autonomous control

levels
ACOUSTIC

Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds

produced by their motors
ACRP
ACS

Airport Cooperative Research Project
Airbome (defense) control station (system)

ACTD

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

AD

Air Defense / Ansar Dine terrorist group

A/D
ADAC
ADC

Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis
Automated Dynamic Airspace Controller
Air data computer

ADF

Automatic direction finder/finding

ADMS

Air defense missile (radar) system

ADS

Air Defense System (USA)
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ADS-B

Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast

systems
ADT
AESA
AEW

Air Data Terminal
Active electronically scanned array
Airbome early warning

AF

Adaptive Filtering

AFCS

Automatic flight control system

AFRICOM

US Africa Command

AGL
AGM
AGARD

Above ground level
Air- to- surface missile
Advisory

Group

for

Aerospace

Research

and

Development (NATO)
AGM-65

Maverick (USA) is an air-to-surface missile (AGM)

designed for close air support. It is the most widely produced
precision-guided missile in the Western world, and is effective
against a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air
defenses, ships, ground transportation and fuel storage facilities.
AHA

Autopilot Hardware Attack

AHD

Analog high definition

AHRS

Attitude and heading reference system

AI

Artificial intelligence
AIAA

AIC
AIP
AIS

American Institute of Aeronautics and Aerospace
Aeronautical Information Circular
Aeronautical Information Publication
Automated Identification System for Collision

Avoidance
AJ

Anti-Jam

ALB

Air Land Battle

ALERT

Advanced

Low-observable

Embedded

Reconnaissance Targeting system.
AM

Amplitude Modulation / al-Mourabitoun terrorist

group
AMB
AMRAAM
ANSP

Agile Multi-Beam
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
Air Navigation Service Provider
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ANO

Air Navigation Order (UK)

AO

Area of Operations

AoA

Angle of Attack

APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

APG

Asia-Pacific Gateway

APKWS

Advanced precision kill weapon system

AQ

Al-Qaida Terrorist Group – “the Base”

AOA

Aircraft operating authority

AQIM

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Ar
AR
AR drone

Receive antenna effective area, m2
Aspect ratio
AR stands for “Augmented Reality” in AR drone. AR

Drone can perform tasks like object recognition and following,
gesture following.
ARM

Anti-Radiation Munitions

ARS

Airborne Remote Sensing

ARW

Anti-radiation weapons

AS

Airborne Sensing Systems

ASB

Advisory Service Bulletin / Air Sea Battle

ASEA

Active electronically scanned arrays

ASEAN

Association of Southeastern Asian Nations

ASL

Airborne Systems Laboratory

ASMS

Automated Separation Management System

ASTM

American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM)

ASTER

Agency for Science, Technology and Research

ASuW

Anti-surface unit warfare

ASW

Anti-submarine warfare

AT

Aerial target

ATC

Air Traffic Control

ATHENA

Lockheed Martin Advanced Test High Energy Asset

ATM

Air Traffic Management

ATR

Automatic Target Recognition

ATS

Air Traffic Service

AUDS

Anti-UAV Defense System

AUV

Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
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Avionics

Aviation electronics in manned or unmanned

aircraft
AUVSI

Association

for

Unmanned

Vehicle

Systems

International
AV

Air Vehicle

AWSAS

All Weather Sense and Avoid System

B

IF equivalent bandwidth, Hz

BAMS

Broad Area maritime surveillance

Backhauling

Intermediate links between core network or

internet backbone and small subnets at the edge of the network
Bandwidth

Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths,

frequencies or energy.
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a
modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device
can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of
electrical communications system.
BDA

Battle Damage assessment

BER

Bit error rate

BLOS

Beyond line-of-sight

BNF

Bind and Fly – with custom transmitter

BRI

Belt and Road Initiative

BR&T

Boeing Research and Technology

BSR

Bilinear Signal Representation

BSs

Base Stations

BVR

Beyond visual range

c

Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per

sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas the Latin word for speed or
velocity
c

speed of sound (344 m/s) in air

C

Combined methods of CR

C2 / C2W

Command and control / Command and Control

Warfare
C3I

Command,

control,

communications

and

Intelligence
C4

Command, control, communications and computers
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C4I

Command,

control,

communications

and

computers, intelligence
C4ISR

Command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance
C4ISTAR

Command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance
CA

Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) /

Cyber Assault (aka CyA)
CAA

Control Acquisition cyber attack

CAS

Close Air Support / Common situational awareness

CASA

Civil Aviation Safety Authority

CASIC

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

C of A

Certificate of Airworthiness

CAP

Civil Air Publication

CAT

Collision Avoidance Threshold

CC / CyC

Cyber Crime

CCCI/II

Classical Cryptography Course Volume I/II (Nichols

R. K., Classical Cryptography Course Volume I / II, 1996)
CCE

Cyber Counter Espionage

CCI

Command

control

interface

Cyber

/

Counterintelligence
CCS

Cyber Counter Sabotage

CCT

Cyber Counter Terrorism

CC-UAS

Counter-Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems

CD

Conflict Detection

CDL

Common data link

CDMA

code division multiple access

CDR

Collision

detection

and

resolution

systems

(automated SAA in UAS)
CEA

Cyber electromagnetic activities (Cyber, EW,

Spectrum warfare)
CETC

Chinese Electronics Technology Group

CF

Computer Forensics

CFTA

Continental Free Trade Area
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CFT

Certificate of flight trials / Cross-functional teams

CHIMERA

Counter-electronic HPM Extended range base air

defense
CI / CyI

Cyber Infiltration

CIA

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central

Intelligence Agency
CIAD

Cyber- Multi-layered Integrated Air Defense

Systems
CIED

Computer improvised explosive device

CIN

Common Information Network

CIR

Color Infrared – artificial standard where NIR bands

shifted so that humans can see the infrared reflectance
CLE

Airport code for Cleveland

C/N

Carrier to Noise ratio in HAPS, => C/ N0

CM / CyM

Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation

CN3

Communications / navigation network node

CNI

Critical National Infrastructure

CNKI

China-North

Korea-Iran

technical

weapons

cooperation agreements
CNO

Chief Naval Operations

CNPC

Control and non-payload links

COA

Certificate of Waiver or Authorization

COB

Chief of the Boat

COMINT

Communications intelligence

COMJAM

Communications Jamming

COMSEC

Communications Security

CONOP(S)

Concepts of Operations

CONUS

Continental United States

COS

Continued Operational Safety

COTS

Commercial off-the-shelf

CPA

Closest Point of Approach

CPA Spoof

CPA spoof involves faking a possible collision with a

target ship
CPL

Commercial pilot’s license
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CPNI

Center for Protection of National Infrastructure

(UK)
CPRC

Communist Party of the Republic of China

CR

Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka

CyR)
CRH

Coaxial rotor helicopter

CRX

Received Signal Power, watts

CS

Control station

CSDP

Common Security and Defense Policy missions (EU)

CSR

Compact Surveillance Radar

CSfC

Commercial Solutions for Classified Program

CSIRO

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research

Organization
CT

Counter Terrorism / Counter Terrorism Mission

CTOL

Conventional take-off and landing

C-UAS

Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses /

countermeasures)
CUAS

CSIRO Unmanned Aircraft Systems

CV

Collision Volume

CW / CyW

Cyber Warfare

D

distance from transmitter in Range equation (Adamy

D. -0., 2015)
DA

Danger area

Danger Close
Definition

www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/

2013/May-June/Myer.html

Nov

14,

2013

– 1) danger

close is

included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire
request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target.
… Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate
distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define
danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of incapacitation.
2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support,
artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term
included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire
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which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of
the target.
DARO

Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DAS

Detection by Acoustical Signature

dB

decibels

DC

Direct Current

DCPA

Distance between vessels approaching CPA

DDD

Dull, dangerous, and dirty

DDOS

Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack

DE

Directed Energy

DEF CON

DEF CON is the world’s longest running and largest

underground hacking conference.
DE / EP
DEW

Directed energy / Electromagnetic pulse
Directed energy weapons

DF

Direction finding

DFCS

Digital Flight Control System

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

DIME

Diplomatic, information, military and economy

DIRCM

Directed Infrared Countermeasures

DIY

Do-it-yourself (amateur built drones or modified

racing drones)
D j

Jammer location – to-target receiver location

distance, in km, FM 34-40-7
DJ

Data Jamming / Drone Jammer

DJI

Popular and functional Chinese made drone series:

Mavic, Phantom, Ryze, Matrix, Spark, Enterprise, Inspire, Tello
{However, banned by USA Army} (Newman, 2017)
DL

Downlink in HAPS

DLA

Date last accessed (usually a web reference)

DLI

Data Link interface

DNA

Deoxyribonucleic acid

DoD

Department of Defense

DOF

Degrees of Freedom

DOS

Denial of Service cyber attack
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DPM

Direct power management / Dynamic Power

Management
DPRK
D-R-O-N-E

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
FAA Guidance: Direct, Report, Observe, Notice

&Execute
DSA

Detect, sense and avoid / Dynamic Sense-and-Act

DSS

Decision Support System

DSSS

Direct sequence spread spectrum

D t

Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver

location, in km, FM 34-40-7
DT

Directional

transmission

/

Department

of

Transport (UK)
DTDMA

Distributed Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA)

network radio system
DTED

Digital terrain evaluation data

DTF

Drug Task Force

DTH

Direct-To-Home

DTI

Direct Track & Identify

DTRA

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DUO

Designated UAS operator

EA

Electronic Attack

EARSC

European Association of Remote Sensing Companies

EAS

Equivalent airspeed

EAU

East Africa union comprising of Israel and six East

African states, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and
South Sudan
(Eb / No)

Thermal noise power spectral density ratio

ECCM / EP

Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic

Protection
ECM

Electronic countermeasures

ECR

Electronic combat reconnaissance

EDC

Estimated Date of Completion

EDEW

Effects of Directed Energy Weapons

EEZP

Exclusive economic Zone protection

EHS

Enhanced surveillance
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EIRP
Electrolaser

Effective isotopic radiated power
Electroshock weapon that is also a DEW. Uses

lasers to form electrically conductive laser-induced plasma charge
ELINT

Electronic Intelligence

ELT

Emergency locator transmitter

ECM

Electromagnetic compatibility

EM

Electromagnetic

EMC

Electromagnetic compatibility

EME

Electromagnetic environment

EMI

Electromagnetic interference

EMO

Electromagnetic operations

EMP

Electromagnetic pulse

EMR

Electromagnetic Radiation

EMS

Electromagnetic Spectrum

EMSVIS

Electromagnetic Spectrum Visible Light

EMW

Electromagnetic Waves

EO

Electro-optical (sensing) / Earth Observation

EOTS

Electro-optical targeting system

ERPJ

Effective radiated power of the jammer, in dBm

ERPS

Effective radiated power of the desired signal

transmitter, in dBm
ESM / ES

Electronic support measures / Electronic warfare

support / Earth station &

ESM

Electronic

Signal Monitoring
EU

European Union

EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force’s anti-piracy naval
mission
EUTM

Somalia Military training mission in Somalia

EVTOL

Electric Vertical Take-off and Landing

EW

Electronic warfare, see 9-15 & footnotes

F

Field theory methods of CR

F

Fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest

frequency of a periodic waveform
f

Frequency, cycles / second RRE)

Fo

Resonant frequency of string, Hz see Eq. 20-5
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F

Frequency in MHz, FM 34-40-7

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FACE

Future Airborne Capability Environment

FAR

False Alarm Rates

FBL

Fly-by-Light, a type of flight-control system where

input command signals are sent to the actuators through the
medium of optical-fiber …
FBW

Fly-by-wire

FCC

Federal Communications Commission

FCS

Flight control systems / Flight Control Station

FDF

Frequency Domain Filtering

FDM

frequency division multiplexing

FHSS

Frequency hopping spread spectrum

FIR

Far Infrared (25-40) to (200-350) um

FIRES

definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon

systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.
FL

Flight Level

FLIR

Forward-looking infrared

Fly-by-Wire

Predetermine flight mission path based on GPS

coordinates
FMS

Flexible manufacturing system

Follow-Me

UAS autopilot automatically follows operator

Fom

HAPS Figure of merit in upload /download link

FoV

Field of view

FFOV

Forward Field of View

FRAGO

Fragmentary Order – to send timely changes of

existing orders to a subordinate
FPV

First Person View – live streaming video used in

racing drones
FPGA

Field programmable gate array

FS

Fixed service

FSS

Fixed satellite service

FW

Fixed wing

G

Geometric methods of CR
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G5S

G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force, has membership of five

states; Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad
GAO

General Accounting Office USA

gAR

Receiving Antenna Gain as a Factor

GBU

Guided Bomb Unit

GCHQ

Government

Communications

Headquarters

(Britain)
GCS
GDPR

Ground control station
European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection

Regulation
GDT

Ground data terminal

GEO

Geostationary Earth orbit satellite

GeoFence

A geo-fence is

a virtual perimeter for

a

real-

world geographic area
GLOW
GNSS
GLONASS
GPS
GPS/INS

Gross lift-off weight for a missile / rocket
Global Navigation Satellite System
Global Satellite Navigational System
Global Positioning System / Geo Fencing
Use of GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate

a solution from an inertial navigation system (INS). The method is
applicable for any GNSS/INS system.
GPSSPOOF

Hack of GPS system affecting UAS commands

GPWS

Ground proximity warning system

GR

The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the

desired signal transmitter, dBi
G RJ

Receiving antenna gain in the direction of the

jammer, in dBi
GS

Ground segment of HAPs

GSE

Ground support equipment

GSHM

Ground Station Handover Method

GSM

Global System for Mobile Communications

GT

Game Theory methods of CR

G/T

Ratio of the receive antenna gain to system noise

temperature
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(G /Ts) dB

Represents the figure of merit of the HAPS receiver,

in dB
GT

Gain of the transmit antenna, dB

GTA

Ground -to -Air Defense

Hard damage DEW complete vaporization of a target
Harmonic

Frequency, which is an integer multiple of the

fundamental frequency
H

Elevation of the jammer location above sea level,

feet, FM 34-40-7
HAE

High altitude endurance

HALE

High altitude – long endurance

HAPS

High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless

communications enhancements)
HAPS UAVs

UAVs dedicated to HAPS service (example to

communicate via CNPC links)
HEAT

High-explosive anti-tank warhead

HELWS

High energy laser weapon system

HITL

Human in-the-loop

HMI

Human machine interface

HO

Home Office (UK)

HPA

High power amplifier

HPL

High powered laser weapon

HPM

High powered microwave defense

Ht

Elevation of enemy transmitter location above

sea level, in feet, FM 34-40-7
HUD

Heads-up display

HUMINT

Human intelligence (spy’s)

HVT

High value target (generally, for assassination)

I

Sound intensity, W x m-2 [Source strength S / 4πr2]

(Uni-wuppertal, 2019)
IA

Information Assurance / Intentional cyber warfare

attack
I-actors

Intentional Cyber Actors

IADS

Multi-layered integrated air defense systems

IAI

Israeli Aerospace Industries
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IAS

Indicated airspeed

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

I.C.B.C

International Center for Boundary Cooperation

(China)
ICBM

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

ICGs

Information centers of gravity

ICS

Internet Connection Sharing

ID

Information

Dominance

/

Inspection

and

Identification
IEDs

Improvised Explosive Devices

IEEE

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IEWS

Intelligence, electronic warfare and sensors

IFF

Identification, friend or foe

IFR

Instrument flight rules

I&I

Interchangeability and Interoperability

IIT

Intentional Insider Threats

Imaging Sensors ARS sensors that build images
IL

Intensity level of sound measured, dB, Eq. 20-2

IMINT

Imagery intelligence

IMM

Interacting-multiple-models tracker

IMU

Inertial Measurement Unit

INS

Inertial navigation system

IMU

Inertial Measurement Unit

INFOSEC

Information Security

IO

Information Operations, see Figure 9-11 & footnotes

IOC

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission

IOR

India Ocean Region

IoT

Internet of things

IIoT

Industrial Internet of things

IPL

Insitu Pacific Limited

IR

Infrared Sensors

IRST

Infrared search and tracking

IS

Information Superiority

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
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ISR

Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS

Platform
ISTAR

Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and

reconnaissance
IT
ITU

Information Technology
International

Telecommunications

Union

–

Standards Organization
ITU-R

International Telecommunications Union – Radio

Sector
IW

Information Warfare

JAGM

Joint-Air-to-Ground Missile

JAUS

Joint architecture for UAS

JDAM

Joint direct attack munitions

JFO

Joint fires observer

JP

Joint Publication – followed by military identifier

JDAM

Joint Direct Attack Munition

JNIM

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin

JOAC

Joint Operational Access Concept

JOPES

Joint Operation and Planning System / Execution

System
JP
J / S

Joint Publication
= the ratio of the jammer power to the desired

signal power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB
JTAC
JTIDS

Joint Terminal Attack Controller;
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

(JTIDS) is an L band DTDMA
K

Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component, RRE) (1.38

x 10 -23 J/K), Kelvin
K

2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers

(jamming tuner accuracy), FM 34-40-7
KAMIKAZI Means “Divine Wind,” Tactic best known for Japanese
suicide A/C attacks on Allied Capital Vessels in WWII. UAS TEAMS
or SWARMS could be directed in the same way.
KE

Kinetic energy

KEW

Kinetic energy weapons
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KM

Katiba Macina Groups

L

λ / 2 in Eq. 20-5

LAANC

Low

Altitude

Authorization

and

Notification

Capability
LASER
of optical

“A laser is a device that emits light through a process
amplification based

on

the stimulated

emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated
as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of
radiation”. A laser differs from other sources of light in that it emits
light coherently, spatially and temporally. Spatial coherence allows
a laser to be focused to a tight spot, enabling applications such
as laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a
laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation),
enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have
high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a
very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light.
Temporal coherence can be used to produce pulses of light as short
as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices
for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018)
Laser JDAM Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition – dumb bombs,
all weather precision –guided munitions. Guided by an integrated
inertial guidance system.
Laser rangefinder Scope to assist targeting of munitions.
Countermeasure: laser-absorbing paint
LGWs
Latency

Laser-guided weapons
Processing difference between time interval signal

is transmitted and signal is received
LCDR
L/D

Lieutenant Commander
Lift to drag ratio

LDCM

Low Duty cycle methods

LEO

Low Earth Orbit Satellite

LGB

Laser-guided bomb, a guided bomb that uses semi-

active laser guidance to strike a designated target with greater
accuracy than an unguided one
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LGTF

Liptako-Gourma task force (LGTF) established by

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region
LIDAR

Light (Imaging) Detection and Ranging

LFS

Free- Space Loss as a Factor

LIPC

laser-induced plasma channel

LJ
LMADIS

Propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi
Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (family

of C-UAS systems)
LMM

Lightweight Multi-role Missile (by Thales)

LOS

Line-of-sight / Loss of Signal / Loss of Separation

LOSAS

Low cost Scout UAV Acoustic System

LPA

Log periodic array

LPI

Low Probability of Intercept

LR

Long range

LRA

Long range artillery

LRAD

Long Range Acoustic Device (Weapon) (Yunmonk

Son, 2015)
LRCS

Low radar cross section

LRE

Launch and recovery element

LRF

Laser rangefinder

LS

Losses existing in the system (lumped

together), dB (RRE)
LS

The propagation loss from the desired signal

transmitter, in dBm
LSDB

Laser Small Diameter Bomb

LST

Laser spot trackers

LTA

Lighter than Air (airship) /Low noise amplifier

LTE /LTE+

Long Term Evolution – refers to mobile

telecommunications coverage
LWIR

Long wave Infrared (sensor or camera)

M

Mass in Eq. 20-5

MA

Multi-agent methods of CR

MAD

Magnetic anomaly detection

MADIS

Marine Air Defense Integrated System

MAE

Medium-altitude endurance
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MAGTF

Marine air-ground task force

MALDRONE Malware injected into critical SAA for UAS
MALE

Medium-altitude, long endurance UAS

MALE-T

Medium altitude long endurance – tactical UAS

MAME

Medium altitude, medium endurance.

MASINT

Measurement and Signal Intelligence

MATS

Mobile Aircraft Tracking System

M-AUDS

Mobile Anti-UAV Defense System

MAV

Micro-air vehicle

Maverick

AGM -65 (USA) Missile

MCE

Mission control element

MCM

Mine countermeasures

MCU

Master Control Unit

MDR

Missed Detection Rates

MEB

Marine expeditionary brigade (14,500 marines and

sailors);
MEMS

Micro-electromechanical systems

MEO

Medium Earth Orbit satellite

MFD

Multi Function display

MGTOW

Maximum gross takeoff weight

MHT

Multiple-hypotheses-testing

MIM
MINUSMA

Man in the Middle cyber attack
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in

Mali
MIR

Mid Infrared 5 to (25-40) um

MIT

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MLRS

Multi launch rocket systems

MLU

Mid-life upgrade

MMI

Man-machine interface

MORS

Military Operations Research Society

MPA

Maritime patrol aircraft

MPI

Message-passing interface

MPO

Mission payload operator

MR

Medium range

MRE

Medium-range endurance
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MS

Mobile service

MSL / AGL

MSL altitudes are measured from a standard datum,

which is roughly equal to the average altitude of the ocean. So, an
aircraft traveling 5,000 feet directly above a mountain that’s 3,000
feet tall would have an altitude of 5,000 feet Above Ground Level
(AGL) and 8,000 feet MSL.
MSR

Maritime Silk Road (China)

MTCR

missile Technology Control Regime

MTI

Moving target indication

MTOM

Maximum take-off mass

Modulation

Signal Modulation is the process of varying one or

more properties of a periodic waveform, called the carrier signal,
with a modulating signal that typically contains information to be
transmitted
MORS

Military Operations Research Society

MTOW

Maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft at which the

pilot can attempt to take off, due to structural or other limits.
MTS

Multi Spectral Targeting System

MTTR

Multitarget tracking radar/Mean time to repair

MUAV

Mini-UAV or maritime UAV

MUJAO

Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

MUM

Manned-unmanned teaming

MW

Microwave

MWIR

Midwave Infrared

MW

microwave towers

N

Available Noise power, watts for HAPS

N

Terrain and ground conductivity factor, FM 34-40-7

5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity
4 = moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground
conductivity
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity[1]
The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy transmitter
location does not include the height of the antenna above the
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ground or the length of the antenna. It is the location deviation
above sea level.
NAC

Network Access Control

NACA

National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics

NAS

National Airspace (USA)

NASAMS II National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System
NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAV

Nano-air vehicle / NAV data message for GPS

systems
NBC

Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare

NCO

Network-centric operations

NCW

Network Centric Warfare

NDRC

National Development and Reform Commission

(China)
NEC

Network enabled capability

NGO

Non-Governmental Organization

NIEM

National Information Exchange Model

NIR

near Infrared

NLOS

Non-line-of-sight

NM
NMAC

Nautical Miles
A NMAC is defined as an incident associated with the

operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as
a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a
report is received from a pilot or a flight crewmember stating that a
collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft.
NMLA

the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad

(Tuareg Rebellion)
NO

Numerical Optimization methods of CR

NOLO

No onboard live operator (USN)

NOTAM

Notice to airmen

NPD

Near Peer Doctrine

NPS

National Park Service

NSA

National Security Agency (US)

NSRL

New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (Chinese)
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NTIA

National Telecommunications and Information

Administration
NTSB
NTT
NULLO

National Transportation Safety Board
Non-Threat Traffic
Not using live operator (USAF)

O

Other methods of CR

OEM

Original Equipment Manufacture

OIO

Offensive Information Operations

OLOS

Out-of-the-line-of-sight

OODA

Decision Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

OPA

Optionally piloted aircraft

OPAV

Optionally piloted air vehicle

OPSEC

Operations Security

OSI

Open systems interconnection

OTH

Over- the- horizon

P

Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of

peak power, Mw
PANCAS

Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative Collision Alert

System
PB

Particle Beams, Particle beams are large numbers of

atomic or subatomic particles moving at relativistic velocities.
PCAS

Persistent close air support

PCS

Personal Communication Services

PEIRP

Transmitter’s effective isotropic radiated power,

watts
PFMS

Predictive Flight Management System

PEMSIA

Partnership in Environmental Management of the

Seas of East Asia
PGB

Precision guided bomb

PGM

Precision guided missile

PHOTINT

Photographic intelligence (usually sky – ground)

PHX

Airport code for Phoenix

PI

Probability of Incapacitation

PII

Personal Identifiable Information
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PIM

Position

of

intended

movements/Previously

intended movements
PIT

Proximity Intruder Traffic

P j

Minimum amount of jammer power output

required, in watts, FM 34-40-7
PL

Power level, dB, Eq. 20-1

PLA

Chinese People’s Liberation Army

PLAN

Peoples Liberation Army Navy (China)

PLC
PMIAA

Programmable Logic Controllers
Permissions

Management:

Identification,

Authentication and Authorization
PNF

Plug and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver,

battery and charger
PO

Psychological Operations

POS

Position and Orientation System

POV

Point of View

PPP

Precise Point Positioning

PPS

Precise positioning service (GPS)

PRC

Peoples Republic of China (China)

Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm (Latin)
PSD
PREACT

Power Spectral Density
Partnership

for

Regional

East

Africa

Counterterrorism (PREACT)
PRF

Pulse repetition frequency codes

PRM

Precision Runway Monitor

PSH

Plan-symmetric helicopter

PSR

Primary Surveillance Radar

P t

Power output of the enemy drone, in watts, FM

34-40-7
PW /PSYWAR Psychological Warfare
PWO

Principal Warfare officer

P(Y)

Precise Signal (GPS)

QOS

Quality of Service in HAPs

QUAS

QUT UAS

QUT

Queensland University of Technology
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R
R4

1 /Tb is the bit rate (b/s) in link equation
Energy density received at detected target

range, R, nm
RA

Resolution Advisory

RAC

Range air controller

RADAR

Radio Detection and Ranging

RADINT

Radar intelligence

RAM

Radar absorbing materials

RAS

Radar absorbing structure

RAST

Recovery, assist, and traverse

RB

Rule-based methods (Conflict Resolution)

RBW

Red- breasted Woodpecker

RCE

Remote Code Execution

RCO

Remote-control operator

RCS

Radar cross-section

RCTA

Surf Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics

RED

Risk Estimate Distance

RES

Radio electronic systems

RF

Radio Frequency

RGB

Red Green Blue for VIS camera

RGT

Remote ground terminal

Rician PDF
RIMPAC

Rician probability density function
Rim of the Pacific Exercise – Maritime

RL

Ramp launched

RMS

Reconnaissance management system /Root-mean-

square
RN

Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment Equations

17-2, 17-3
RNRA

Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk

Assessment for Cyber cases
ROA
ROC

Remotely operated aircraft
Republic of China (Taiwan) / Regional Operations

Center (USA)
RPA

Remotely piloted aircraft

RPH

Remotely piloted helicopter
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RPV

Remotely piloted vehicle

RR

Radio regulations

RRE

Radar Range Equation

RSA

RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adelman) -authors of early

public –key cryptographic system
RSTA

Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition

RTA

Dubai Roads and Transport Authority

RTF

Off- the- shelf, Ready -to -Fly

RTK

Real Time Kinematic

RTS

Remote tracking station/Request to send/Release

to service
RTU
RUAV

Remote Terminal Unit
Relay UAV

RWR

Radar warning receiver

S

Intensity at surface of sphere

SA

Situational Awareness

SAA

Sense and Avoid &

SAA

Sense and Act Systems; replaces See and Avoid

function of a human pilot
SAASM

Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module

SAE

Society of Automotive Engineers

SAM

Surface to Air Missile

SAMPLE

Survivable autonomous mobile platform, long-

endurance
SAP

Systems Applications and Products also the name of

a company
SAR

Synthetic aperture radar / Search and rescue-

especially using helicopters
SAS

Safety Assurance System

SATCOM

Satellite communications

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems

SCHEMA

Security Incident Identification

SCIF

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility

SCS

Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo

Camera System / South China Sea
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SE

Synthetic environment

SEA

Airport code for Seattle

SEAD

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SECDEF

Secretary of Defense

Shadowing

Airframe shadowing – UAV- Ground signal

degradation during maneuver
SEZ

Special economic zones

SHM

Simple harmonic motion – represented by sign wave

SHORAD

Short Range Air Defense systems

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence

Signature

UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal and

radio /radar
SJM

Salafi-Jihad Movement

SKASaC

Seeking airborne surveillance and control

SKYNET

Fictional artificial intelligence system that becomes

self-aware
SLAMRAAM Surface launched AMRAAM
SM

Separation Management

SMC

Single moving camera

SME

Subject matter expert

SMR

Single main rotor

S/N

S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio,

dB; Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver
SOA
Soft damage
SPL

Static Obstacle – Avoidance system
DEW disruption to a UAS computer
Sound pressure level, dB = 20 Log p / po [ measured

pressures to reference pressure]
SPS
Spoofing

see Eq. 20-3,4; 6-7

Standard position service (GPS)
A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals

to replace valid ones
Spot sensors

ARS sensors that measure single locations without

image library.
SQL

SQL Injection – common malevolent code injection

technique
SR

Short range
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SRBM

Short range ballistic missile, ex SCUD missile

SRL

Systems readiness level

SSA

Static Sense-and -Act

SSBN

Ballistic missile submarine force

SSP

Smart Skies Project

SSR

Secondary Surveillance Radar

SST

Self – Separation Threshold

STANAG 4856 Standard interfaces of UAV Control System for
NATO UAV
STK

Satellite toolkit

STOL

Short take-off and landing

sUAS

Small Unmanned Aircraft System

SUAVE

Small UAV engine

SWARM

High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or

unmanned boats
SWAT

Special Weapons and Tactics (police / paramilitary)

SWAP

Size, weight and power

SWIR

Shortwave infrared, 1400-3000 nm, 1.4 -3.0 um

wavelength range
SZ

Safety Zone is defined as the horizontal and vertical

separation criteria which form a cylindrical airspace volume around
the UAS. In figure 3-2 that volume is defined by 1000 ft radius and
200 ft height. It is assumed that initially the UAS is in the center with
100 ft above and below the A/C.
T

In Range equation & environment, strength of a

received signal, function of square or fourth power of distance, d,
from transmitter (Adamy D. -0., 2015)
T

Time, sec (RRE)

T

Tension in Eq.20-5

TA

Traffic Advisory

TAC

Target air controller

TACAN

Tactical air navigation

TAR

Antenna noise temperature, Kelvin

TAS

True airspeed

TBO

Time between overhauls
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TC

Type certificate

TCAS

Traffic alert and collision avoidance system

TCPA

Time to reach Closest Point of Approach

Te

Effective input noise temperature, Kelvin,

TEAM (UAS) High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or
unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team
Leader, (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and
is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt.
TETRA

Terrestrial Trunked Radio for terrestrial terminals /

services
Thermobaric Metal augmented charge
THOR

Tactical high-power operational responder

TIR

Thermal infrared = 8000 – 15000 nm, 8 -15 um

TL

Team Leader

TO

take-off

Tort

A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury

or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts
impose liability.
TP

Trajectory Prediction

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command networks
TRL
TS

Technology readiness level
Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above

absolute zero
TSTCP

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. TSCTP

partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
TT & C

Telemetry, tracking and command

TUAV

Tactical UAV

UA

Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential

intruder)
U-Actors

Unintentional Cyber Actors

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UAM

Urban Air Mobility (vehicle)

UAPO

Unmanned Aircraft Program Office

UAS

Unmanned aircraft system
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UASCdr

Unmanned aircraft system commander

UASIPP

UAS Integration Pilot Program

UAS-p

UAS pilot

UAV

Unmanned aerial vehicle

UAV-p

UAV pilot

UBR

Uplink bit rate, Mb/s

UCAR

Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft

UCARS

UAV common automated recovery system

UCAV

Unmanned combat air vehicle

UCWA / UA Unintentional cyber warfare attack
UGCS

Unmanned Ground Control Station

UGS

Unmanned ground-based station

UGV

Unmanned ground vehicle

UHF

Ultra High Frequency, 300 MHz – 3 GHz

UIT

Unintentional Insider Threats

UK

United Kingdom

UL

Upload link

UMTS

Universal Mobile Telecommunications System

U.N.

United Nations

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization
UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

USD

Unmanned surveillance drone

UTM

Unmanned Traffic Management

UTV

Unmanned target vehicle

UUV

Unmanned underwater vehicle

UUNs / DUNSs Urgent / deliberate universal needs statements
V

Visible

VFR

Visual flight rules

VIKI

Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence

VLA

Very light aircraft

VLJ

Very Light Jet

VLAR

Vertical launch and recovery

VLOS

Visual Line of Sight

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions
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VNIR

Visible light and near infrared 400 – 1400 nm, 0.4 –

1.4 um wavelength range
Voloport

Landing site for Volcopter

VTOL

Vertical take-off and landing

VTUAV

Vertical take-off UAV

WEF

World Economic Forum

WEZ

Weapon Engagement Zone

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WRC

World Radio Conference Standards Organization

XO

Executive Officer of Naval vessel

ZIGBEE or KILLERBEE

Sniffing / penetration tools specific to

UAS
Greek Symbols
λ

Wavelength in Hz, c / f where c= speed of light 344

m/s and f = frequency, Hz.
Σ

Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2

Sources plus Bibliography below: (Nichols R. K., 2019)
Austin, R, (2010) Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design,
Development and Deployment, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, [Condensed
with additions from eleven-page “Units and Abbreviations Table.”
Pp. ix-xxix] Additional sources generated from / specific to Chapter
development / discussion. A few definitions taken from Wikipedia.
Cyber terminology from: Nichols, R. K. (Sept. 5, 2008) Cyber
Counterintelligence & Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(SCIF) Needs – Talking Points & (Randall K. Nichols J. J., 2018)
& (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy
Counter Measures, 2019) & (Randall K. Nichols D. , Chapter 20
Acoustic CM & IFF Libraries V SWARMS Rev 1 05142019, 2018)
& (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)& (NIST, September 2012)
Alford, L. D., Jr., USAF, Lt. Col. (2000) Cyber Warfare: Protecting
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Military Systems Acquisition Review Quarterly, spring 2000, V.7, No.
2, P, 105, (Nielsen, 2012)
Nichols, Randall K.; Mumm, Hans C.; Lonstein, Wayne D.; Ryan,
Julie J.C.H.; Carter, Candice; and Hood, John-Paul, “Unmanned
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain” (2019). NPP eBooks. 27.
https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27
Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Dtic/Tr/Fulltext/U2/A487951.Pdf
Appendix 1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical Properties
(Entokey, 2019)
and (Gelfand S. A., 2009)
A majority of the technical abbreviations come from (Nichols, et
al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019)
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Chapter 1: The Role of
Information Technology
J.J.C.H. RYAN

Student Learning Objectives:
After completing this block, the student will be able to use the
conceptualization of an OODA loop in order to:
— describe the role of automated decisions in UAS operations
— analyze communications pathway weaknesses between UAS
components
— identify points of attack in a notional UAS architecture
— explain types of sensing and how they are used to support
decision making
–– ideate countermeasures to UAS operations
Introduction
In counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) operations, there
are basically just two ways to actually do something to counter
the UAS activity: physically interfere with the system(s) or virtually
interfere with the system(s). In this text, a wide variety of methods
will be presented that employ one or both of these approaches. It
is useful to have a structure upon which to consider those methods,
which is why this chapter is first.
A UAS is, at its most abstract, an information processing system.
Data is sensed, processed, shared, and communicated in order to
control flight parameters (speed, altitude, etc.), internal sensors,
external sensors, navigation, and mission execution. Data can be
shared internally and externally, with other UASs, ground control
elements, and computational backend systems. But this abstraction
hides an incredible complexity of configuration. The various
configurations of UASs range from stratospheric balloons (Loon
LLC,

2020) (Sampson,

2019)

to

high

altitude
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jets (AirForceTechnology.com,

2019)

to

hobbyist

quadcopters (Fisher, 2020). Uses for UASs include surveillance,
communications, weapons deployment, and entertainment. They
exist

in

single

system

collaborations, and swarms.

configurations,

multiple

element

Simply put, the complexity and

numbers of UAS configurations are legion. Therefore, it can be
useful to abstract a construction of a UAS in order to have a way
of discussing the issues without being bound by and constrained by
implementation details.
In such an abstract description, a UAS consists of at least the
following elements: a propulsion system, a control system, and
a housing system. The propulsion system is what provides the
mechanisms for flight and maneuver. The control system, which
may be partially or completely autonomous, is what provides
guidance to the UAS. The housing system is the physical structure
that brings all components together to create a single operational
UAS. A UAS may also include sensors, decision-making systems,
communications systems, weapons, and defensive systems. Of all
these components, only one may be bereft of information
technology:

the

housing

system.

It

follows,

then,

that

understanding the role of IT in UAS operations is critical to
understanding such mission-critical elements as targeting, effects,
and execution of counter UAS activities.
Note that UAS operations could (and probably should) consider CUAS actions prior to actual execution of a mission. In considering
the potential C-UAS actions that a particular mission might
encounter, the operators of a UAS might engage in counter C-UAS
(CC-UAS) activities. These might include mission planning to avoid
C-UAS capabilities, hardening of systems to resist C-UAS actions,
and engaging in deception activities to confuse or deny C-UAS
action effects. Simply put, considering how adversaries might try to
disrupt and deny mission execution gives operators the opportunity
to plan ways to subvert those adversarial activities. Thus, a mission
planner needs to not only plan how to execute the mission but also
to how to mitigate the actions that an adversary will take to thwart
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the mission. From the other perspective, a C-UAS operator must
consider that an adversary might anticipate the C-UAS actions and
have prepared alternatives and defenses. Whether you are Blue or
Red in this scenario, the other side gets a vote.
The following Table 1-1 is a simple exploration of how UAS, CUAS, and CC-UAS operations relate to each other. These are simply
notional, are not intended to be a complete exposition, and are
simply offered as a way to more easily integrate the concepts into a
single operational construct.
Table 1-1 UAS, C-UAS and CC-UAS Operations Relationships

UAS
operations

Counter-UAS
operations

Counter Counter-UAS operations

Flight path

MIJI activities

redundant systems
alternative flight paths

Surveillance

Dazzling
Camouflage

Multiple types and numbers of sensors
with different capabilities

Swarm
Communications
coordination interference

Redundant channels

Source: Ryan, J.J.C.H (2020) Private Notes
When you think through these possibilities, it becomes clear that
the potential for physical interference to UAS operations is limited:
you can shoot down a UAS, but that’s about it. But shooting down
a UAS can be tricky, especially if the UAS is operating very remotely
(like a stratospheric balloon) or in a swarm (where there are too
many UAS to target individually). Plus, shooting down a UAS can
deny the mission but is pretty darn obvious. A more subtle C-UAS
operation might be to hijack the data feed or cause the UAS to
operate in an area slightly different from the goal target. So, the
real target may very well be the information systems embedded in a
UAS.
Disrupting the Decision Cycles
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To oversimplify significantly, the importance of embedded
information processing technologies is to support and enhance
decision-making capability. Should the UAS change course? Does
the UAS have enough fuel to get home? If not, what should happen?
Is the UAS about to fly into a tree? The entire flight of a UAS,
whether alone or in a swarm, is filled with the need to make and
execute decisions.
The point of integrating advanced information technologies into
UASs is to speed up the ability to make and execute appropriate
decisions.

Those

two

phrases:

“make

and

execute”

and

“appropriate” are critical to understanding the problem space.
“Make and execute” imply data input to a decision-making system,
data output from such a decision-making system, and a triggering
mechanism for a decision acting element. “Appropriate” implies
that the decision and triggering processes have been thoroughly
tested to comply with the rules of engagement and the policies that
exist for the mission profile. These are decision cycles: a decision
made based on input, action is done based on the decision, and a
reassessment of the situation is performed to see if further action is
needed. Rinse and repeat, as needed.
The point of attacking information technologies in UASs is to
disrupt or deceive the decision cycle, for one or more purpose.
Therefore, it is useful to have a short discussion on conceptualizing
decision cycles. There are many different ways to conceptualize
how decisions are formed, but one that has currency and broad
based acceptance is the OODA Loop, first conceptualized by John
Boyd (Richards, 2012) and updated by many, including Julie Ryan in
1996 (Nichols, Ryan, & Ryan, 2000). There have been many other
contributors to the nuanced application of the OODA Loop as well,
including criticisms (Forsling, 2018). The point is that the useful
but only as far as the nuanced application of it allows. Further,
the model was developed in a time when decisions were definitely
restricted to the human brain, hence the development of OODA 2.0
(Nichols, Ryan, & Ryan, 2000, pp. 477-488). Both versions of the
model are useful in planning C-UAS activities. See Figure 1-1.
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The original OODA Loop is normally simplified to a simple loop
that encompasses four steps connected with arrows. The four steps
comprise a decision cycle. The first step is to observe what is
going on. The second step is to orient those observations within
the context of the environment and activities. The third step is
to create candidate decisions based on the observations, the
orientation, and mission. The fourth step is to act on the decision(s)
that are deemed appropriate. Finally, the cycle repeats as needed.
The following diagram depicts the OODA Loop as normally drawn:
Figure 1-1: Simplified OODA Loop

Source: (Richards, 2012)
The literature is clear to point out, however, that the OODA
conceptualized by Boyd was much more nuanced, considering the
role of feedback, mental biases, and experience level throughout
the entire model. Figure 1-2, taken from (Richards, 2012), shows the
version of the OODA drawn by Boyd:
Figure 1-2: Boyd’s Drawing of the OODA Loop
Chapter 1: The Role of Information Technology | 7

Source: (Richards, 2012)
Both versions of the OODA Loop capture the essence of the
process, in that a decision is made as a result of observing
something in the environment that can be characterized (oriented)
as something worth acting upon.
An interesting way of conceiving of this process includes layering
time over the various steps. Using the simplistic version, simply to
control the resultant complexity of the diagram, one can conceive
that there are hard physical limits to each step of the process.
Hard physical limits derive from the speed of light, the speed of
neural transmission, the speed of thought conversion from sight
to context, and the speed at which cognition occurs. These hardphysical limits, when characterized in scenarios, describe the
ultimate maximum speed at which any decision cycle can occur.
Figure 1-3 shows the simple version of the OODA Loop with such
time overlays.
Figure 1-3: Time Elements of the OODA Loop
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Source: (Ryan, Lecture Notes, EMSE 218/6540/6537, 1997)
The time elements shown include the times required to execute
any of the given steps (T) plus the time to transition between steps
(Tr). When the laws of physics and neurobiology have been pushed
to their limits, there is a hard stop as to how fast this cycle can be
executed.
Effective management of any situation depends on making
decisions, typically with less than perfect data. Waiting for perfect
data is a recipe for being last in the race to action but jumping
into action with data that is imperfect is risky. When the potential
impacts of a decision are low, then the pressure to be absolutely
correct is reduced. When the impacts of a decision are high,
including perhaps causing death or committing an act of war, then
the requirement for better data is concomitantly high.
On the other hand, the faster a decision is made, and the
necessary action executed, the faster the results occur. Fast,
effective, and appropriate decisions depend on experience,
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education, and supporting capabilities. When a decision is needed
very quickly, automation of some or many components of the
system is a must.
Advanced information technology allows us to “cheat”, as it were.
Incorporating advanced processing and automated reasoning
enables a rethinking of this abstraction. Consider: what if all
possible flight paths, potentials scenarios, and problem sets were
modeled prior to any need for a decision to be made? Would that
change the need for observation? What if all possible decisions
based on all possible scenarios were categorized and stored prior to
the mission? Would that change the need for real-time analysis of
potential courses of action?
The answer is, of course: yes. This technology enhanced decision
cycle can be modeled as OODA Loop 2.0, which isn’t actually an
OODA loop at all but an ODAO Loop. Figure 1-4 shows the modified
OODA Loop 2.0, with some technology suggestions associated with
each step.
In this OODA 2.0 variation, preliminary preparation using
databases, modeling, simulations, and expert systems provide a rich
backdrop to the potential mission, allowing strategists to work with
tacticians to flesh out the potential variations that the mission can
involve. Based on these comprehensive analyses, a set of decisions
can be predetermined, not unlike the decisions that are
programmed into autonomous vehicles of all sorts. Decision
parameters, such as values, rules of engagement, and geopolitical
considerations, are integrated with expert systems in order to
create a rich environment of allowable decisions responses under
certain conditions. Note that the conditions must be completely
describable as well: that is necessary in order to characterize the
observables that comprise the triggering actions. Those set of
activities with those types of technologies create the Orient and
Decide phases of the OODA 2.0.
When those are completed, a system instrumented with sufficient
sensors and actuated elements can wait for the conditions to be
met that trigger a decision. The decision is triggered automatically,
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which causes the preprogrammed actions to be taken, and then the
system goes back to observing. When considering this variation, it
is useful to point out that the OODA 2.0 includes not one but two
decision cycles: a tactical decision cycle and a strategic decision
cycle. Both are critically important to the speed of operations, and
both are points of vulnerability. Feedback is provided in two ways:
strategically to the expert systems that model potential outcomes
and inform decision options, and tactically to the observation
sensors.
These decision cycles occur at the speed of computational
processes and electronic communications, which is to say: very
fast. There are two case studies that inform the design and use of
systems employing the OODA 2.0 approach: the stock market crash
of 1987 and the Vincennes tragedy of 1988.
The stock market crash of 1987 was the result of automated
elements (bots) deployed in financial transaction systems to speed
up the purchase or sale of assets in order to react to market
conditions faster. In 1987, the number of bots had risen to the point
that when the market moved in a certain direction, the bots reacted,
as programmed, to buy or sell. These actions were detected and
acted upon by other bots, which reacted in kind, and a feedback
loop was created very quickly that led to wholesale selling. The
humans, who were not in the decision loop, stepped in to stop the
market and reassess the system architecture. (Kenton, 2019)
Figure 1-4: OODA Loop 2.0
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Source: (Ryan, Security Challenges in Network-Centric Warfare,
2001)
The Vincennes tragedy of 1988 was a result of an automated
system on a warship mistaking an Iranian airliner for an incoming
attack: the warship’s systems automatically launched what was
thought to be a defensive strike on the airliner. Hundreds of people
died. (Halloran, 1988) The relationship between Iran and the US
continues to be haunted by this very deadly mistake. (Gambrell,
2020)
These two cautious tales have the side effect of pointing out
that any system using the OODA 2.0 approach is vulnerable to two
attacks: the incitement of positive feedback loops, which may
trigger undesirable decision states, and the enticement of data
suggesting eminent danger, which may also trigger undesirable
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decision states. But these are not all of the opportunities that might
be taken advantage of by a clever C-UAS planner. Using the OODA
Loop analysis framework, both 1.0 and 2.0, can assist a planner in
identifying many such opportunities to subvert, deny, or disrupt
UAS missions by focusing on the information systems that enable
the UAS operations.
Conceptualizing the Information Systems in UASs
The UAS is a “box” propelled through the air, controlled through
remote and onboard means, focused on conducting a mission. The
mission can vary both in terms of geospatial coverage and in terms
of active or passive interaction with the target. There are several
truisms.
• 1) At the beginning of a mission and until some certain point
(which may be quite soon after launch), there are usually active
communications between the UAS and the ground control
station. This time may be a short period of time, such as 2
minutes or less, or it may be for the entirety of the mission.
• 2) The UAS may have some capability to detect and avoid
objects, so as to avoid mid-air collisions. This capability may be
extremely rudimentary, or it may be quite sophisticated.
• 3) The UAS has a propulsion system that provides adequate
power to move in the manner it is intended to move. Control of
this propulsion system may be through artificial intelligence,
as in the case of the Alphabet Project Loon (Loon LLC, 2020),
or they may be controlled through remote pilotage.
• 4) The UAS may have some capability to navigate
autonomously or semi-autonomously. In relatively simple
systems, like balloons, this may involve means to change
altitude. In more complex guided systems, this means that it
may be able to simply fly to an emergency landing field when
certain circumstances arise. In other systems, this means that
there is an onboard computer system dedicated to navigation
that controls the flight of the system when released from
active external control (whether ground or air based) and
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continues that control until commanded to return to base or
resume responding to external control.
• 5) The UAS may have some capability to sense its surroundings.
This may be rudimentary radar sensing, it may be optical
sensing, or it may be multispectral sensing. The interpretation
of the sensed data may be computed on board, either partially
or completely, or may be computed off-board, perhaps with
derived data returned to the system for action.
• 6) The UAS may have some capability for action, depending on
the mission. This may include deploying decoys, munitions, or
taking evasive action. The capability for action may be
initiated remotely or may be autonomous, in which case a
decision support system must be onboard.
These

capabilities

require

computational

systems

and

communications. And all of these may be targets for C-UAS
activities. So, let’s take a look at the information systems in a
conceptual UAS.
Internal
A UAS can’t fly (very far) if it doesn’t have internal systems to
parse received instructions, make decisions based on sensed data,
and control its onboard systems in a UAS. The internal systems
can be thought of as the internal nervous system of a UAS. Sensed
data is collected and may possibly undergo some preprocessing,
prior to being transferred to a decision support system, a suite of
AI support elements, or external communications for relay to other
UASs and/or command and control elements, such as an airborne
control system or a ground control system. The internal systems
interpret and instruct navigational control, mission execution, and
propulsion control. When emergency situations occur, the internal
systems execute preprogrammed options, which could include
autonomously navigating to safe zones or self-destructing. The
internal systems also monitor the health and welfare of the UAS
according to the instrumentation included onboard. This may
include fuel level monitoring, damage assessment, and interference
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detection. According to design, the internal systems may relay
information continuously, on schedule, or in emergencies.
Any successful attack on internal systems could affect mission
execution. Internal systems could potentially be attacked in many
different manners, many of which will be discussed in the following
chapters. But for the time being, consider these two obvious
options:
• Electronic beam attack, where the strength of the focused
energy disrupts or disables the electronic components of the
internal systems. For example, a powerful beam may
overwhelm delicate circuits, rendering them inoperable.
• Malicious software (malware) injection using channels of
communication to the UAS, or activation where the malware
has been included in components of the UAS before launch and
triggered by operational parameters.
In order to a priori protect against such activities, a UAS designer
would need to consider the potential for these types of attacks and
design in protections that mitigate the possibilities of such attacks
being successful. For instance, the design architecture could
include using hardened chips that are resistant to an electronic
beam attack or incorporating a Faraday Cage into the design of the
housing system to protect vulnerable electronics.
Boundary systems
Boundary systems are those systems that exist on the boundary
of the UAS. These include any sensors, such as air pressure,
altitude, navigation aids, and mission specific sensors, as well as
external communications elements, such as antennae. These are
elements that interface between the external conditions in which
the UAS is operating and the internal systems.
A successful attack on boundary systems can subvert the entire
UAS mission. Designing protections for these systems is tricky,
though, since by definition they need to be on the boundary of the
physical system in order to operate. Because some missions may be
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dependent on ground-based data processing backend systems, the
compromise of data transfer systems may result in a mission abort.
Similarly, if external sensors are compromised, the ability for a UAS
to operate safely could be undermined.
Examples of boundary systems include:
• Passive sensors, which receive data without stimulating the
environment. These include cameras and navigation aids.
• Active sensors, which stimulate the environment in order to
collect data. These include radar and lidar systems.
• Communications system components, such as receivers and
transmitters. These include data communications systems and
automated identification transponders.
External
External information systems are those that are wholly or
partially contained in one or more systems external to the UAS.
These may include data servers, control systems, mission execution
support systems, or backend processors. Because these elements
are external to the UAS, there are two points of vulnerability: the
external system itself and the communications pathway between
the external system and the UAS.
External systems may include:
• Active mission control, for part or all of a mission. The external
elements may include systems tracking many UAS missions as
well as navigation assistance.
• Data processing systems to support big data analysis,
characterization, and integration.
• Data processing systems to support sensor data processing,
interpretation, and application.
Understanding the potential for attack and defense on external
systems is specific and dependent on the mission and uses.
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How Complex information Technologies Are Used in UAS
operations
Decision Support Systems
A decision support system (DSS) is an information technology
system that supports the making of decisions concerning mission
operations. The DSS requires a knowledge base of facts and rules
relevant to the mission. In support of mission planning, a DSS may
use models or analytic methods to review and evaluate alternatives.
During the mission a DSS may assist the controllers with decisions
concerning options for mission execution, using the knowledge
base together with sensor data from the UAS and perhaps other
current intelligence.
Expert Systems
Expert systems are information technology systems that emulate
decision-making by human experts. In a UAS, such systems can
make decisions even when communications to mission controllers
is not available. An on-board expert system requires access to an
appropriate knowledge base of facts about the mission and rules
that apply to the mission under various contingencies. The system
must have an inference engine capable of applying the rules to facts
about the status of on-board systems and sensor data, as well as
mission plans and rules, to make decisions regarding continuing
operations. For example, if communications is lost with mission
controllers, the expert system may take control and direct the UAS
to a contingency holding area or landing field.
AI
What is “artificial intelligence” or AI? This is a subject of much
debate, even today. The various definitions that have been offered
range from a full replication of generalized intelligence (as defined
by sensing and reacting to internal and external stimuli of both
expected and unexpected nature), an ability to mimic human
behavior, an ability to execute specific complex tasks (such as
sensory aspects of biological life, including smell, hearing, vision,
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and touch), and being able to detect patterns in complex data from
multiple sources in order to make correct decisions (such as
identifying a terrorist in a crowd of people). These are just a few of
the types of definitions that have been offered, but they provide a
view into the breadth of the contribution for AI in every aspect.
The types of AI are variously referred to as belonging to “strong”
or “weak” classes of AI. Strong AI implementations are, as one might
imagine, more towards the fully generalized and autonomous types
of intelligences. A classic test of a strong AI system is the Turing
test, in which an AI is tested as a black box to see if a human can
figure out if the system is an actual person or a machine. There are
other, more nuanced, tests as well, but this gives you the sense of
strong AI. (Huang, 2006) Weak AI is not, in fact, weak, but simply
limited by design. Artificial vision, for example, can be considered
weak AI. Advanced decision support systems (DSSs) can also be
considered weak AI (James, 2019).
Why devote some time to AI in a C-UAS book? Advanced
information technology, including all forms of AI, is very important
to both UAS and C-UAS operations. Consider: humans are bad at
several activities that are critical to UAS operations. Augmenting
or replacing humans as decision makers, actuators, or monitors of
elements of UAS missions is an important application of technology.
One of the things in which humans have limited capability is
multi-tasking: humans have severe limitations in their ability to do
more than one thing at a time. Even people who think they are good
at multi-tasking are demonstrably not so when tested. (Miller, 2017)
This limitation means that an operator, when trying to keep track of
many UAS operations and support activities, is very likely to either
miss or delay reaction to a problem. The use of specialized AI frees
up people to focus on one thing at a time.
Another problem with humans is that they get bored. When
bored, their attention wanders, they daydream, and they zone out.
Maybe even fall asleep.

Also, when they get bored, they make

mistakes.
Further, humans are slow to react. Very slow, compared to
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automation. What counts as fast for a human is a few minutes. Very
fast is a few seconds. For automation, fast can be a few milliseconds
and very fast can be a few nanoseconds. In the OODA Loop
2.0 (Nichols, Ryan, & Ryan, 2000, pp. 468-489) world, speed matters,
a lot. Harnessing the power of automation can mean the difference
between success and failure. The speed issue comes into play in
several different areas of UAS and C-UAS operations. First, UASs
can fly very fast. Hypothetically, a UAS flying at 60 miles per hour
can cover 1 mile in 1 minute. In 15 seconds, that UAS can fly 440
yards (1320 feet).
To put that distance in perspective, consider this analysis of
human reaction times during an ordinary situation: driving a car.
Suppose a person is driving a car at 55 mph (80.67 feet/sec)
during the day on a dry, level road. He sees a pedestrian and applies
the brakes. What is the shortest stopping distance that can
reasonably be expected? Total stopping distance consists of three
components:
Reaction Distance. First. Suppose the reaction time is 1.5 seconds.
This means that the car will travel 1.5 x80.67 or 120.9 feet before the
brakes are even applied.
Brake Engagement Distance. Most reaction time studies consider
the response completed at the moment the foot touches the brake
pedal. However, brakes do not engage instantaneously. There is an
additional time required for the pedal to depress and for the brakes
to engage. This is variable and difficult to summarize in a single
number because it depends on urgency and braking style. In an
emergency, a reasonable estimate is .3 second, adding another 24.2
feet3.
Physical Force Distance. Once the brakes engage, the stopping
distance is determined by physical forces (D=S²/(30*f) where S is
mph) as 134.4 feet.
Total Stopping Distance = 120.9 ft + 24.2 ft + 134.4 ft = 279.5 ft
(Green, 2013)
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Simple arithmetic tells us that humans cannot keep up with
detection and closure rates.
Suffice it to say, automation is needed to augment human actions.
Sometimes it replaces the human entirely while other times it
simply augments human capabilities. But it is incredibly valuable in
all circumstance.
So, let’s get back to the types of AI that can be used and what it
means in terms of footprint, infrastructure, backend support, and
vulnerabilities.
Strong AI, including full replication of generalized intelligence, is
still a long way away from existing in a small form factor. While
great strides have been made in creating intelligent-like capabilities,
some scarily intelligent, the resultant systems are dependent on
very large banks of backend processors for computational support
so that the user-facing systems can be smaller. (Tozzi, 2019)
Replicating intelligence is actually pretty tricky. Ignoring the
methods in which data is collected and transferred from outside a
system to inside the system (analogous to human eyes perceiving
objects and transmitting the information to the brain to be
considered, classified, and integrated into the human’s thought
process), there are really interesting issues associated with
developing a system capable of taking data and making sense of it.
Part of the challenge is simply classifying the data as belonging to
one type or another: is this a bird or a bear? Is it a duck or a goose?
Is it a Canadian Goose or an Arctic Swan? And so on, with increasing
detail and specificity.
Another part of the challenge is distinguishing truth from
falsehood: is this data input truly representative of reality or is
it a falsehood? Falsehoods can come from a variety of sources,
including sincerely held beliefs. For AI systems that are collecting
textual postings, such as from sources like books, tweets, and
newspapers, distinguishing truth can be extremely tricky. This is
one of the challenges that Watson, the IBM system, has had to
confront in order to execute such things as participating in
Jeopardy (Gray, 2017).
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All this leads to the issue of training data. AI classifiers are
developed, or trained, using data sets. By inserting false or
misleading data into the training sets, it is possible to cause the AI
to make mistakes when deployed in real world situations (Moisejevs,
2019) (Bursztein, 2018).
A less robust AI, with the ability to mimic human behavior, an
ability to execute specific complex tasks (such as sensory aspects
of biological life, including smell, hearing, vision, and touch), can
fit into a smaller form fit, depending on the function. One of the
things most home users don’t realize about voice recognition and
interpretation systems, such as Siri, is that the voice interpretation
and characterization does not occur on the handheld phone or the
small speaker system. Instead, the data is collected and transmitted
to

backend

processors,

where

the

actual

data

crunching

occurs (Goel, 2018). This distributed processing is necessary in
order to bring the amount of computing power to bear that is
needed to interpret all the various types of voices, circumstances,
and commands, and even then, mistakes are made. There are
examples of voice recognition systems that are fully functional on
standalone home computer systems, such as Dragon Naturally
Speaking (Nuance, 2020), but these work only because the first
thing the user needs to do is to train the software to interpret
the user’s voice, including cadence, accent, and structure. Every
year, these systems are getting more capable but there is still a fair
amount of processing needed when more than one unique user is
interfacing with the AI.
Systems that are trained to sense and interpret environmental
elements

may

be

limited

by

the

technology

used

for

sensing (Vincent, 2017). The examples of automated vehicles hitting
pedestrians

illustrates some

of this challenge (Wakabayashi,

2018) (McCausland, 2019). It becomes even more problematic when
complicated scenarios are envisioned, such as being able to detect
patterns in complex data from multiple sources in order to make
correct decisions (such as identifying a terrorist in a crowd of
people) (Tarm, 2010).
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It goes without saying that the increasing miniaturization of
electronic components, the incorporation of alternatives to
electronics, such as optics, and the development of special purpose
processors have and continue to revolutionize the ability to squeeze
capabilities into a small size form factor. Size reduction has a lot of
advantages: it can mean lower power requirements, faster execution
of computational cycles, and less heat generation. It can also have
some inherent disadvantages, including less robust physical
components. Protecting advanced microelectronics from directed
energy attacks, for example, can require significantly increased
shielding, which can in turn affect overall energy requirements for
flight operations. In mission situations where energy efficiency and
UAS maneuverability are important, tradeoffs need to be considered
in overall system design. However, great strides have been made
in both the development of specialized processors that execute AIlike capabilities and the integration of those processors on common
chip sets. Integration of multiple special chips in a system can
provide a marked improvement in on-board intelligence (Morgan,
2019).
The integration of advanced automation, including AI, into UAS
architectures can be thought of as having several faces. First,
decision

support

systems

with

pre-programmed

rules

of

engagement can be embedded onboard the individual systems.
Next, specialized AI processors can be included as well. Naturally,
more complex AI and decision support solutions can be
implemented that rely on backend (either terrestrial or airborne)
processing for the heavy computational lifting. Finally, all of these
can be integrated together.
The interesting thing about automated decision support systems
is that all possible scenarios must have been considered by the
human programmers who created the system.

The scenario

analysis allows the humans to catalog the potential decisions that
must be made. In a trivial example, consider an automated water
tap. There is a sensor that detects when something matching the
profile of human hands is placed under the tap. The system is
22 | Chapter 1: The Role of Information Technology

programmed to decide in those circumstances: if the profile of the
detected object matches the profile loaded into the system, activate
a switch that allows water to flow. When the sensor loses detection
of that object, activate a switch that stops the water from flowing.
All of that needs to be specifically programmed into the system: no
decisions are possible without a priori structural design.
The same type of a priori structural design is needed for all
autonomous decision systems, including and especially complex
systems in complicated situations. For example, in an autonomous
car, a scenario to consider might be that an old lady and a child
run into the street in front of the car so suddenly that the car must
(because of physics) hit one or the other of the people. The decision
must be made which one to hit. In a strong AI system, the internal
intelligence would process the data and make the decision based on
internal logic. If the processing is sufficiently fast, the car would
then execute the system’s decision, taking out either the old lady
or the child. In weak AI or a conventional decision support system,
the system would simply execute the pre-programmed decisions
embedded in the system. These decisions might take something
like the following structures, depending on the programmer team
considerations:

• if two objects block the path with insufficient time to avoid
both,
• • hit the one to the right

The decision, of course, could have just as easily been:

• • hit the one to the left
OR
• • navigate between the objects
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Alternatively, a more complex system might have the following
type of logic path:
• if two objects block the path with insufficient time to avoid
both,
• • characterize the identity of the objects
• •• are both objects members of a protected class?
If yes, hit the one to the right
If no, then:
• •• is one a member of protected class?
If yes, hit the other object
If no, then hit the one on the right
The point of this thought exercise is to illustrate that
“independent thinking” by a machine is dependent on thinking done
by programmers in designing the system.
Implications for C-UAS Operations
A UAS may have decision processes in place that impel the UAS
to avoid hitting members of its swarm, deploy electronic
countermeasures when certain threats are detected, or increase
power when the rate of altitude change exceeds certain thresholds.
Each of these decisions structures is necessary to support the semior fully autonomous aspects of the mission. Each of these decisions
can

provide

an

exploitable

aspect

for

C-UAS

activities.

Understanding what the decision structure is provides the C-UAS
mission planner with the opportunity to create situations that
trigger certain decisions that can lead to desirable outcomes, like
diverting the flight path of a swarm.
Similarly, if the UAS is dependent on backend processing to
support decision processes, then denying the link between the UAS
and the backend processes will have an obvious effect. A competent
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architect will have programmed in failsafe decisions in the event
of a lost link — forcing this outcome may or may not be a desired
outcome. Spoofing the link and replacing the authentic backend
processing with alternative processing may be a more desirable
outcome, if it can be accomplished (probably very difficult if
possible, at all). A middle level attack, where the link is degraded
to the point that the decision cycle slows down significantly can
be the more desirable outcome, as it provides the C-UAS operator
additional time to pursue the C-UAS mission objectives.
Bottom line: understanding the level and complexity of onboard
intelligence is an important part of C-UAS planning.
How Sensing is Used to Support UAS Operations
Other elements of the UAS information processing architecture
that are potential targets for C-UAS activities include the sensors.
A UAS is blind and deaf without sensors interacting with the
environment and providing data about the environment to the
control systems. Sensors include thermometers, barometers, visual
spectrum cameras, multispectral sensors, wind speed sensors,
hydrometers, and as many other types of sensors as can be
imagined. Some of these may provide data to external systems,
such as navigation aids or intelligence data collection systems, while
others may provide data solely for use by the UAS.
Each of these sensors should be considered as potential targets
for C-UAS activities. Confusing sensors that support navigation may
cause a UAS to failsafe into an automated return to base profile.
Denying the intelligence data gathering sensors may not do much
to the flight operations of the UAS but would degrade or deny the
effectiveness of the mission. Finally, attacking the sensor systems
though electronic means to physically degrade or destroy the actual
sensing apparatus provides a more enduring effect that the
adversary would have a harder time recovering from.
In summary, there are more options to C-UAS than simply
shooting the systems out of the sky. Although that is always an
option.
Summary
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UAS operations are complex symphonies of activities of many
operators, both automated and humans.

Understanding and

analyzing interfaces can provide the C-UAS mission planner with
many opportunities for vulnerability exploitation.

In reading

through the rest of this book, think about how each element fits into
a larger analysis.
Questions for Reflection

1. Diagram the likely coordination communications network for a
UAS swarm. Identify potential points of compromise that
would degrade the swarm activity.
2. Describe the probable effect of jamming the ground to UAS
control link.
3. Explain the contribution that information technology makes to
autonomous UAS operations.
4. Your side is in a tense geopolitical conflict where both sides
are using UASs to surveil the situation. There is pressure to
avoid escalating the conflict by engaging in overtly hostile
actions. However, it is necessary to move some military forces
in order to be better positioned to react in case the situation
degrades. Movement secrecy is desired, which means that
some means must be found to deny the adversary’s
surveillance capabilities while the move is taking place. The
known capabilities of their UAS surveillance systems include
radars and visual spectrum cameras with video capabilities.
The data is collected onboard the UAS and uploaded to a highaltitude relay system, which sends it through other relays to
the adversary intelligence data processing center. Your boss
has asked you to come up with a C-UAS plan that is nonaggressive, but which provides cover for the force movement.
What options can you provide for C-UAS activities in this
scenario?
5. A spy has revealed that The Flaming Arrow terrorist group is
planning on using UASs in a swarm formation, designed to
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appear as a flying arrow, to deliver many small explosive
devices to a key energy generation node. This node lies within
a densely populated area that spreads out for 10 miles radius.
There is a park one mile away from the targeted node. Once
the UAS swarm is launched and released into autonomous
mode, the explosives will be armed, with detonation occurring
upon collision with some other object. The UASs to be used
will be small, capable of flying 40 miles per hour for a distance
of 5 miles while under load. There will be approximately 50
UASs in the swarm, flying approximately 50 feet above the
ground. Each UAS has a basic decision support system
onboard that allows fully autonomous mission execution once
launched. Navigation is accomplished through image-based
terrain feature recognition, where the visual data is collected
through cameras and compared to onboard maps. The lead
UAS establishes the route, but each of the UAS is capable of
navigating independently. The spy has revealed the structure
of the decision support system processes, which includes the
following rule: if a swarm member to the right moves within
10 feet distance, move to the left until 10 feet separation is
maintained. Your challenge is to design a C-UAS to cause the
UAS system to divert to the park rather than hit the energy
node. Keep in mind that you don’t know where the launch
point is, but you know it has to be somewhere within the flight
parameter limitations. Also, keep in mind that destruction of
any UAS will cause the bomb to detonate. Your goal is to
minimize the damage and keep the bombs away from both the
energy node and the populated areas.
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Chapter 2: Understanding
C-UAS Purpose and Process
CANDICE CARTER

Introduction
Drone technologies are evolving rapidly and, not surprisingly,
counter-drone technologies are as well (Cole, 2019). The threat of
UAS used by insurgents for surveillance or to delivery of hazardous
payloads has increase
Each

industrial

revolution

has

included

changes

in

the

industrialization of warfare. An industrial revolution increases the
killing power, mobility, and production of weapons along with the
growing advancement of technology and population. The Fourth
Industrial Revolution has not been different then predecessors, it
continues to bring dramatic changes to how war is waged. The
addition of space and cyber as domains of battle has made our world
more complex than ever before. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
are unique, they can be used in all war domains (air, land, sea, space,
and cyber) in single or multiplex scenarios. The threat of UAS is the
strongest multi-domain battlefield weapon of our time. Countering
this emerging threat requires strength in understanding how UAS
is used for good and evil, the growing technological advancements
of UAS, and the ability to predict how UAS will evolve in the future.
The global market for C-UAS is to two billion dollars by 2024 (Global
Aerospace Techology Network, 2019).
In terms of complexity of C-UAS, the size of UAS needs to be
taken into consideration. Small UAS (sUAS) can be used in all war
and domestic domains. The sUAS, can carry a deadly payload, be
used to identify targets, confuse systems, and send critical target
information. sUAS are ideal for asymmetric warfare with the
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characteristics of being stealth, pervading, and inexpensive. The
complexity of sUAS as a multi-vector threat are endless, creating
the largest challenge in the Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(C-UAS) industry. Larger UAS, while limited in threat vectors, has
proven to be an asset in battle. Large UAS can also carry a deadly
payload, be used to identify targets, confuse systems, and send
critical information. However, they are predictable in execution of
these capabilities. UAS can also be segmented into private,
commercial, and military. These verticals have similarities and
differences, however overall the common characteristic is they are
a valid threat vector.
Figure 2-1: Flock of Drones in the Air

Source: (Ruff, 2017)
Driving forces for increasing the demand for C-UAS
UAS can be beneficial when used for good. However, to
understand the need for C-UAS, the level of threat of UAS poses
has to be considered. Low cost has makes UAS widely attainable at
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all levels of the population. The evolving risks of UAS used for evil,
in the military theater and homeland. Outside the military theater,
UAS can be used for attacks against critical infrastructure,
terroristic attacks and target intelligence collection, and assist
members of organized crime. Inside the military theater, small
commercial UAS can transport critical surveillance data and
explosives for a terrorist group. As far back as 2014, Daesh militants
use DJI quadrotors for reconnaissance against Kurdish fighters
(Defence iQ, 2019).
The traditional methods of interdiction serve as the base for the
evolution of disruptive technologies needed to build an equal,
eventually superior, countermeasure to rogue UAS. Currently when
a threating UAS situation can be mitigated, the threat has been met
with defense measures verses offensive countermeasures. Viable
threats and attacks of UAS has limited the C-UAS space to just
interception and detection of all sizes of UAS (Michel A. H., 2019).
Predicting the threat of UAS is far from perfection, with the gap
growing. Offensive security measures are ideal to have in place to be
consistently successful in defeating threats. The progression of CUAS technologies has the challenge of keeping up with the evolution
of UAS, defensively and offensively.
C-UAS and the Fourth Industrial Revolution
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is characterized by an
unprecedented speed, scale and scope of technological change,
with governments around the world struggling to adapt their
approaches to policy and regulation in the face of these
transformations (World Economic Forum, 2018). The Fourth
Industrial Revolution has not been different then predecessors, it
continues to bring dramatic changes to how war is waged. The
addition of space and cyber as domains of battle has made our world
more complex than ever before. UAS are the airspace Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) are unique, they can be used in all war
domains (air, land, sea, space, and cyber) in single or multiplex
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scenarios. The threat of UAS is the strongest multi-domain
battlefield weapon of our time. Countering this emerging threat
requires strength in understanding how UAS is used for good and
evil, the growing technological advancements of UAS, and the ability
to predict how UAS will evolve in the future. The global market for
C-UAS is to two billion dollars by 2024 (Global Aerospace Techology
Network, 2019).
In December 2018, a commercial UAS became a threat at Gatwick
Airport. With over sixty reports of UAS sightings near the runway,
airplanes (a prior industrial revolution invention) were under
possible attack from its next evolutionary competitor. The majority
of modern airports are not prepared to respond to an UAS attack,
nor prior to this global impacting incident, had not thought about
UAS as a threat. Ben Marcus, Chairman of AirMap, recommends
combining to an Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM) system with
a C-UAS system to complete the airspace operation environment
(Marcus, 2019). The integrated system, will supply information
related to any aircraft detected by C-UAS is exchanged with the
UTM system and remotely identified as either collaborative
(registered) or non-collaborative, requiring intervention (Marcus,
2019). Gatwick is one event of an airport facing the threat of a
rogue drone. Events of UAS threat have occurred globally including
New York and Dubai. While UAS is widely recognized as part of the
fourth industrial revolution, C-UAS needs to be acknowledged at all
levels as part of the revolution in order to evolve at the rapid rate
necessary to match the advancements of UAS. The use of one vector
of C-UAS will not solve an issue, other disruptive technologies will
have to be combined to thwart this fourth industrial revolution.
Figure 2-2: UTM and C-UAS
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Source: (Image: AirMap) (Marcus, 2019)
Disruptive technologies that will innovate the future of C-UAS
A disruptive technology is one that provides a non- typical
technological solution to simplify our everyday life. UAS can be
considered one of the ultimate disruptive technologies of our time.
UAS has been the most dynamic growth sector of the global
aerospace industry in the last one decade. The present day UAS is
an amalgamation of advances made in different domains of science
and technology, such as composite materials, aerodynamics,
communication systems, radars, propulsion systems, precision
navigation systems, sensors, digital signal processing and so on
(Sharma, 2017). These characteristics are true for C-UAS. When
combining C-UAS with artificial intelligence (another disruptive
technology), the ability to extend flights, identify and remember
objects, and understand and collect intelligence.
The difficultly of tasks for C-UAS grows almost daily as
technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace. At the time of this
writing, the effort to keep ahead of the curve at times is
overwhelming.
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Proven, is the instability of using one type of technology for
countering UAS. The traditional method of high-performance Radio
Frequency (RF) is a thing of the past. Deaf drones or drones that
do not follow the pattern of library of sounds for acoustic sensors
demonstrate RF is not effective as a countering method. Another
example is the combination of Electro-Optical systems (EO) with
Infrared Sensor (IR) cannot successfully distinguish a bird from an
airplane in broad daylight (Michel A. H., 2019). Thus, causing a great
deal of false positives, rendering the detection unreliable and
unusable. Detection technology must evolve to be able to properly
identify the target UAS despite weather, time of day, and/or sound
pollution. For example, at a large sporting event, the airspace may
be crowded with legitimate aerial cinematography drones that do
not pose a security risk (Michel A. H., 2019). In the military theater,
C-UAS system that cannot tell the difference between allied and
adversary unmanned aircraft could accidentally shoot down
friendly drones (Michel A. H., 2019) Therefore, the C-UAS system
will need to be able to read intent of the incoming UAS, forcing the
need for the disruptive technology of Artificial Intelligence (AI).
Applying countermeasures also comes with legal implications. In
the theater, peacetime verses wartime uses of C-UAS different
policies apply by country law. The method of C-UAS could also be
a factor in legality. If C-UAS is used as a matter of public safety
versus military engagement. Could innocent human life being at risk
outweigh a defensive measure?
The Need for Innovation of C-UAS
In

2016,

commercial

UAS

new

developments

included

waterproofing, robotic arms, and functionality to remotely control
the UAS from mobile device. There was the introduction of a pocket
size drone that could identify an object, remember it for tracking
at a later time. Today. commercial UAS technology has developed
to include sense and avoid capability, artificial intelligence to learn
patterns from collected data and run pre-programmed flight path.
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In 2020, commercial drones will have sharper picture/video quality,
greater storage, longer flight time, all packed into a device that is
smaller than an iPhone.
Military C-UAS has traditionally focused on RF and GPS. Future
military C-UAS will need to address speed, ease of installation,
precision detection, ease of mobility and versatility (large/small
UAS, swarms, etc.) Military C-UAS have focused on defending
against large UAS verses sUAS.
With the rapid innovation and use of commercial UAS, C-UAS
needs to not only match but exceed functionality to be a successful
combatant. The ideal future C-UAS will use artificial intelligence
(AI) algorithms that automate the detection, identification, locating,
and tracking of drones with minimal false detections, and directed
energy weapons that can mitigate multiple drones quickly and/or
simultaneously (Global Aerospace Techology Network, 2019).
There is a need integrate multiple technologies to combat the
multiply vectors of attack; for example, anti-swarm, complex
tracking, signal jamming, ability to be cellular controlled and
operate in a congested air traffic area. The commercial user
community would like the future C-UAS have functionality to locate
drone operators and operate on open architecture software that
allows for integration into existing security systems (Global
Aerospace Technology Network, 2019).
Figure 2-3: Black Sage UASX-L3 Automatic Drone Disruptor
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Source: (Black Sage, n.d.)
The Black Sage C-UAS, UASX-L3 Automatic Drone Disruptor, is
leading the market with functionality. The UASX-L3 detects, tracks,
identifies and disrupts UAVs using a new type of doppler Compact
Surveillance Radar (CSR), artificial intelligence and long-range video
tracking and RF jamming components (Black Sage, n.d.). Black Sage
was recently acquired by Acorn Growth Companies, a private equity
firm. This could impact the advancement and direction of Black
Sage. Other C-UAS start-up companies in Silicon Valley have felt
backlash in the form of protests and code deletion, based on
political and ethical beliefs of the employees.
UAS and C-UAS Qualify as the New Global Arms Race
At the end of World War II marked the beginning of the arms
race between the U.S., Russia, and respected allies to build the best
nuclear warfare program in the world. Starting in 1987, countries
came together and through a series of treaties and initiatives the
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global superpowers and their allies agreed to take steps to limit
and stop the creation of nuclear missiles and cap military wartime
inventory. For thirteen years, Russia and the U.S. did not change
their approach. Suspicions let to cracks in agreements, and slowly
the effort to control arms has crumbled. The new arms race is not
between two nation-states, it is become a global race among larger
players that threaten not only each other but are all face a common
unpredictable threat of terrorism.
Russia has developed a comprehensive strategy for using UAS
in warfare. The Russian military perceives this strategic approach
foremost as “no-contact warfare”, described as a war where Russian
military can defeat a hostile state without the engagement of
regular Russian forces (Sharma, 2017). February 2019, the anti-drone
forces development by Russia released their first mobile units, part
of the radio engineering forces armed with the “Kasta 2-2″ radar
and an automated air defense control system (ACS) (Bendett, 2019).
Kasta 2-2 uses landscape features combined with the ability to
monitor objects that fly at a low altitude with little false positives.
Russia’s “Silok” C-UAS can debilitate the control channels,
communications, and telemetry of sUAS. Another Russian C-UAS
solution, created by the Sozvezdiye Group, is a radio electronic
system based on artificial intelligence to fight illegal drones
(Bendett,

2019).

This

C-UAS

learns10,000-20,000

standard

situations to produce selective impacts on objects. Enabling this CUAS to make ‘friend or foe’ decisions based on an array of signs,
situations and the object’s behavioral characteristics (Bendett,
2019).
Currently the U.S. Air Force is embarking on a year of testing and
training of High Energy Laser Weapon Systems (HELWS) supplied
by Raytheon. According to Raytheon’s website, HELWS is an open
architecture laser weapon system that can work on land, in the
air and at sea, providing 360-degree coverage (Raytheon, 2019). In
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addition, the U.S. Air Force is testing Lockheed Martin’s Advanced
Test High Energy Asset (ATHENA), an anti-drone laser. ATHENA
has the capability to shoot down multiple fixed wing and rotary
drones. Raytheon’s defense customers are “likening drones to the
improvised explosive device (IED) situation 20 years ago, when we
saw an adversary take a readily available technology and weaponize
it in a low-cost way,” says Todd Probert, vice president of Raytheon
Intelligence, Information, and Services (Dulles, Virginia) (Cole, 2019).
Figure 2-4: Russia’s Kasta 2-2

Source: (Bendett, 2019)
Figure 2-5: U.S. High Energy Laser Weapon Systems (HELWS)
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Source: (Raytheon, 2019)
The Italian company, IDA Ingegneria Dei Sistemi, has created a
military grade system, NO-DRONE. The system has been tested in
China and in North America. NO-DRONE has been released in North
America by a third party, 34 North Drones, for all government and
civilian protection applications. NO-DRONE uses EMP, powerful
multiband jamming, GPS spoofing or live fire systems to disable,
redirect or destroy threats (UAS Weekly, 2019) Italy is not the only
smaller country exploring C-UAS. Singapore’s ST Engineering
Electronics Ltd. sells a 6.6-pound radar gun powered by a 24-pound
battery backpack that can jam a drone’s GPS signal and disrupt
the radio link to its operator (Wall, 2019). Diehl Defense has a fire
electronic laser that has a range of more than 0.6 miles and also
comes in a smaller, civil version with about half that range (Wall,
2019).
Figure 2–6: IDS NO-DRONE
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Source: (UAS Weekly, 2019)
China Central Television reported in September 2019, China
Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) has developed
a counter-drone system consisting of multiple weapons and
equipment, including land-based rockets and drone-hunting drones
that can shoot huge webs and vehicle-based detection devices
(Chan, 2019). In 2018, at the China Airshow CASIC showcased a
vehicle-based laser weapon called LW-30, which could use a
directional-emission high-energy laser to quickly intercept many
kinds of aerial targets (Chan, 2019). Early in 2018, in Abu Dhabi, the
Chinese “Silent Hunter”, the portable drone killing laser, can shoot
from 2.3 miles (Military Aerospace Electronics, 2018). Chinese stateowned Poly Technologies Inc. has a truck mounted drone downing
laser with range of up to 4 kilometers.
Figure 2-7: China’s LW-30
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Source: (Chan, 2019)
Conclusions
The rapidly growing industry of C-UAS is a needed force to
combat rogue UAS activity. C-UAS are used to locate, track and
neutralize unwelcomed UAS. The growing need for C-UAS spans
from the commercial to the military space, since the threat of
unidentified UAS in the civil and military theater increases. The
is not an international standard for the design of C-UAS and not
all C-UAS systems work as advertised. Along with evolving C-UAS
technology, global standards and policies will need to be developed.
But make no bones about it, the need is being addressed. From
jamming rifles to ground installations that fire nets, a new report
lays out the expansive Wild West of anti-drone tech entitled: “Report
on 537 Anti-Drone Systems Shows How Wild the Market Has
Become.” (Gault, 2019) Bard University also has addressed the
Counter Drone Systems 2nd Edition. (Michel A. H., 2019)[1]
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Chapter 3: Developing a
C-UAS Strategy Goals,
Options, Target Analyses,
Process Selection,
Operational Metrics
Approaches to Countering
UAS Activities (First
Principles)
H.C. MUMM

Student Learning Objectives
The student will gain knowledge on the concepts and framework
as it relates to the process of developing an end-to-end CounterUnmanned Aerial System (C-UAS). The student will gain knowledge
through real-world examples and a case study, allowing the student
to use critical thinking skills to apply learning to multiple C-UAS
situations.
History
When drones became dangerous, counter-drone responses had
their start. One of the more famous counter-drone operations was
waged against the German V-1 Buzz Bomb. Due to its speed and
size, this was a difficult drone to destroy. The British air defense
used anti-aircraft guns, static balloons where the cable was the kill
mechanism, and fighter aircraft. (Military-history-now, 2015) Only
the fastest fighters would do, such as the de Havilland Mosquito.
British fighter aircraft would be alerted and guided to the V-1 by
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ground radar. Once the fighters intercepted the V-1, they would
place their wingtip under the wingtip of the V-1. The disruption in
the airflow would tip the V-1, which would cause the primitive gyro
stabilization to tumble and send the V-1 crashing to the ground. The
fighters would also shoot down the V-1, which was a risky decision
as the V-1 could detonate and also destroy the attacking fighter.
Post-World War II, counter-drone tactics have been mostly antiaircraft guns.
C-UAS Analysis Framework
1. Analyzing the Threat
Careful study will allow for an in-depth analysis of the threat, and
thus a critical first step in the process. By answering the questions
in the C-UAS analysis phase, the requirements will be determined,
and a solution can be devised to build an appropriate counterdrone system. Mistakes in this first step can result in developing
an ineffective system or a system inappropriate for the job. There
are several types of questions that need to be answered within
the analysis steps: what is the nature of the threat; what are the
aerodynamic abilities of the threat; what is the overall design of the
threat; is it a singular or multiple entity threat? As well as what is the
navigation method used by the threat?
Understanding the Purpose and Weaponization of the Threat
The analysis needs to include answers to the following questions:
What is the nature of the drone threat? Is it just surveillance?
Is it reconnaissance? Is it directing fire support? Is it a Kamikaze
drone? A Kamikaze drone can be as small as a commercial
quadcopter with explosives onboard to a significantly larger aircraft
or even cruise missile. Does the drone have the ability to release
weapons and return home? If the vehicle is equipped with a
warhead, can it be detonated in flight? Is the drone delivering
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contraband items over a barrier? Small drones are commonly used
to drop contraband drugs over prison walls (Biesecke, 2011). Once
the nature of the threat is determined, the next step is to determine
the aerodynamic capabilities of the threat.
Understanding the Aerodynamics of the Threat
These questions should include as much information as possible
about the offending drone (s): How fast? How high? What is the
range? What is its payload capacity? As the speed of the drones
increases, the potential response methods decrease. As these
questions are answered, the expense and level of effort to develop
the defense can be determined. Additional questions that need to
be asked include: How can it be tracked? Does the drone use stealth
technology? Stealth technology may be applied to radar, infrared,
visual, or auditory signatures. Most of the time, the drone is
considered stealthy just because of its size and that it is made from
material with little or no metal except for the avionics. Another
component of a drone’s signature is speed. It is very common for
modern radars to be dependent on the Doppler Effect for detection
and tracking. Slow objects can fall into the notch designed to
eliminate ground clutter (vehicles) and birds. Objects that are not
moving towards or away from the radar (called the beam) can
disappear altogether from the radar scope (Saabgroup, 2018).
Understanding the Air Vehicle Design of the Threat
Air vehicle design is an important factor in creating an effective
defensive response. Questions need to be asked to determine what
materials were used to construct the aircraft. Is it metal, plastic,
or a composite? Non-metallic aircraft are more susceptible to a
variety of counter technologies, including tactical lasers. For the
main body and flight surfaces: what will it take to breach the body
or disable the flight surface? Does the vehicle have exposed rotors
or propeller that can be attacked? Rotors and propellers can be
destroyed by lasers, broken by impact, or snagged by a net. Does
the vehicle has exposed electronics or electronics that can be easily
jammed, interfered with, or destroyed using lasers, jammers, radio
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waves, or by overpowering a frequency? Can the warhead (if
equipped) be detonated in flight?
Is it One Drone or Multiple Drones?
Are there current intelligence reports that indicate the tactics
that are or are expected to be employed by the enemy? Are they
using one type of drone or multiple types? Are these drones
operating independently, together, or using swarm tactics? As the
numbers of drones increase, so does the complexity of the
response. Drone tactics, techniques, and procedures are largely
unwritten as the technology is adopted and adapted into the civilian
and military arena at a rate of speed that has not allowed for indepth, intelligent gathering, databasing or analysis to occur.
Understanding the Navigation
Threat control and navigation methodology can be fundamental
to the potential solution. What frequencies is the drone using for
control, information gathering, and distribution? What navigation
platform does the drone use? A great variety of drones use either
GPS (Global Positioning System) or GLONASS (Global Satellite
Navigation System) or both. Some drones are extremely dependent
on these navigational signals. Other drones have an IMU (inertial
measurement unit) that provides both altitude and location
references. The smaller the IMU, the higher the drift rate usually
is and thus the dependence on GPS type signals for frequent
corrections. (UNOOSA, 2019)

2. Solution Limitations

Before starting on a proposed response solution, limitations must
be identified. Many limitations are governmental in origin, while
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others are weather or terrain-related, based on the location for the
deployment of the counter-drone solution.
Frequency Limitations
Many world governments control the frequency spectrum for
their country. In the U.S., that control comes under the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) (Commission-Licensing, 2019).
UAV operators can passively listen to the frequency spectrum, but
as soon as the solution involves transmitting on a particular
frequency or frequencies, then permission and approval must be
sought from the FCC (or similar agency) for that transmission. This
is especially true when it comes to using jammers as part of the
solution as “Federal law prohibits the operation, marketing, or sale
of any type of jamming equipment, including devices that interfere
with cellular and Personal Communication Services (PCS), police
radar, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and wireless networking
services (Wi-Fi)” (FCC, Jammer Enforcement, 2019). When it comes
to exemptions: “Only federal agencies are eligible to apply for and
receive authorization” (Commission-Licensing, 2019).

Smaller

drones often fall into the Wi-Fi set of frequencies, while larger
drones often use a variety of radio or satellite frequencies. There
are other countries in the world where this limitation is not as
restrictive. Combat operations also open up the solution to a
variety of jammers. During combat operations, it is easier to
coordinate the jamming of data linked frequencies than it is to
coordinate GPS jamming, due to the dependence that U.S. military
forces have on GPS. As more GPS jam-resistant equipment makes it
into military services, this limitation of GPS jamming will decrease.
Global Governance
In addition to particular frequencies, airspace is also controlled
in many countries. In the U.S. that airspace control is governed by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Drones in the U.S. are
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currently limited to 400ft AGL (above ground level) unless otherwise
approved by the FAA. There are at least two drone-on-drone
counter methodologies that would also fall under this limitation.
Other countries have different limitations, and some countries have
little or no limitations defined at this time. Any drone defense
system will need to be coordinated with the host country or the
combatant command within a war zone. Mutual coordination is
especially true for any projectile or tactic that destroys the UAS,
commonly referred to as a kinetic kill mechanism.
If the area to be defended is urban or suburban versus rural,
the kill mechanism may be further limited; especially kinetic kill
mechanisms. Bullets or missiles that are deployed and do not hit
the intended target and can potentially injure or kill someone, and
if the drone is large enough, the drone itself may crash into people
or property. There are two caveats to consider when determining
the risks of kinetic C-UAS against a lethal drone. One, the drone
may cause much more damage if it is not destroyed, and two, even
though an urban environment has a high population density, the
odds of a drone crashing on an individual is surprising low. This
is because people are physically a small portion of the area in an
urban environment and often protected from this type of impact by
buildings and other sturdy structures. This is especially true of all
but the largest of drones; even they have limited mass per square
foot of impact area. (C. Horowitz, 2016).
Legal Ramifications
Country, State, and local laws regarding drones and counterdrone operations are proliferating at a great rate around the world
with no consistent theme. Some counter-drone technologies have
been designated as illegal in some countries while not being
recognized in other countries. Additionally, there are anti-hacking
and technology laws that affect aircraft (in general) that can impact
the use of certain counter-drone technologies. Hacking a drone to
render it safe seems like a technically good idea; however, the legal
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ramifications can be significant, including being charged with grand
larceny for drones ranging in price from $400 to $1,000. According
to 18 U.S.C. § 32, it is a felony to willfully damage or destroy aircraft
(§ 130i., 2019). Although many courts have chosen to sidestep these
cases, a counter-drone engagement could subject the operator to
civil, criminal, and tort liabilities. In the U.S., criminal and liability
limits are disclosed, but these penalties (many severe) are not always
disclosed in other countries. It is critical for the solution to adhere
to the national and local laws including getting proper permissions
or exemptions before any drone engagement. A major exemption
falls under 6 U.S.C. § 130i Protection of certain facilities and assets
from unmanned aircraft (§ 130i., 2019). Similar laws give the Coast
Guard and Secretary of Energy Counter UAV authorization. Other
countries are developing their own laws/rules for facility and asset
protection.
Atmospheric Limitations
Weather is another limitation of a C-UAS solution. Atmospheric
considerations are a key element in support of UAS flight testing.
The local atmospheric environment (wind speed and direction, wind
shear, temperature, precipitation, and turbulence) must be
characterized and understood (Edward Teets, 1998).

In regions

where cloud cover and/or fog are prevalent for a significant portion
of the year, most sensors used for the identification of UAS are
significantly degraded.
3. Developing a Counter-drone Response:
Range
The range required for detection and interdiction of the drone
or drones must be determined. If the drone can release weapons,
that adds to the range required for detection and interdiction. The
faster the incoming threat, the lower the approach, the larger the
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area needed to defend, the more lethal the weapon portion; the
further out the drone needs to be detected and interdicted.
There is also the need to identify the number of response layers
for the appropriate range. Will there be two or more response
layers or just a one-point defense layer? Will there be a shoot-lookshoot requirement to produce the desired probability of kill on the
drone? If there is a wave of attacking drones, more than one layer
of defense is recommended.
Detection
There are several passive and active detection technologies
available to include as part of the solution. Electronic Signal
Monitoring (ESM) is a very desirable passive detection system. ESM
systems detect the communication frequencies of the drone and its
associated ground station. Depending upon the antenna sensitivity
and the output power of the drone, these signals can be discovered
at significant ranges. The key advantages of these systems are is
that the ground station controlling the drone may be located and
engaged and that the systems are numerous (İ, 2017).
When selecting a signal detection system, all of the potential
frequency ranges must be considered to counter all of the potential
threats. If only a sample of frequencies is known, then the solution
might be lacking during execution. The systems that receive
commercial

drone

frequency

bands

are

proliferating

and

significantly increasing in capability. Additionally, these frequency
detection systems can quickly identify the signals for the drone
and ground station. Some frequency detection systems include the
ability to produce a digital fingerprint that can be leveraged as
evidence for later prosecution. However, these frequency detection
systems that are available on the open market lack the frequency
bands of the more sophisticated commercial drones as well as the
military drone frequency bands.
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There are acoustic sensors to detect drone sound signatures, but
because of their short-range and limitations in noisy environments,
they can be part of a solution; however, it is rare that a single sensor
technique be a part of a complete in the overall C-UAS solution.
A key part of detection is identification. Other passive types of
detectors such as long-range cameras, IR (infrared) sensors, and
SWIR (short-wave infrared) can provide the necessary identification
(Red-ID) that the object is a drone and a threat. There are software
packages available that can provide a much quicker and longerrange identification than a human operator. Additionally, some
detectors include powerful illuminators within a frequency band
that provide a stronger return and fewer false alarms. Illuminators
in the infrared bands are invisible to the eye.
Active detection is primarily centered on various radar types.
Conventional military radars pick up large and fast-moving targets
easily and reject slow or non-moving targets to reduce false alarms.
There are some new tactical radars that are designed to pick up
the smaller, slower set of drones in addition to the larger ones.
One radar variety uses an active electronically scanned array (AESA),
and another variation uses a continuous wave radar. The latter is
currently range limited, but technology can be extended (İ et al.,
2017).
4. Interdiction
Small Drones
As small drones have proliferated, so too have the small drone
counter systems. An initial favorite is the Radio Frequency (RF)
jammer. These are designed to jam the control uplink for the drone.
If a drone frequency is successfully jammed, there are multiple
possible outcomes. One possible outcome could be the drone flying
back to home base, which would be useful in capturing the
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operator. However, if the operator designated the target as the
home base, this method would be ineffective. A second outcome
might be that the drone makes a controlled landing. The least
desirable outcome is that the drone exhibits uncontrolled behavior
and crashes.
A GPS spoofer can gain a type of control over the drone by
manipulating the GPS location. The drone can be directed to a safe
location for capture and de-arming if necessary.
Figure 3-1: XBee Chip

Source: (BBC, 2016)
Hacking a drone is facilitated by having multiple manufacturers
using similar avionic designs and somewhat predictable drone
behaviors. A relatively inexpensive set up like a telemetry module
by Mr. Rodday using an XBee chip acquires the unique key and
takes command of the drone, rendering it harmless. This action
is significantly more difficult if the chip has been encrypted. (BBC,
2016). Nets are an effective tool against the typical small commercial
drones as long as they are not too fast. See Figure 3-2. There are

56 | Chapter 3: Developing a C-UAS Strategy Goals, Options, Target
Analyses, Process Selection, Operational Metrics Approaches to Countering

several varieties of employment: e.g., another small drone can carry
a small net cannon and launch the net at another drone.
Figure 3-2: UAV Net

Source: (Openworksengineering, 2019)
This methodology usually comes with an attached line that allows
the shooter to gently lower the offending drone to the ground. Nets
can also be launched from the ground using equipment that looks
like a bazooka. Less reliable unless used by an expert are the nets
deployed by a shotgun shell.
A relatively inexpensive but effective system is a kamikaze type
drone. See Figure 3-3. This can protect a fairly large area and can
“shoot down” a variety of small drones. The key challenge is they
must hit a vulnerable part of the target drone. As opposed to a
missile, these types of systems can reattack if they miss.
Figure 3-3: Kamikaze Drone Example
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Source: (Dormehl, 2019)
This capability is a function of the target drone speed. Another
proven method is the use of a predatory bird to attack and
potentially capture the drone.

Though proven effective, this

method requires a high level of maintenance.
Medium Drones
The medium drone classification is mostly made up of military
drones designed for surveillance. The world market is seeing more
and more kamikaze type drones entering the medium-sized
classification. Iran has placed significant emphasis in this area and
has a variety of direct attack drones.
Some of the same counter techniques used for small drones are
also effective on medium drones. RF jamming, for example, can be
effective, albeit with some limitations. Medium drones generally
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require more RF jamming power and across a variety of frequency
bands. However, once in the target area, they may no longer need
external control from a ground station. These drones can proceed
to the target coordinates on their own. If the attack drone requires
GPS/GLONASS, this can be jammed to limit precision, but the drone
will land somewhere.
A more direct counteraction is required to be effective against
this class of drones to include the use of missiles, bullets, and lasers.
The type of missile to be used is dependent on the size of the
offending drone and its signature. Generally, medium-sized drones
have a very small infrared signature, which makes it difficult to
deploy IR missiles as a countermeasure. This category of drones
also has a limited radar signature. Radar guided missiles are most
effective when they have their own terminal radar and can be
guided by a more powerful ground radar data uplink. Surfacelaunched AMRAAM (SLAMRAAM) is an example of this type of
weapon. The SLAMRAAM is no longer used by the U.S. military
due to priority changes; however, there are indications that other
countries will employ these weapons in a C-UAS scenario. An
effective weapon is a laser-guided missile that does not have the
signature limitation that the other missiles do, and it has a very
limited countermeasure set to work against.
Bullets tend to be a last line of defense due to their limited range.
There are two techniques that can be effective. First is the hail of
bullets typically from a Gatling gun type system. The second is
from a rapid-fire cannon that has bullets that fragment just before
hitting the drone. There are 25mm bullets that fit into this desired
capability. As a point of consideration, as the area to be defended
increases, so does the required number of gun sites and ammunition
needs.
High-Powered Microwave (HPM) systems directly attack the
electronics onboard the drone. Depending on the power and range,
the system disrupts the data links, and eventually, the actual
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circuitry as the power increases, and the range decreases. These
systems can be indiscriminate, so a focused system and a clear
background are important. See Figure 3-4.
Lasers, because of their price tag, are normally limited to military
applications. These systems are getting more and more powerful
and, therefore, more effective and capable of engaging at longer
ranges. These systems target a vulnerable flight control on the
drone. See Figure 3-5.
Large Drones
This classification includes both commercial and military drones;
however, it is the military drones that represent the threat. [
Figures 3-6 and 3-7] These military drones range from slower,
higher altitude, surveillance drones (some with weapon capabilities)
to stealthy fighter-type drones. The latter of these two is more
dangerous and more difficult to eliminate.

Figure 3-4 High Powered Microwave System
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Source: (Trevithick, 2019)
Figure 3-5: Laser Sensor Ball
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Source: (spazio-news.it, 2019)
The flight control is damaged, which then sends the drone out of
control and to an eventual crash. There are now several versions of
laser weapons available.
Manned attack aircraft are also included in this response
category, especially for cruise missile type systems. For attack
drones that fly under 200 knots, a propeller-driven light attack
aircraft with an onboard gun system is sufficient. Once the speed
rises about 200 knots, a jet-powered fighter-type aircraft is
required. While missiles and guns are available, generally, the most
effective choice is the gun for single drone engagements. In a
situation where there are several attacking high-speed drones, the
fighter aircraft will be required to use its missiles and follow up with
guns or missiles on the ones that survive the initial response.
Some of the defenses for medium-sized drones carry over into
the large drones. Defensive systems designed for attacking manned
aircraft become prominent in this large drone category.
Figure 3-6: Iranian Drone
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Source: (Singh, 2019)
Figure 3-7: Chinese Drones on Parade

Source: (George, 2019)
Jamming systems, though somewhat effective on some drones in
this category, generally fall off as a primary defense system because
the satellite uplink can be jammed. Jamming the uplink is a typical
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point defense solution unless it is space-based or has an included
airborne relay. Bullets can no longer be used as a primary point
defense system due to their short range and limited altitude
coverage.
High-end missile systems, such as the US Patriot system, can be
brought to bear for these type threats. Typically, missile systems
are an early choice because they are already in the military
inventory. For wealthy countries, the poor cost exchange of using
expensive missiles against often less expensive UAS is not much of
a factor. The potential cost of damage from an enemy UAS often
outweighs the cost of the missile. Interdiction success is the
primary metric. Stealthy drones are the most challenging, but
acquisition ranges, though shorter, are typically sufficient for a
successful engagement. The most significant limitation of this
drone response is the amount of area that is being protected is
relatively small.
Directed energy weapons, though of limited use against manned
aircraft, are becoming a weapon of choice for larger drones.
Directed energy weapons include high powered microwaves and
lasers, which are considered point defense systems. If the attack
corridors are known and limited, then these types of systems can be
set up like a picket fence formation to protect a much larger area
and engage threats much earlier. Of the two, the high-powered
microwave systems tend to be more effective due to the short
engagement time required. Lasers often must dwell on the target
for several seconds to be effective. Against the slower end of the
large drone category, lasers can be extremely effective. Faster
aircraft are more problematic for current lasers, but as the lasers
become more powerful, the dwell time required will go down, and
this type of weapon system will be effective against the fast-moving
UAS in this category.
Manned aircraft become a primary part of the defense to protect
64 | Chapter 3: Developing a C-UAS Strategy Goals, Options, Target
Analyses, Process Selection, Operational Metrics Approaches to Countering

larger areas and engage the threat much earlier. Large drones,
including the stealthy ones, can be easily terminated by a fighter
jet as these drones have no self-awareness and have limited
maneuverability. Since these drones usually have no weapons to
fight back, they can be attacked and re-attacked with impunity.
Fighter pilots quickly become drone aces. The most challenging
scenario is a swarm of stealthy attack drones. Fighter squadrons
must determine if there are enough missiles and gun rounds to
take out all of the attacking drones before the drones reach their
intended targets (U.S. Air Force Major Jay Snyder, 2019).
Case Study
The case study below reviews the swarm drone attack in Saudi
Arabia on the morning of September 14, 2019. Although the event
is real and well documented, the analysis, limitations, and solutions
are fictional and designed to demonstrate the C-UAS analysis
framework.
Background:
On the morning of September 14, 2019, two state-owned Saudi
Arabian oil production sites were attacked. The Abqaiq and Khuraid
oil fields are the largest oil production facilities in the world. These
two plants account for almost 8% of the world’s oil supply (bbc,
2019). The attacks were conducted using drones and cruise missiles
from an unknown origin. “According to the Saudi Defense Ministry,
eighteen drones and seven cruise missiles were fired at the
kingdom” (Frantzman, 2019). Defense News stated, “If ever the
world needed a reality check for the threat posed by drone swarms
and low-altitude cruise missiles, this was it” (Frantzman, 2019).
The news reports differ as to the specific number and types of
drones and missiles used in the attack. Four missiles did hit their
intended oil field targets; however, it is unclear how many did not
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complete the mission. (Frantzman, 2019). This was a major
escalation in UAS attacks given the type and number of utilized
drones.

There also continues to be speculation as to the

geographical origins of the attack. Previous drone attacks had come
from Yemen and were limited in size, scope, and range. It is widely
believed by Saudi Arabia and the United States that Iran was the
source; however, Iran has not claimed credit for this attack.
What is remarkable is that despite the heavy defenses of the
Abqaiq oil field, none of the systems or technologies thwarted the
attack. The facility is believed to have air defenses that include
an American Patriot system, a Swiss-made 35 mm anti-aircraft
Oerlikon cannon in conjunction with a Skyguard radar, and a
French-designed Shahine, which is a surface to air missile system.
(Frantzman, 2019). The Patriot missile defense system is the only
component specifically designed to defend against UAVs. It is highly
possible that the drones were guided using on-board sensors and
not GPS programmed, which, given the infrastructure of an oil
processing facility, was quite advantageous.
If US-supplied air defenses were not oriented to defend against
an attack from Iran, that’s incomprehensible. If they were, but they
were not engaged, that’s incompetent. If they simply weren’t up to
the task of preventing such precision attacks, that’s concerning, said
Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. Ambassador to Israel. (DM, 2019).
Brig. Gen. Pini Yungman believes that the “primary challenge in
stopping an attack like that in Saudi Arabia is not the ability to shoot
down the threats, but rather to detect things that can sneak in near
the ground” (DM, 2019).
Creating a Solution
Analyzing the Threat:
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In this case study, the threat determination is more speculative
than defined. Iran denied launching the attack, but the weapon
systems were most definitely Iranian in design and possibly in
manufacturing. The origin of the drones was determined by these
same drones being previously used against Saudi Arabia and the
recovered wreckage. There is some speculation that one type of
drone was used against the Patriot defense system, while the
second type of UAS was used against the oil facility, based on the
wreckage from numerous sites. The recovered delta-winged drone
was determined to be most likely from a Toofan Iranian drone or a
similar design class with a greater range.

Toofan Drone
The Toofan drones are a series of drones developed and used
by Iran specifically for suicide missions. Iran does not publish
information about the drones it builds and designs. The Toofan
drone is considered small and is known to be very fast – up to
250km/hr. One of the advantages is its’ undetectable launch. All of
these features make it difficult for an effective C-UAS response. See
Figure 3-8.
Figure 3-8: Toofan Drone
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Source: (“Iran Suicide Drones,” 2019)
Industry analysts who have seen the Toofan describe it having
a small radar cross-section and appearing to be made with
lightweight radar-absorbing materials and guided by cutting edge
avionics. It can fly for over one hour. There is also a front-facing
camera in the nosecone which transmits live images until the
moment of impact. All of these characteristics make the Toofan a
very effective suicide drone (memri, 2019).
Although the Toofan has a small radar signature, the estimated
speed of approximately 135 knots places it in the detectable range.
The other possible drone used in the attack was most likely a
Yemeni Houthi militia Quds-1 cruise missile (memri, 2019).
Possible Cruise Missiles
Cruise missiles are slower than traditional missiles, fly at lower
altitudes, and are small – all radar-evading advantages. Another
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advantage is that cruise missiles are typically lower in price than
other types of missiles. (armscontrolcenter, 2017) Cruise missiles
can be launched from almost any location: by land, from the air, or
an ocean vessel (armscontrolcenter, 2017). These types of missiles
can have multiple guidance systems depending upon the design.
The missiles can be completely pre-programmed for GPS flight or
can be guided by an operator using a forward-positioned camera.
Quds-1 Missile
Initially thought to be designed in Yemen by the Houthi, the
Quds-1 cruise missile is powered by a Czech built turbojet engine.
See Figure 3-9. However, based on an Iranian industry analyst, the
Qud-1

might

have

been

developed

and

designed

in

Iraq

(armscontrolcenter, 2017). The Iranians have been developing
several different types of missiles for the past few decades. The
Quds-1 is smaller than the Soumar and Hoveyzeh missiles and has
less thrust than the Ya Ali missile. (armscontrolcenter, 2017). The
Quds-1 appears to be primarily made out of metal, based on the
wreckage. The signature is likely small but in line with other cruise
missile signatures (Hinz, 2019).
Figure 3-9: Quds-1 Cruise Missile
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Source: (Hinz, 2019)
Potential DIANA Missile Usage
Since little is known about the Quds-1 cruise missile besides the
suspected range of 425 miles, the DIANA target cruise missile can
be used as a surrogate for analysis since it has the same engine and
is approximately the same size (Hinz, 2019). This gives the Quds-1
a suspected speed of 330-350 knots. Manufactured by Equipaer
Industria Aeronautica, the DIANA has a flight altitude variance of
10m – 8,000m and is designed for high speed / high
maneuverability. It is advertised to have a maximum speed of 380
mph (equipaer, 2011).
Tactical Analysis:
The oil facility attack demonstrated a precise and sophisticated
attack utilizing multiple drones with different attack profiles to
multiple locations within a small amount of time. It is suspected
that multiple Toofan drones first attacked the Patriot radar,
followed by additional Toofan drones and Quds-1 cruise missiles
attacking the oil facilities. The Toofan’s optical final guidance could
have been employed. That would mean the human controller(s)
would have to be part of the attack. The Quds-1 most likely uses an
IMU and GPS for guidance (Hinz, 2019). This is consistent with what
is known about their anti-ship cruise missiles. The attackers used
low-cost attack vehicles specifically designed to evade radar. The
attackers knew the specific locations for the radar defenses and the
overall defenses of both facilities. Additionally, the attackers used
a combination of manned and unmanned systems – but no human
support was physically located at either oil field.
Solution Limitations:
In this scenario, the use of the Patriot radar and patriot missile
response, coupled with little intelligence against an unknown
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number of targets, limited the effectiveness of the system. It has
been reported that the guards at the facility attempted to use their
rifles and handguns to defend the installation (DM, 2019).
Preservation of Existing Infrastructure
Saudi Arabia’s oil fields have high value and are in a protected
area, which is relatively remote; there are fewer limitations on the
potential solution. As this is an industrial site, the solution needs
to consider minimal damage to the physical facilities as well as the
electronic and communication systems of the facility infrastructure.
Returning to the concept of not incurring damage to the physical
facilities, mitigation plans need to be developed if friendly or
threatening drones are destroyed over the oil fields. There should
be special care taken to consider any combustible materials.
Governance
Additionally, military and commercial air traffic need to be
accounted for in the plan. If GPS/GLONASS jamming is to be part of
the solution, it needs to be coordinated and approved by the Saudi
government. The oil fields are owned by the Saudi government;
this fact should assist in any governance being written, altered or
waivered to protect this critical infrastructure.
Atmospheric Limitations
Several atmospheric limitations exist in the Middle East Region.
The weather in Saudi Arabia is normally sunny with mixed or no
cloud cover, and the week of September 8 – 14, 2019, the weather
in this region averages from 80 – 107 degrees Fahrenheit. The days
are coolest just before midnight until approximately 7 am. During
September, the dew point average is 6 %. Abqaiq skies experience
cloud cover between 7-29 % of the time for this month
(weatherspark.com, 2019). In this region, there are sand storms,
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heatwaves and even fog in the air near the ground. These
conditions don’t preclude laser solutions, but it does have an impact
on them. Consideration should be made to elevating the laser above
the ground if it is part of the system, possibly in a guard tower
or in an airborne platform. The topography is considered to have
modest variations with a 1,270 ft variation for a 50-mile radius.
A Multi-Layered Counter Drone Response Plan
The multiple drones used in the Saudi oil field attacks are
considered medium drones; therefore, the solution should consider
all appropriately sized and quantity countermeasures. The
countermeasure response should account for multiple drones
attacking at once; more than one type of drone; with one drone
being relatively high speed; and a sprawling soft infrastructure to be
protected; all lead to more than one layer of defense and that the
first engagement should far enough away to allow for an assessment
and engagement of leakers before they can reach the facility. As the
first layer of defense is extended out, the larger the engagement arc
distance grows.
For this case study, the first layer should be about 25 miles out
from the protected area. This perimeter allows for advancing
targets and receding targets, as well as enough time to coordinate
the second layer response. The proximity of the coastline is a factor
in the system placement. The expanse of the perimeter precludes
the use of shorter-range systems because of the number of sites
required. Bullets, lasers, and high-powered microwaves concede to
missile-based solutions at this range. Ground-based missile systems
are a more practical choice for protection than aircraft-based
missile systems. The cost of the aircraft and pilot patrolling the
airspace becomes astronomical for an irregular threat.
The range for the point defense second layer needs to be far
enough out to interdict the drone and not have it come down within
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the facility boundaries; while at the same time not creating an arc
distance that is too big not to be cost-effective. In this case that
range would be approximately 5 miles to account for the cruise
missile type attack drone. With the shorter coverage zone, the
variety of shorter-range systems can be considered.
Detection
Detection is one of the more challenging portions of the solution.
At least one of the threat drones is a low altitude ingress type
drone, and therefore the detection system needs to be elevated.
The Quds-1 is unlikely to be transmitting any signal for an ESM
type system. The Toofan may or may not be transmitting. The
interdiction system selected needs a precise location for weapon
guidance, and since sensors in the light spectrum have too short of a
range for this protection ring, the best choice is a radar type system.
The next decision is the type of elevation method. Is the radar
system on a tethered balloon or an extendable arm or a fixed tower?
Due to the risk of sand storms, a tethered balloon is not the best
solution. For maintenance reasons and sand storm considerations,
the extendable arm is preferable over the fixed tower. Although
stationed on the outer perimeter, the radar needs to be effective
across the entire facility.
Interdiction
Interdiction is best done when layering defense technologies,
methodologies, and systems. Numerous scenarios need to be
considered when designing an effective counter-drone defense
solution. Combination systems can be more effective, especially
when defending against different types of drones. As an example,
the Toofan type drone is more susceptible to a directed energy
weapon, whereas the Quds-1 cruise missile is more susceptible to a
hard kill. Each layer should have overlapping interdiction systems
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to preclude multiple attack drones attempting to overwhelm a
single sector. Additionally, if ground missiles are part of the overall
solution, then, the number of ground stations, missiles and support
personnel need to be considered as part of cost and maintenance.
Graphical representation of the anticipated engagement envelope
can be particularly useful when determining point positioning. Most
engagement envelopes are not a circle; effective engagement zones
look much more egg-shaped. The narrow end is drawn for the
receding targets and the wide end for the advancing targets. The
faster the incoming target, the more the egg shifts such that the
receding target zone gets smaller. The faster the intercepting
missile, the larger the egg gets, and the greater the receding target
capability (Snyder, 2019).
Integration
When dealing with a variety of interdiction methods, the system
needs to be evaluated so that no one part of the system conflicts
with any other part of the system. It would be counterproductive
to have a communications system that is susceptible to the jamming
solution. If an HPM is being integrated, it should be analyzed to
make sure it will not damage other system components.
Additionally, shots fired at receding targets should not cause
collateral damage to the property being protected. All components
should be tested with every other component to validate that all
components work harmoniously together and do not harm the
home facility (U.S. Air Force Major Jay Snyder, 2019)

The Chosen Solution:
Figure 3-10 shows a SAAB Giraffe AMB Radar. The Giraffe is a 3D
detection system that can detect small, low, and slow targets as well
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as aircraft, cruise missiles, rockets, artillery, etc. The radar is on an
extendable arm to increase the detection range of low-level targets.
Outer Layer
Figure 3-10: SAAB Giraffe AMB Radar

Source: (Saabgroup, 2018)
The radar system operates out to approximately 65 nautical
miles. The small signature of the Toofan drone reduces the
maximum detection and tracking range of the system. SAAB
demonstrated detection and tracking of a small drone with a
signature of .001 square meters at a range of 4 km. (SAAB, 2019)
Extrapolating this information to the Toofan (using the Harpy
drone as a surrogate) delivers an approximate detection and
tracking range of 25 km. By placing the radars approximately 40 km
apart, there is good detection range throughout the arc with small
notches. See Figure 3-11. (US Army, 2019)
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Figure 3-11: Toofan Detection System

Source: (US Army, 2019)

Interdiction is provided by a ground-launched version of the
AMRAAM-ER missile. It comes in a six-box configuration that can
be ground or vehicle-mounted. This is called NASAMS II (National
Advanced Surface to Air Missile System). The AMRAAM-ER is a
Mach 4 missile with an approximate range of 27 nautical miles (50
km). (globalsecurity.org, 2019) The missile launch systems will also
be 24 miles (40 km) apart to provide dual coverage to the arc.
Twelve missiles per site deliver the capability to shoot down up to 24
drones in any given sector before requiring a reload (US Army, 2019)
Based on the potential threat approach directions, an initial arc of
270 degrees will be used for the outer layer. The arc can be reduced
or increased depending on enemy tactics.
The StarStreak II is a Mach 4 class missile system is designed for
a kinetic kill with a range of approximately four nautical miles. It
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employs three tungsten darts that are laser-guided and immune to
all known countermeasures (Sparks, 2017). See Figure 3-12.

Inner Layer
Figure 3-12: Stark-Streak II Missile System

Source: (Sparks, 2017)
This permits the engagement of targets with extremely small
signatures. (Minister, 2008) To complement this system for the
inner layer is a High-Powered Microwave (HPM) system designed to
fry the internal electronics of the attacking drone.
The system will be deployed on a fixed turret with an 8-missile
configuration. The turrets will be remote-controlled from the
Command Center. They will be deployed at six nautical mile
increments around the inner 5-mile ring. This provides continuous
and overlapping coverage. The typical concept of operations would
use a shoot-look-shoot methodology. The concept of operations
is facilitated by the speed of the missile. The StarStreak II is a
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very versatile weapon system and is capable of handling inner layer
defense against a large variety of medium and large drones.
To complement the StarStreak system for the inner layer is a
High-Powered Microwave (HPM) system designed to destroy the
internal electronics of the attacking drone. There are two viable
systems for this particular solution: Boeing’s Thor and BAE Systems’
HPM. See Figure 3-13.
Figure 3-13 Example of a High Powered Microwave System

Source: (Vavasseur, 2019)
Since this will be a component of the inner layer of defense, the
BAE Systems’ HPM is a logical
choice. The Boeing system is overkill for the inner layer due to its
size and power output (Vavasseur, 2019)

BAE Systems HPM is “Scalable and designed for use on all sizes of
surface combatants[.] HPM instantaneously defeats a wide range of
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air and surface threats at tactically significant ranges (such as UAV,
Aircraft, Helicopters, USV, Fast Attack Craft…)” (Systems, 2018) A
High-Powered Microwave System was chosen to prevent the overall
system and especially the inner layer from being overwhelmed with
the number of simultaneous attacking drones. The HPM type of
defense system also permits the overall system to defend against
swarming small drones if or when those also become part of the
threat matrix. The HPM system will be deployed on a six-mile
arc, halfway between the StarStreak systems. This slightly more
forward deployment is to prevent possible interference with the
StarStreak systems (Vavasseur, 2019).
Command and Control
The more complex the system and the more layers involved, the
more integrated the command and control system must be.
Sensors, weapons, and communications need to be integrated and
robust. Threat or no threat determinations need to be made in a
quick and efficient manner to include an appropriate method of
engagement. The number of personnel to accomplish this can be
reduced by an expert or an AI system (U.S. Air Force Major Jay
Snyder, 2019).
For this case study solution, all of the detection and interdiction
components will be commercial off the shelf components to create
the final comprehensive, integrated command and control center.
Although many of these components have been integrated in the
past, they have not been integrated with the inner layer systems.
To minimize labor hours required and to maximize effectiveness,
Artificial Intelligence (AI) will be leveraged as much as possible into
the solution. When integrating a system of systems, it is always
best to involve a major system vendor in that integration. There
are several defense contractors who excel at complex integration,
testing, and receiving government authorization for the final
solution. Creating a new command and control system will most
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likely involve multiple vendors including one like the ARES
Corporation to work with the lead integrator (Snyder, 2019). The
ARES’ mantra is “Protecting the world’s most critical assets” (ARES
Security, 2019).
ARES AVERT C2 product, as seen in Figure 3-15, creates a singular
scalable interface that integrates partners’ command and control
portal. The company touts the configurability of the system to
adapt to multiple situational awareness and incident response
needs utilizing role-based security. The proprietary system can
link unique network systems, sensors, with unique customizable
client requirements collaborative response. (ARES Security, 2019)
See Figure 3-14.
Figure 3-14: Sample Image of an AVERT C2 System

Source: (Vavasseur, 2019)
As this is a static design, the primary communications solution
should be fiber optic cabling. The hard-wired cable provides a
stable, consistent communication platform and avoids possible
interference problems with the radars and HPM systems and can
be secured. Wi-Fi or satellite links could be jammed, cause
interference, receive interference, or have intermittent to poor
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performance (Snyder, 2019). Figure 3-15 is a composite of the
overall solution coverage.
Figure 3-15: Case Study C-UAS Solution Diagram

Source: (U.S. Air Force Major Jay Snyder, 2019)
Conclusions
This chapter has examined some of the challenges and thought
processes required to build a C-UAS framework for a given area.
Developing a solution requires a multi-step process to avoid
potential pitfalls and achieve a very high degree of success.
Analyzing the threat or threats is the first step in the process. This
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process could involve something as easy as a quadcopter delivering
contraband into a prison yard or as hard as cruise missiles and
attack drones with the added challenge of having limited
intelligence data available. The drone’s mission and potential level
of weaponization will determine the appropriate C-UAS response.
The number of attacking drones will also govern the complexity of
the overall solution.
Before

contemplating

a

counter-drone

solution,

careful

consideration needs to take place regarding the limitations to the
possible solution set. Some limitations are physical, such as the
weather, but some limitations could create legal issues, including jail
time. Those limitations are set by the government of the respective
country. Working with a government agency or requesting a waiver
may be the only path to a successful counter-drone system.
As a counter-drone system is developed: range, detection, and
interdiction will be the supporting foundation. At what distance
does the drone need to be detected, and at what distance does the
drone need to be engaged or interdicted? As these distances and
perimeters increase, so does the need for a line-of-sight limitation
solution. More than one layer or ring may be needed. Passive
detection systems are fantastic if the drone and possibly the ground
station are emitting RF signals. However, if the attacking drones
are radio silent, then a radar type system will likely be necessary.
Interdiction choices are often driven by the size of the drone and
whether it is carrying weapons that can be released. As the size
increases, the interdiction methods move from a soft interdiction
using jammers, nets, etc. to more traditional weapons for aircraft
that include bullets and missiles. As the number of attacking drones
increase, the interdiction method moves from kinetic attacks to
the non-kinetic realm of directed energy such as lasers and highpowered microwaves.
Do not forget the limitations and requirements for command and
control in the overall solution. The command and control solution
may be extremely simple and potentially designed for a variety of
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commercial drones. As the threat grows and the number of defense
layers grows, so too does the complexity of the command and
control system. The necessary level of complexity may require an
expert software solution embedded with artificial intelligence to
help guide the attack and response phases. C-UAS will continue
to change and adapt as the technology improves, and the drone/
counter-drone issues are more constrained by human innovation
than the science that empowers the machines.

Questions
1. Name three factors that must be taken into consideration
when building the framework for CUAS?
2. What are the limitations of a C-UAS solution?
3. Can C-UAS be countered? If yes, how?
4. Why would a non-kinetic kill be chosen over a kinetic kill in CUAS around populated areas?
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Chapter 4: Planning for
Resiliency and Robustness
J.J.C.H. RYAN

Student Learning Objectives:
After completing this block, the student will be able to:
— describe the difference between resiliency and robustness
— describe different ways that resiliency might be enhanced
— explore ways in which resiliency can be measured or estimated
— describe difference ways that robustness might be enhanced
— describe how robustness can be measured
— conceptualize attacks on resiliency and explain cascading
effects of successful attacks
— conceptualize attacks on robustness and explain cascading
effects of successful attacks
— describe the cost-benefit trade space associated with resiliency
and robustness
— explain how operational secrecy can be used as part of
resiliency and robustness
— conceptualize protections to systems than can shore up
resiliency
Understanding the Difference between Resiliency and Robustness
A stone aqueduct built by the Romans to carry water over
hundreds of miles exists to this day. It is robust. An aspen tree
quivers in the winds, perhaps loses a few leaves, but continues to
live after the storm has passed. It is resilient.
Both of these attributes are important. But they can be the
subject of choices in design: the aspen tree is both resilient and
robust while the aqueduct is only robust and not resilient. Should
assault or insult cause an aqueduct to break and fall to the ground,
it would take a great deal of effort to rebuild and mend the
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structure (World Monuments Fund, 2016). Were the aspen tree to
be subjected to an axe, the individual tree would be felled quickly
enough, but the organism would continue: the vast majority of the
“tree” is a large underground root system (Featherman, 2014). Soon
a new shoot would emerge to replace the aspen that had been cut
down.
The concepts of robustness and resiliency seem simple enough,
so it is striking that they are so difficult to define and measure.
The New Webster’s Dictionary simply defines robust as “strong,
healthy.” It defines resilient as “springing back; buoyant.” (Bolander
(ed.) & Stodden, 1986) These definitions are not useful for
engineering purposes. In this chapter, the concepts of resiliency
and robustness will be explored through the lens of security,
focusing on how C-UAS operations can exploit the various aspects
of both attributes for compromise. To start, baseline operational
definitions are offered so that a common language is possible for the
subsequent analyses.
Resiliency
In exploring the literature, the varying definitions of resiliency do
not stray far from the definition quoted above. Two ideas permeate
the definitions: first, the ability to return to a previous state; and
second, the amount of time needed to return to that state. Systems
that are able to return to the previous state in a short period of time
are said to have high resilience while those that take a longer period
of time are said to have low resilience. (Hollnagel, 2016) (National
Academy of Engineering, 1996)
There are several design features that enable or increase
resiliency. First, a system must have an ability to respond to
anything that changes its state. Next, the system needs to be able
to monitor its state, being alert to internal or external changes that
could affect it. Third, the ability to “learn” is useful: keeping track
of previous experiences, responses to those experiences, and the
results of those responses can provide the ability to more quickly
respond appropriately. Finally, the ability to anticipate challenges
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or changes can accelerate the detection of issues and subsequent
responses. (Hollnagel, 2016)
For the aspen tree, the ability to bend in the wind allows it to
return to its previous state quickly, once the wind has calmed.
Evolution has provided the aspen with that ability, having “learned”
over millennia that wind exists and how to respond appropriately.
These functions are internal to the aspen ‘system’ and are
reproduced for each instantiation of aspen. Thus, it is possible to
characterize the aspen as having high resilience.
The aqueduct, on the other hand, is entirely dependent on
external forces to return to its functioning state: people to identify a
problem, care enough to respond, and commence the labor needed
to repair the structure. In the context of an aqueduct system that
includes the architects, laborers, and tax payers, it has many of the
design features, such as learning and anticipating, but the time to
respond and repair is very long. The aqueduct has low resilience.
Robustness
The definitions in the literature regard robust design as a concept
separate from robustness. There is some suggestion that following
robust design processes will result in robustness, where the
definition of robustness is a system that is insensitive to variations,
both internally and externally. There is no time component noted
in these definitions although time does seem to lurk in the
background: a system that fails soon is not robust whereas a system
that lasts a long time is robust.
Robust design is a process that focuses on quality in order to
reduce the vulnerability of the system as a whole to problems that
it may encounter. There are three components of robust design:
system, parameter, and tolerance, with a focus on increasing quality
during manufacturing rather than trying to “inspect in quality” after
manufacturing. (Wysk, Niebel, Cohen, & Simpson, 2000) (Maurer &
Lau, 2000)
The aqueduct design and build process used by the Romans
focuses on product improvement at every step, including research
and development of better materials to increase the effectiveness of
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the system. Continual maintenance was performed regularly until
the organizing structure of the Roman Empire collapsed. The
aqueducts continued to exist for a long time after the end of regular
maintenance. (World Monuments Fund, 2016) They were highly
resistant to variations and, as a result, very robust.
The aspen is a wonder of nature: most of it is underground and
hence able to withstand the insults and challenges associated with
environment and technical changes. The oldest aspen stand is
estimated to be more than 80,000 years old (Featherman, 2014). It
is highly resistant to variations, has great lasting power, and is, as a
result, very robust.
Comparing Resiliency and Robustness
The following Table 4-1 summarizes the above discussed
differences between resiliency and robustness:
Table 4-1: Summary of Resiliency and Robustness

Attributes
Ability to respond to undesired
changes
Resiliency

Ability to monitor current state
Ability to learn from
experiences
Ability to anticipate
challenges
Insensitive to component
variation

Robustness Insensitive to parameter
variation
Tolerant of environmental
variation

Time Component
Quick to recover to
desired state
∂t ~ 0

Lasts a relatively long
time
T >> 0

Source: Ryan, J.J.C.H Notes (2020)
Operational Aspects of Resiliency and Robustness
Resiliency and robustness aspects are important considerations
in system design and operations. Integrating the components into
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a system that enhance these two attributes can be costly, which
means that design trade-offs may have to be made. On the other
hand, sometimes neither resiliency nor robustness are desirable
attributes. For example, single use plastic kitchen waste bags are
intended to be flimsy and easily degraded environmentally, although
the nature of the material renders a level of robustness that is
undesired (United Nations, 2018). On the other hand, material
scientists have recently created a type of plastic that can selfdestruct when exposed to sunlight:
Engineers at the Georgia Institute of Technology have developed
a new type of plastic that can form flexible sheets and tough
mechanical parts—then disappear in minutes to hours when hit by
ultraviolet light or temperatures above 176 degrees Fahrenheit. …
DARPA has already used the plastic to make light, strong gliders
and parachutes. Last October the agency field-tested one of these
vehicles: dropped from a high-altitude balloon at night, a glider
successfully delivered a three-pound package to a spot 100 miles
away. After four hours in the sun, it vanished, leaving behind nothing
but an oily smudge on the ground. (Patel, 2019)
The example given in the story illustrates an obvious use for
disappearing plastic: short term mission execution with very little
forensics residue. Adversaries planning attacks on distant targets
could use these types of materials to launch their attacks without
leaving much behind for investigators to find. C-UAS planners
might use this type of design feature as a focus for attack.
Deciding how much resiliency and how much robustness is
needed for a given system is a design choice and must be made in
consideration of the overall mission goals.
Measuring Resiliency and Robustness
As noted in the discussion regarding the definitions of robustness
and resiliency, measurement of such attributes is only possible in
relation to the system mission goals. If a system is designed for
preplanned product obsolescence (Buck, 2017) (Patel, 2019), then it
is right and appropriate to design it with a planned lifetime. In
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fact, the robustness of that product is appropriately measured in its
ability to last the planned lifetime. If it does, reliably, then it can
be considered robust. If there is a non-trivial chance of it failing
prior to planned end of life, then it can be considered not robust.
Similarly, resilience must be measured relative to the mission goals.
If the mission has a goal to linger over a territory for a period of
time, then resiliency can be measured in the determination of the
system to react to and recover from expected problems during that
period of time. These attributes must be carefully considered and
designed into the system from the beginning.
How Processes can Boost Resiliency and Robustness
Resiliency and robustness do not need to be cares borne solely
by single components or even single systems. Having redundant
systems can boost both resiliency and robustness, if those
redundant are integrated appropriately. It does no good to have
redundant systems or elements if such components are equally
vulnerable to expected attacks or insults. Redundant processes can
additionally assist in delivering resiliency through the augmentation
of learning and detection capabilities. Having redundant processing
channels that double check the precision and appropriateness of
the primary processing channel is a very valuable method of
monitoring the state of the system and ensuring that it is operating
correctly.
When Resiliency and Robustness is More Costly than Optimal
Engineering for increased resiliency and/or robustness costs
resources: money, labor, energy, and space. As such, the decisions
must be carefully made. In some cases, it is not possible to have
precise data on the operational environment, in which case guesses
must be made.

For example, the scientists and engineers

developing the first-generation space systems had little empirical
data to work with when trying to design the desired resiliency and
robustness. One thing they did know is that once the system was
launched, it was going to very difficult indeed to send a repair
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person after it. As a result, the early systems lasted much longer
than expected (Gruss, 2014).
Those satellites were very expensive, but data to inform the
decision space was for all practical purposes non-existent. For
most of the systems that are being designed for terrestrial purposes,
ample data exists, and significantly more computing power exists
to support modeling and simulation. Costs can be extrapolated
for both design improvements and marginal returns on investment,
giving the product manager the ability to make rational decisions on
how to make the hard decisions about expenditures for resiliency
and robustness. But these decisions can not be made as cookie
cutter decisions: just as robustness and resiliency are only
measurable relative to mission goals, so are the costs associated
with providing these attributes.
When Resiliency and Robustness are Attacked
Both the presence and absence of robustness and resiliency can
be used as vectors for attack. When robustness or resiliency is
absent, the attacks are much more obvious. It is when the systems
have been designed with robustness or resiliency in mind that the
attack challenge becomes interesting.
Candidate targets to be considered include (Ryan J. J., Information
Warfare: A Conceptual Framework, 1997):
• Autonomous Sensor Systems, which can be exploited to send
false data back to the controlling system or used as conduits
for other weapons such as viruses, logic torpedoes, and worms
• The C2 Infrastructure, which includes Civilian and Strategic
Leadership, the Decision Process, Societal Support Structures
such as the police, and other governmental entities like the
Bureau of Land Management and the Strategic Oil Reserves.
Attacking these targets can sow discord in an opponent’s
society, thereby fracturing the decision-making process or any
consensus, deny an opponent the ability to marshal needed
resources to rebuff an attack, or divert attention from other
activities.
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• The Communications Infrastructure, including the physical
part of a communications infrastructure which includes
microwave antenna towers, switching stations, telephones,
radios, computers, and modems. Non-physical portions
include the data, electrical systems, and management support
systems.
• Logistics, including the computerized backbone that identifies
supply requirements, positions materials, tracks deliveries, and
schedules resources. Attacks on that backbone can severely
impact the ability of the dependent forces to deploy or
maintain a deployment.
There are many other targets, including the sensors and individual
UAS systems, but it pays to think broadly about targets.
Types of Attacks
A system that is designed to be very robust is one that is expected
to last for a long period of time, relative to its mission. The designers
made the decision that it was necessary for the mission to engineer
the components for enhanced robustness, which was a resource
decision: simply stated, they decided it was worth the extra money,
energy expenditures, labor, and time to make the system more
robust. The mission needs are for it to last, to persist. Destroying
or damaging such a system, then, is an obvious priority for an
adversary. Discovering the relative robustness of each system is also
an adversary priority, since it informs targeting decisions.
Similarly, a system that is designed to be resilient is one that has
been imbued with the ability to recover quickly from challenges.
For such a system, a single attack is not likely to be (very) effective.
Instead, a series of attacks in intervals at a rate that overwhelms the
recovery process may be appropriate. For example, the distributed
denial at service (DDOS) attack concept was developed when
targets began designing interfaces that were resilient to normal
denial of service (DOS) attacks (Cloudflare, 2020).
Revisiting the definitions of resiliency and robustness, the very
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attributes provide clues as to how to craft effective attacks (see
Table 4-2):
Table 4-2 Attributes v Time

Attributes

Time Component

Ability to respond to undesired
changes
Ability to monitor current state
Ability to learn from
experiences
Ability to anticipate
challenges

Resiliency

Insensitive to component
variation
Robustness Insensitive to parameter
variation
Tolerant of environmental
variation

Quick to recover to
desired state
∂t ~ 0

Lasts a relatively long
time
T >> 0

Source: Ryan, J.J.C.H (2020)
Attacking

resiliency

should

focus

on

slowing

down

or

compromising entirely the ability to recognize and recover from
state changes. Attacking robustness may be best accomplished
through sabotage in the manufacturing process. Focusing on each
of these attributes provides the C-UAS planner options for
consideration.
In designing appropriate attacks, the C-UAS planner needs to
consider

system

design

and

system

operation.

Individual

components of systems can prove to be the Achilles’ heels of larger
systems. Getting to this level of knowledge requires significant
intelligence data support and analytical capability.
Cascading Effect Potential
One of the challenges associated with automated systems, such as
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UASs, is that there is a huge potential for them to be used in multiple
system configurations, including swarms. While the offensive
potential of such swarms is large, it also provides a potential for
cascading C-UAS effects. For example, if a swarm has a single
controlling entity, the jamming or destruction of that single entity
makes the entire swarm vulnerable. Analysis of the C-UAS potential
should always consider the potential for creating effects that
cascade from one system to another (Ryan, Woloschek, & Leven,
Complexities in Conducting Information Warfare, 1996).
The Role of Secrecy
Because of the obvious implications of the preceding discussion,
secrecy associated with all aspects of UAS operations can be a
paramount consideration. UAS operators should be mindful of
adversaries attempting to discover information useful to the
adversaries C-UAS activities. C-UAS planners should be careful of
adversaries trying to discover intent and capabilities of the C-UAS
efforts. The types of secrecy considerations span operations,
capability and resiliency/robustness attributes.
Operational Secrecy
Normal operations can provide hints to how resiliency and
robustness are engineered into a system. When conducting UAS
operations, caution might be warranted to disguise or hide
operational patterns or capabilities. Obviously, the longer a system
is in use, the harder this becomes and the potential for secrecy
dwindles to simply secrecy regarding current operations. But even
this can be valuable.
From a C-UAS perspective, observing adversary training and
operational patterns can provide a great deal of information
regarding capabilities and intentions. Even such apparently minor
things as the types of personnel expertise being acquired or the
amount of energy being used can provide clues. Clues provide
lines of inquiry for potential targeting and C-UAS mission planning.
Granted a huge part of the C-UAS problem is when the adversary
fleet is inbound, but don’t overlook the opportunity to subvert it
before it is launched.
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Capability Secrecy
Hiding or disguising capabilities is always a popular choice. For
C-UAS planners, care should be taken to test hypotheses thoroughly
to ensure that the adversary has not managed to confound the
intelligence gathering and analysis process regarding the UAS
missions and capabilities.
Resiliency and Robustness Secrecy
Adversaries may go to some lengths to hide the actual nature
of how robust or resilient their systems might be. In some cases,
the systems may be quite frail, contrary to the data revealed by
the adversary. In other cases, the systems may be much more
capable and resilient than expected. In either case, the potential for
a target-weapon-effects match might be affected, to the detriment
of both the nature of the conflict and the geo-political stability.
Getting it right is important and no information should be taken at
face value.
Questions for Reflection
1. You are planning a C-UAS operation against an adversary that
has very robust UASs. Your intelligence support activity has
verified this level of robustness. Is your best option to try to
sabotage the systems while they are in production, in the field
awaiting launch, or while in flight? What are the trade-offs
associated with each choice?
2. A spy has revealed that an adversary has been outfitting
recreational UASs with secret surveillance capabilities. These
UAS systems have been advertised during the recent holiday
season at deep discounts and, as a result, the sales of the
systems have sky rocketed. Part of the secret surveillance
system is an AI system that detects unauthorized activity and
self-destructs to avoid any information being extracted. You
have been charged with coming up with a way to subvert these
capabilities. What are your alternatives?
3. You are on guard duty and the alarm has just been raised that a
swarm of very resilient UASs are inbound on an intelligence
98 | Chapter 4: Planning for Resiliency and Robustness

collection mission. What are your options?
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Chapter 5: Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
H.C. MUMM

Student Learning Objectives – The student will gain knowledge
of the concepts and framework as it relates to the surveillance
and reconnaissance aspects of C-UAS (Counter-unmanned aerial
systems). The student will be able to:
• Describe the importance of surveillance to C-UAS activities,
differentiating it from reconnaissance
• Describe the importance of reconnaissance to C-UAS
activities, differentiating it from surveillance
• Develop a surveillance plan for a notional C-UAS scenario,
identifying processes, systems, and technologies needed, as
well as mission goals and metrics
• Explain how detection of UAS is different from detection
and interpretation of adversarial intent
• Explain the need for operational secrecy for C-UAS
surveillance and reconnaissance activities
History-What is it, and Why Does it Matter?
This chapter explores the differences and similarities of how
technology is used to find manned and unmanned aircraft in the
sky. The history of surveillance and reconnaissance has its roots
in military uses with only a small operation with its civilian
counterparts. “The tactics and techniques that are applied to today’s
technology stem from the field of remote sensing. Remote sensing
has a long history as it began with humans attempting to see and
sense phenomena from a distance and (we have now) taken a long
journey from using pigeons to balloons to aircraft, then to satellites,
to UAS [unmanned aerial systems]” (Nichols & Mumm, 2018)
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The use of UAS or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is one of the most
well-known applications of the technology. “The vast majority of
UAVs

are

used

purely

for

intelligence,

surveillance,

and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. In current military usage, they
range from the Global Hawk, with a wingspan greater than a Boeing
737 airliner, to nano-helicopters that weigh a few grams, and all
points in between” (Lambeth, 2006). This field of study has allowed
advances in military movement, attack, and defend, as well as
civilian

surveying

and

developing,

freedom

of

movement

throughout our world. (Nichols & Mumm, 2018)
However, the tactics this chapter will discuss are almost 180
degrees from the normal thought process in surveillance and
reconnaissance, as the “target” is up in the expansive sky and is
not always bound by the rules of conventional manned aircraft, and
sometimes UAS technologies evolve so quickly that counter-UAS (CUAS) systems just cannot adapt quickly enough. “The proliferation
of C-UAS technology might even accelerate the development of
technologies

that

will

render

C-UAS

systems

ineffective,

particularly in military environments” (“The new world of counterdrone technology,” 2018). C-UAS technology has two primary
functions “the first is to identify or detect drone activity. The
second function is to intercept the airspace threat or defeat the
drone” (Friedberg, 2019)
Figure 5-1: Drone Capability Diversity
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Source: (Snow, 2014)
According to Merriam-Webster, the definition of reconnaissance
is “a preliminary survey to gain information; especially an
exploratory military survey of enemy territory. (Dictionary, 2019)
In historical terms, it is French and means “recognition” or from
Old French reconoistre or to “recognize” (Surveillance, 2019). This
idea of a quick look or survey is in contrast with the meaning of
surveillance which is “continuous observation of a place, person,
group, or ongoing activity in order to gather information: attentive
observation, as to oversee and direct someone or something”
(Surveillance, 2019). This continuous observation does not always
need to be carried out with the knowledge or consent of the
surveilled as we can use electronic surveillance methods which
allow for “surveillance or the gathering of information by
surreptitious use of electronic devices, as in crime detection or
espionage” (Surveillance, 2019)
.Furthering this idea in the C-UAS arena, one must look at not
only finding an object in the vastness of the open sky but the ability
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to detect, classify, identify and dispatch countermeasures for not
only the flying vehicle but also for the operator or base station on
the ground. Detection means the technology can discover UAS in a
given area. Classification of UAS will usually be able to separate UAS
(drones) from other types of objects – such as manned aircraft.
“One step further is identification. Some equipment can identify a
particular model of drone or even identify the drone’s or controller’s
digital fingerprint, like a MAC address for example. This level of
identification can be handy for (tracking and) prosecution purposes.
Being alerted that a drone is present…is already useful. But your
situational awareness, and ability to deploy countermeasures is
greatly enhanced if you know the drone’s (and/or the controller’s)
exact location. Some equipment will even allow you to track the
drone location in real-time” (9 Counter-Drone Technologies To
Detect And Stop Drones Today, 2019).
Table 5‑2:
‑ Threat Detection Tools

110 | Chapter 5: Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Technology

Method

Radar

Detects the presence of small unmanned aircraft by their radar signatur
encounters RF pulses emitted by the detection element. These systems
between drones and other small, low-flying objects, such as birds.

Radio
Frequency (RF)

Identifies the presence of drones by scanning for the frequencies on wh
Algorithms pick out and geo-locate RF-emitting devices in the area that

Electro-Optical
Detects drones based on their visual signature.
(EO)

Infrared (IR)

Detects drones based on their heat signature.

Acoustic

Detects drones by recognizing the unique sounds produced by their mo
of sounds produced by known drones, which are then matched to sound
environment.

Combined
Sensors

Many systems integrate a variety of different sensor types in order to pr
capability. For example, a system might include an acoustic sensor that
a potential drone in the vicinity. The use of multiple detection elements
probability of successful detection, given that no individual detection m

Source: (Michel, 2018)
Threat Identification-How and Why
The traditional ways of looking for human-made objects in the
sky are radar signatures, heat signatures, visually seeing the object
with the human eye, or through an optical assist mechanism. There
are also acoustic signatures as well as an array of electronic signals
sweeping technologies used for detection as “C-UAS systems can
be ground- or air-based or even handheld. Most systems on the
market today are designed only for detection or for interdiction, and
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the clear majority are ground-based, although a few comprise air
and ground components” (Wilson, 2018). Table 5 -1 lists the main
techniques for the detection and tracking of UAS.
The ability to find an object in the sky is a combination of the
mechanism chosen as well as the size, speed, trajectory, weather
conditions and possible stealth capabilities the object may employ
to avoid detection. Surveillance and reconnaissance in the C-UAS
arena
includes radar, radio frequency (RF), electro-optical (EO), infrared
(IR), acoustic, and combined sensors. There are no perfect detection
methods. Many affordable electro-optical sensors are limited to
daylight operations and a direct line-of-sight to the target (also
true for IR and many RF systems). RF and acoustic sensors use a
library of known sounds and frequencies to detect UAVs, but the
rapid development of new platforms makes it impossible for those
to be fully up to date. Sensor sensitivity also is an issue; too sensitive
generates many false positives, while reduced sensitivity leads to
false negatives (Wilson, 2018).
Adding to this equation is the atmospheric effects of temperature,
weather conditions, and location of the object be it over an open
desert, the vastness of the ocean, or mixed within the many
buildings and signals within a city or urban terrain. Tracking an
object in the sky is more difficult than tracking an object on land as
the vastness of the sky creates the difficulty of a three dimensional
environment where the object could move up, down, laterally side
to side or a combination of all three dimensions as individuals and
sensors attempt to find and track the object. The most common way
to find and track an aircraft is through the use of radar. RADAR is
an acronym for Radio Detection and Ranging. A simple explanation
how radar works is:
A beam of energy, called radio waves, is emitted from an antenna.
As they strike objects in the atmosphere, the energy is scattered in
all directions, with some of the energy reflected directly back to the
radar. The larger the object, the greater the amount of energy that
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is returned to the radar. In addition, the time it takes for the beam
of energy to be transmitted and returned to the radar also provides
is with the distance to that object. (How Radar Works., 2019)
Figure 5-2: Example of RADAR Signal

Source: (Goyal, 2019)
A radar signal has a pulse width (pulse duration), which can be
increased or decreased to “see” further out or to get a better image
of the object in question. The “Pulse width determines the spatial
resolution of the radar… decreasing the pulse width increases signal
bandwidth. A wider system bandwidth results in higher receiver
noise for a given amount of power, which reduces sensitivity”
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019). As we are working with the position
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of time and space of an aircraft a “Doppler radar systems can
provide information regarding the movement of targets as well as
their position by measuring the shift (or change) in phase between
a transmitted pulse and a received echo, the target’s movement
directly toward or away from the radar is calculated” (How Radar
Works., 2019).
Several factors affect the performance of a given radar system,
these factors include
• (1) the maximum range at which it can see a target of a
specified size, (2) the accuracy of its measurement of target
location in range and angle, (3) its ability to distinguish one
target from another, (4) its ability to detect the desired target
echo when masked by large clutter echoes, unintentional
interfering signals from other “friendly” transmitters, or
intentional radiation from hostile jamming (if a military radar),
(5) its ability to recognize the type of target, and (6) its
availability (ability to operate when needed), reliability, and
maintainability (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019).
These and many other factors create issues when attempting to use
radar to find and track UAS as “Echoes from land, sea, rain, snow,
hail, birds, …but they are a nuisance to those who want to detect
aircraft, ships, missiles, or other similar targets. Clutter echoes can
seriously limit the capability of a radar system… (we must)
minimizing the effects of clutter without reducing the echoes from
desired targets” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019)
UAS tend to be small in size and have a low electromagnetic
signature, which can be missed by most traditional detection
measures

such

as

an

airport

radar

system;

however,

a

micro–doppler radar “is able to detect movement – specifically,
speed differences – within moving objects. And drones tend to have
propellers that create a large spectrum of speed differences. Part
of the propeller is moving towards you, and part is moving away
(9 Counter-Drone Technologies To Detect And Stop Drones Today,
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2019). This micro-doppler technique can identify drones and even
distinguish drones from birds. UAS can also be detected by using the
millimeter-wave range as this range is “ideal for surveillance tasks in
the immediate environment, particularly when visibility is poor. In
comparison to the optical and IR spectrum, millimeter waves have
good penetration characteristics in the presence of fog, smoke, or
dust.” (Caris, 2019)
Radio Frequency (RF)
Radio Frequency (RF) sensors can detect the UAS and the
operator or ground station location from which the control signal or
payload exploitation signal is being sent and received. Commercial
drones are usually operated via a radio control signal and often
have onboard data link transmitters for real-time sensor download
(typically in the 2.4 GHz ISM band). These upload and download
frequency signals can be detected and geolocated (Drone Detection
, 2019).

RF sensors are passive and do not require legal

authorization for use, so they will not emit signals that can cause
issues with other signal emitters in a given area. RF sensors are
one of the first lines of defense in C-UAS as they can “detect
commercial, consumer, and DIY or prototype drones, flight paths,
and the location of drones. RF sensors are capable of identifying
a drone’s type and model based on the protocol or frequency the
drone is operating” (Friedberg, 2019).
Electro-Optical (EO) Sensors-Full Motion Video Cameras
Full motion video or digitally enhanced cameras can “provide vital
visual confirmation of a drone, help identify payloads, and record
forensic evidence of drone intrusions. This sensor is important for
times when human verification is necessary, or when security teams
need visual evidence of an intrusion” (Friedberg, 2019).
Video and camera sensors are limited in their ability to find a
UAS and generally need to be cued to a UAS through other sensors.
Cameras are limited in a C-UAS system due to limitations of weather
conditions, low visibility environments, line of sight, range, smoke
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environments, and nighttime operations. EO sensors are normally
combined with an infrared sensor (IR) device and sold as one unit,
as an EO/IR sensor.
Infrared Sensors (IR)
Infrared sensors are based on the science that “all objects emit
infrared energy, known as a heat signature. An infrared camera
(thermal imager) detects and measures the infrared energy of
objects. The camera converts that infrared data into an electronic
image that shows the apparent surface temperature of the object
being measured” (Thermography Fundamentals, 2016).
Figure 5-3: Infrared Heat Signature

Source: (Thermography Fundamentals, 2016)
This temperature difference offers the ability for the sensors to
surveil the aircraft in the sky as the “camera processor takes the
signal from each pixel and applies a mathematical calculation to it
to create a color map of the apparent temperature of the object
(Thermography Fundamentals, 2016).
Acoustic Sensors for C-UAS
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The concept behind acoustic sensors is based on the idea that
the distinct sounds created by different aircraft can be identified
and distinguished from all other sounds in a given area as “acoustic
sensors use a library of known sounds and frequencies to detect
UAVs, but the rapid development of new platforms makes it
impossible for those to be fully up-to-date. Sensor sensitivity also
is an issue; too sensitive generates many false positives” (The new
world of counter-drone technology).
It’s a Big Sky-How Can We Discern the Clutter from the UAS?
Another issue of tracking airborne objects is one or more of the
objects in the sky making contact or colliding into each other;
however, this is rare and is known as the Big Sky Theory. The Big
Sky theory states “that two randomly flying bodies are very unlikely
to collide, as the three-dimensional space is so large relative to the
bodies. Some aviation safety rules involving altimetry and navigation
standards are based on this concept” (Big Sky Theory, 2019).
With the “advent of radar, two aircraft could be “seen” and
maneuvered clear of each other’s flight paths. The advent of Traffic
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) equipment allowed equipped
aircraft to resolve conflicts. Now we have technology that allows
space-based positioning of two aircraft” (Big Sky Theory, 2019).
One of the techniques to control the Big Sky Theory is assigning
different types of airspace rules to control certain areas of time and
space. This use of airspace allows different rules to be assigned to
different environments. As an example, if an aircraft, manned or
unmanned is not following the agreed-upon rules it is considered
to be hazardous. Predetermined responses are employed depending
on which airspace the vehicle is operating in and to what degree the
vehicle is not following the agreed-upon rules.
Figure 5-4 depicts the different types of airspace and control
within each of these airspace corridors. Depending upon which
airspace corridor a vehicle is operating in, a series of positive
controls are in place including radar tracking, mode “C” altitude
encoders (allows for a unique code to be assigned to each aircraft in
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an area), self-reporting by operators, visual indicators and radio call
signs. This concept has worked well in the manned aircraft arena
as all aircraft in controlled airspace must have an altitude encoder,
and “up until now means planes moving between Europe and North
America have had to use regimented tracks in the sky. The rigid
structure maintains large areas of clear space around planes to
remove the possibility of a collision” (Amos, 2019). This concept
must now become more flexible as unmanned and optionally
manned technology proliferates around the world. The system is
slowly evolving with the invention of Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast

(ADS-B)

transponders.

These

transponders push out information from a particular aircraft –
including its identity, GPS-determined altitude, and ground speed.
ADS-B was introduced to enhance surveillance and safety over land,
but the messages can also be picked up by satellites (Amos, 2019).
Figure 5-4: Air Space Classification

Source: (FAA, 2019).
Table 5-3: Airspace and Altitude Definitions
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Airspace Altitude Definition
Generally, airspace from 18,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) up
to and including FL600.
Class A

Includes airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles
(NM) off the coast of the 48 contiguous United States and
Alaska.

Class B

Generally, from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL including the
airspace from portions of Class Bravo that extends beyond the
Mode C Veil up to 10,000 feet MSL (e.g. SEA, CLE, PHX).

Class C

Generally, from the surface up to 4,000 feet MSL including
the airspace above the horizontal boundary up to 10,000 feet
MSL.

Class D

Generally, airspace from the surface up to 2,500 feet above
the airport elevation. The configuration of each Class D
airspace is individually tailored.

Class E

Class G

Above 14,500 feet MSL over the 48 United States and Alaska,
excluding airspace at and below 2,500 feet AGL and excludes
airspace 18,000 MSL or above.
Includes airspace overlying the waters within 12 nautical miles
(NM) off the coast of the 48 contiguous United States and
Alaska.
Uncontrolled airspace – not designated as Class A, B, C, D, or
E.

Source: (-Handbooks, 2019) [1]
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)-Helping
to Eliminate the “Good Guy” from C-UAS Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Challenge
The introduction of the Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast

(ADS-B) will

help

transform

surveillance

and

reconnaissance of manned aircraft, yet how this new technology
can fit into the unmanned arena and possibly assist C-UAS is still
being determined. The U.S. firm, Aireon, says “its new satellite
surveillance network is now fully live and being trialed over the
North Atlantic. The system employs a constellation of 66 spacecraft,
which monitors the situational messages pumped out by aircraft
transponders. These report a plane’s position, altitude, direction
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and speed every eight seconds. The more detailed information they
now have about the behavior of airplanes means more efficient
routing can be introduced” (Amos, 2019).
ADS-B is a system of systems and rides “piggyback on all 66
spacecraft of the Iridium sat-phone service provider. These sensors
make it possible now to track planes even out over the ocean,
beyond the visibility of radar – and ocean waters cover 70% of
the globe” (Amos, 2019). If we know where the manned “friendly”
aircraft are in time and space, this may assist in the surveillance
and reconnaissance of potentially harmful UAS and allow for the
tracking and neutralizing of this threat. Figure 5-5 illustrates how
ADS-B will operate in the next few months as the FAA (Federal
Aviation Administration) has mandated that all aircraft are required
to comply by January 1, 2020. This includes any aircraft operating
in Class A, B, or C airspaces. Additionally, any aircraft operating in
Class E airspace (above FL100 MSL but not below 2,500 ft AGL) must
also comply (“The “No-BS” PDQ ABC’s of ADS-B,” 2019).
Figure 5-5: ADS-B Signal Broadcast
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Source: (The “No-BS” PDQ ABC’s of ADS-B, 2019)
With ADS-B technology offering near-real-time surveillance from
satellites, the ability to “introduce greater flexibility into the
management of the airspace (become[s] possible). For example, in
the North Atlantic, traditional in-line safe separation distances will
eventually be reduced from 40 nautical miles (80km) down to as
little as 14 nautical miles (25km)” (Amos, 2019). This flexibility offers
great promise for the airline industry; however, it also complicates
C-UAS, as aircraft are no longer on a known, predictable flight
path. Attempting to mandate that all UAS incorporate ADS-B
transponders may prove to be difficult as the technology can cost
thousands of dollars, and integration into current UAS designs may
not be completely successful.
The Difficulty of Differentiating Harmless Aircraft from Threat
Aircraft in the C-UAS Space
How do you determine what is flying in the area-is it a bird, small
plane, UAS, and is it a threat? The standard airport radar does not
work well for finding and tracking most UAS. There are several
reasons for this, including the size of the aircraft, the material it is
made from, and the general lack of a heat signature in most of the
Group 1 and Group 2 weight classes. (See also Figures 5-6, and 5-7)
Table 5-4: UAVs Classification According to U.S. DoD
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UAVs Classification According to the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD)
Category

Size

Maximum Gross Ta
Weight (MGTW) (lb

Group 1

Small

0-20

Group 2

Medium

21-55

Group 3

Large

<1320

Group 4

Larger

>1320

Group 5

Largest

>1320

*AGL = Above Ground Level **MSL = Mean Sea Level
Note: If the UAS has even one characteristic of the
next level, it is classified at that level.

Sources:

(U.S.

Army

Unmanned

Aircraft

Systems

Roadmap

2010-2035, 2010)

Complicating the matter of discerning manned from unmanned
systems is a multitude of ontologies and taxonomies used to discuss
different sizes, weight, and mission classes of aircraft as illustrated
in Tables 5-3 and 5-4. The fact that most UAS blur the line between
civilian and military use (dual-use technology) compound these
issues. Cohesive agreed to classifications for UAS, and manned
aircraft is a worldwide issue. There is a real challenge in verifying
if an aircraft is manned, definitely unmanned, or maybe optionally
manned when a human must make a judgment call of life or death
when determining if a UAS has nefarious intent or is simply an
innocent aircraft flying in a given airspace.
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Table 5-5: NATO UAS Classification

NATO UAS
Classification
Category

Normal
Employment

Strike/ Combat*

Strategic/ National Up to 65,000 ft

HALE

Strategic/ National

Up to 65,000 ft

Unlimited (BLO

MALE

Operational/ Theatre

Up to 45,000 ft
MSL

Unlimited (BLO

Class II

Tactical

Tactical Formation

Up to 18,000 ft
AGL

Class I

Small (>15 kg)

Tactical Unit

Up to 5,000 ft A

Mini (<15 kg)

Tactical Subunit (Manual or
hand launch)

Up to 3,000 ft AGL

Up to 25 km (LO

Tactical Subunit (manual or
hand launch)

Up to 200 ft AGL

Up to 5 km (LO

Class
Class III
kg)

Micro**
(<66 J)

(> 600

Source: (Szabolcsi, 2016)
An airport radar normally detects aircraft as small as helicopters
and single-engine land aircraft, and as large as jumbo jets, however,
these all of these aircraft are generally made out of metal, have
a recognizable heat signature, and a pilot that can communicate
location and intent. UAS tend to have none of these attributes.
Additionally, most UAS are made from plastics, balsa wood,
composite materials, or combinations of all of these materials, with
metal tending to be used less than any other material. Group 1 and 2
UAS tend to be battery-powered and therefore offer no discernable
or trackable heat source. UAS that uses a combustible fuel engine
will still not have enough of a heat signature or radar return
signature to make surveillance and reconnaissance an easy task.
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Normal Operat
Altitude

Figure 5-6: Size Comparison Drone to Commercial Aircraft -A

Figure 5-7: Size Comparison Drone to Commercial Aircraft -B
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Sources: (Aviation-Design of UAV Systems, 2014) (Eggers)
These composite built UASs do not reflect radar energy the way
denser materials such as metal does. UAVs can further reduce any
energy by using composites made with radar absorbing materials
(RAM) or be constructed to include a radar-absorbing structure
(RAS) into the superstructure using reinforced plastics or other
unique non-traditional materials. Most UAS are small enough that
finding a radar signature is sufficiently difficult; however there is
now “a plethora of foams and coatings that can reduce radar
signature now make up a highly active sector of the microwave
materials market” (Marsh, 2010).
The use of composites is not unusual in UAS as reinforced plastic
materials are known for their unique combination of low weight
with high strength, stiffness and fatigue resistance, but their
electromagnetic (EM) characteristics are important too; witness, for
example, glass fiber reinforced plastic (GRP)-based printed circuit
boards and carbon composite electromagnetic interference (EMI)
shielding enclosures for sensitive electronic equipment. Lowweight RAS can be made from glass and carbon fiber composite
lattices in which the voids are occupied by microwave absorbent
foams. Absorption effectiveness would be related to the volume
fraction of the grid cell structure and the distance between
elements (Marsh, 2010).
New Challenges Require New Thinking-Combined Sensors
The most successful C-UAS initiatives incorporate a multi-sensor
approach to ensure the accurate identification of a UAS as
relying on just one detection method; it can be possible for a
drone to be missed. For example, when using conventional radar,
it can be difficult to detect low-flying drones or distinguish drones
from birds. Or if the drone is obscured by buildings or trees, an
optical sensor will struggle to pick it up. By augmenting the radar
and optical sensors with spectrum monitoring, the security team
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(will) have a much clearer picture of any potential drone activity
(Drone Detection , 2019).
The discussion presented here is a sampling of the technical
challenges of finding and tracking UAS. The tasks of identifying the
specific UAS type, aircraft owner, what the UAS is generally used
for (normal payloads) and the aircraft operator become an even
greater challenge as “C-UAS systems, employing combined data
from several sensors, also must be able to differentiate between
legitimate and hostile, allied, and enemy UASs — something no
known system can do. This is where a human operator must
intervene to make what often is a split-second assessment” (Wilson,
2018).
Since the early years of the FAA, the agency has mandated that
manned aircraft must be registered and assigned a tail number,
which must be displayed permanently on the aircraft. Information
on manned aircraft is easily found in databases around the world. As
a newer technology that is evolving faster than policies, laws, and
governance can keep pace with, there is no comprehensive database
that offers an easy UAS identification look up and even if there
were such databases, the varying laws for registering the UAS (along
with limited compliance) would render most of the information
incomplete and unusable. New UAS are evolving at a rapid pace, and
their missions are far beyond the once normal camera sensor work
as UAS are taking over many traditional manned aircraft missions.
This is illustrated with Boeing’s aircraft refueling drone which is
an “advanced unmanned aircraft designed to refuel the US Navy’s
fighter jets in mid-air has taken to the skies operating under the
name T1, the prototype MQ-25 performed an autonomous flight
over the course of two hours at MidAmerica St. Louis Airport”
(Lavars, 2019). The FAA is continuing to struggle with these issues.
In July 2019, many US lawmakers sent a letter to the Secretary of
Transportation stating that
“We write to register our ongoing concerns regarding the
continuing

delay

in

the

issuing

of

the

Federal

Aviation

Administration’s (FAA) rule requiring remote identification for
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unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and urge you to dedicate the
necessary staff and resources for the rapid publication of a notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on this subject…the failure to
complete Remote ID poses “serious risks” to the airspace and also
“stifle innovation” in the drone industry. There are many reasons for
this – the technology isn’t simple, there are multiple methods and
discussions over which is best, and many stakeholders in the mix”
(McNabb, 2019).
This section of the chapter offers a glimpse of new technologies,
tactics, techniques, and policies that are being explored to assist the
difficulties in the C-UAS surveillance and reconnaissance mission
areas. Technologies that were originally designed to protect military
installation are being modified for C-UAS missions. The Scanning
Surveillance Radar System (SSRS) is an example and is “ideally
suitable for the detection and precise location of several drones
of both classes (micro and mini UAS) at close range. In addition,
the SSRS system offers live tracking for up to four UAS in a
measurement range of 50 to 150 meters”(Caris, 2019). This
technology is effective for smaller UAS; additional combined sensor
technology must be used to create a full C-UAS spectrum of
protection.
Many C-UAS directories exist; however, a good amount of the
information is not vetted correctly or is more in an advertising
format than an informative format. The Counter UAS Directory from
www.unmannedairspace.info is one of the more comprehensive
lists. The latest edition had 83 technologies discussed within a
54-page document. The directory is free to the public and tends to
be vetted with only verifiable information listing “available counterUAS systems, networks, and components and is supplied free of
charge…Information is supplied directly by suppliers, with data
edited to remove unverifiable claims” (FAA, 2019).
One of the issues that have proven to be difficult in the C-UAS
arena is attempting to not only find and track a vehicle; it is
attempting to find where the vehicle is being controlled from and
who is controlling the vehicle. New technology is being developed
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to cope with this issue as “CACI’s SkyTracker® Technology Suite is
a counter-small unmanned aircraft system (C-sUAS) capability
comprised of different form factors designed to exploit the radio
communication between small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS)
and their controller” (CACI, 2019).
The SkyTracker® has three different form factors depending on
C-UAS requirements; they include the:
CORIAN system

provides

fixed

facility

protection

against

unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) threats to warfighters and critical
infrastructure. CORIAN detects, identifies, tracks, and mitigates
sUAS threats using precision neutralization techniques to ensure
little to no collateral damage to the surrounding radio frequency
(RF) spectrum and existing communications.
AWAIR® system

provides

on-the-move

force

or

facility

protection against hostile sUAS. The ruggedized mobile platform
leverages the CORIAN software baseline to precisely detect,
identify, and mitigate sUAS threats. The system can be easily
deployed on a vehicle or marine vessel, providing both ground and
maritime convoy protection.
CACI’s man-packable advanced attack system can defeat small,
complex UAS. The system surveys the environment to enable
deployed units to counter sUAS and analog video signals. The
system can operate autonomously to deliver precision distributed
attacks and provide rapid, responsive force protection capability in
hostile environments (CACI, 2019).
A U.S. applied research not-for-profit company known as SRC
“is applying its extensive background in electronic warfare, air
surveillance, and target detection, tracking and classification
algorithms to help detect, track and defend against low, slow and
small unmanned aircraft system (UAS) threats”

(Counter-UAS

Systems, 2016).
SRC has taken this knowledge and create C-UAS technology for
both the military and civilian market places.
Silent

Archer® counter-UAS

technology detects,

tracks,

identifies, and defeats hostile UAS. The technology comprises
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proven, radar and electronic warfare systems, a camera for visual
identification of targets, and a 3-D user display to provide the
warfighter with advanced situational awareness.
Small, slow, low-flying drones can easily slip through current
security measures, posing an undetected threat to personnel and
property. SRC’s Gryphon Skylight® drone security solution relies
on radar and spectrum sensing to detect and identify UAS,
commercial aircraft, and even birds to give you a clear picture of
your secure airspace (Counter-UAS Systems, 2016).
Mission Planning Secrecy – Protecting the Data
The first question in protecting the data is, does it matter if
the data is seen by others? This may seem counterintuitive to this
conversation; however, encrypting data carries costs that may not
be needed in most C-UAS scenarios. The art of surveillance and
reconnaissance tends to be done in the shadows. In the C-UAS
arena it might be more advantageous to allow the information to be
known by all who have access, allowing for additional informational
inputs and more “eyes” on the subject aircraft. Now, the response
to the subject aircraft is another matter, as individual companies
and governments may not want to disclose the exact methods being
employed and the effect these methods will have on the subject
aircraft. Information such as acoustics signatures is important to
mask and not be disclosed as today’s sensor includes
a range of tracking and data collection capabilities and
visualizations, including early warning alerts with target bearings,
multiple simultaneous threat detection, and tracking, and 3D-track
of targets. The system can be configured with multiple networked
sensors to support a wide area of coverage, from remote field
operations to congested urban environments. Captured data can be
integrated into existing command and control software programs to
support Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, operations,
and decision-support applications (General Atomics demonstrates
acoustic drone-detector to US Army, 2019).
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The nature of most UAS platforms are inexpensive and openly
available components, yet these components are often:
built independently without cyber protection standards built-in
leaving the systems vulnerable, and the very nature of “plug and
play” tends to create incompatibility in cyber protection with very
few if any true data standards.
Analysis

of

the

configuration

and

flight

controllers/

microprocessors of several popular UAV models having multiple
rotors revealed weaknesses associated with both the telemetry links
streaming data to and from a drone via serial port connections (in
which information could be captured, modified, or injected), and the
UAVs’ connections to their ground station interface (whose data link
could be spoofed, enabling hackers to assume complete control of
the vehicle).” (Nichols & et.al, 2019)
Sensor data security and the threat of attacks within the cyber
domain must be a part of all aspects of mission planning. Mission
planning will require tradeoffs between target area access, sensor
capability and availability, information time dominance, and cyber/
data security requirements.
Mission Planning for C-UAS for Perimeter Protection
Now that the foundation of combined for C-UAS has been
discussed, the placement and interconnection of these sensors
systems are required for triangulation of the UAS. As seen in Figure
5-8, the interlocking nature and overlap of sensors will create a
triangulation of the UAS target.
Figure 5-8: Overlapping Sensor Example
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Source: (Perimeter Protection & Defense, 2019).
In protecting the perimeter of a given facility, an in-depth analysis
must take place to understand the ability to obtain the security level
required before surveillance and renaissance of the area can begin.
Once the reconnaissance of the area is complete the surveillance of
any unauthorized UAS can occur and will be digitally documented
and the appropriate countermeasures taken against the offending
UAS.
Combining the correct sensors (discussed earlier) will depend on
many factors including:
• Topography (line of sight)
• Amount and height of buildings and human-made objects in
the area
• Protection level- Provide for 24/7 operations, all-weather (or
just during occupied times)
• Frequency noise level-electromagnetic interference
• Applicable laws for the area/country
• Threat level-is there known threats in the area-critical
infrastructure or protecting the family business
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• Most likely type of threat (quad-rotor with EO/IR sensor or
fixed-wing suicide UAS)
• What are the likely responses to the threat? How does the
combined sensors system verify the threat has been
neutralized or has left the area and is no longer a threat?
• What is the budget for C-UAS? How much of this budget can
be allocated to surveillance and reconnaissance?
• Can the sensors cover hidden areas or pockets without
overlapping coverage?
Each of these factors will affect the type and number of sensors
placed and how these sensors report back, store information, and
are utilized during the normal course of time, or during a C-UAS
threat event and the threat de-escalation and neutralization phase.
Additionally, technology refresh schedules should be considered as
the UAS market continues to evolve, and the tactics and techniques
from threat actors get more sophisticated. The planning for C-UAS
perimeter protection must be updated to match the new threats.
Conclusions
Reviewing

the

difference

between

surveillance

and

reconnaissance in the context of C-UAS offers distinctions between
the typical thought process of sensors looking down on a target and
the reality of the difficulty in attempting to find UAS targets in the
vastness of the sky. The sensors that track manned aircraft are often
not good at finding and tracking UAS as the size, materials, heat
signatures, and overall UAS radar profiles are vastly different than of
manned aircraft. The ability to discern this difference, catalog it and
maintain the accuracy of the database information is imperative to
avoid loss of life from an accidental mischaracterization of manned
aircraft versus from a hostile UAS. The introduction of ADS-B will
assist in identifying manned aircraft in controlled airspace. The
transponder will also make the task of determining a threatening
UAS in this airspace easier to detect and mitigate. The use of
multiple sensor suites and continued innovation in this space is
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required to have the best chance of allowing surveillance and
reconnaissance to occur in this ever-changing and growing field of
UAS. The overall identification mechanisms, be it administrative or
technical for UAS are issues that are still being developed through
the creation or adaptation of policies, laws, and governances by
aviation authorities across the globe. The ability for all aviation
authorities to agree upon identification mechanisms, ontologies and
taxonomies of the UAS arena along with national and international
cooperation agreements offers an opportunity to positively impact
the safety of the aviation community.
Questions
1. What is the difference between reconnaissance and
surveillance in the context of C-UAS?
2. What airspace can UAS operate in? (Hint below 400AGL)
3. For C-UAS surveillance and reconnaissance, does the UAS size
and composition matter? Why or why not?
4. How would you position multiple sensors to surveil a given
area for C-UAS?
5. What is the correct sensor placement for triangulating UAS?
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Chapter 6: C-UAS Evolving
Methods of Interdiction
CANDICE CARTER

Student Learning Objectives
There are several goals for student learning in this chapter:
1. To understand the need for Interdiction in C-UAS,
2. To see the need to increase security UAS Supply chain
management potentially using Blockchain,
3. To dig into the Blockchain process and understand its
strengths and vulnerabilities and its relationship to aircraft
communications,
4. To recognize the hurdles that Blockchain may face like 5G and
public acceptance.

Why is Interdiction Needed?[1]
Unmanned aircraft receives external communication through
radar. There are four different types of radar: active (using the
drone’s transmitter or illuminator), passive (using another drone’s
transmitter), basic (from one location) and multistatic (when the
radar transmitter and receiver are at different locations) (Chantz,
2016). In addition, radar is used with a measure of signals and
patterns to direct the drone out of harm’s way. This communication
process is based on a network of trust. GNSS/GPS jamming, and
spoofing are methods that compromise the blind aviation trust of
the external communications the unmanned aircraft receives. Other
methods of electronic compromise have created a challenge when
addressing C-UAS.
Methods of interdiction should be one step ahead of the
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unmanned aircraft industry to become an effective offensive
security measure.
What is a Blockchain?
Most people associate blockchain with cryptocurrency, not all
blockchains are created with the same product in mind. At the most
basic level, every blockchain is a digital ledger of transactions that
take place on a peer-to-peer network with the ability to control
visibility — who has permission to see which data (Marx, Sealy,
& Thompson, 2019). Each step the transaction makes through the
supply chain it is assigned an encrypted block. Each block contains
information about a certain number of transactions, a reference to
the preceding block in the blockchain, and an answer to a complex
mathematical challenge known as the “proof of work”. The concept
of proof of work is used to validate the data associated with that
particular block as well as to make the creation of blocks
computationally “hard”, thereby preventing attackers from altering
the blockchain in their favor (Ferrer, 2017)
The blockchain network has four main components viz,
asymmetric cryptography and node applications, transactions and
blocks, the distributed ledger, and the consensus mechanism
Blockchain is can be considered trustless, since the transaction
participates do not require trust. Inversely to digital certificates,
which a client trusts the certificate presented by a certificate
authority on behalf of a website, to conduct secure transactions.
Figure 6-1: Blockchain in Supply Chain Management
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Source: (3i Infotech, 2019)
The Process of Blockchain Synchronization
The advantage of decentralization and the distribution of
information in the blockchain is also a vulnerability. Depending on
the implemented framework of blockchain, the scalability and
consensus becomes more challenging to guarantee performance of
the blockchain process. Below is a list of parameters that determine
synchronization mechanism between nodes in a distributed system
(consensus mechanism) (Bogdanov, et al., 2018):
• Decentralized governance: a single central authority cannot
ensure the completion of a transaction.
• Quorum structure: Nodes exchange messages in
predestination (paths that may include steps or levels).
• Authentication: this process provides the means to verify the
identity of participants.
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• Integrity: it provides verification of the integrity of a
transaction (for example, mathematically by means of
cryptography).
• Non-repudiation: provides a means to verify that the intended
sender actually sent the message.
• Privacy: this helps ensure that only the intended recipient can
read the message.
• Fault tolerance: The network works efficiently and quickly,
even if some nodes or servers do not work or are slow.
• Performance: considers bandwidth, survivability, scalability
and latency.

The blockchain is not full proof from attacks. Established chains
of reliable users can be used to carry out a third-party attack
(Bogdanov, et al., 2018). Also, there is the possibility of including
third parties as an additional node of the Blockchain system with
the participation of an unscrupulous partner of a streamlined chain
(Bogdanov, et al., 2018).
Blockchain Aircraft Communication
Announced in 2018, as of January 1, 2020, the FAA will now enforce
the mandatory installation of Version 2 ADS-B Out system to fly in
most controlled U.S. airspace. The ADS-B system uses GPS satellites
verses the traditional ground-based radar. The advantage of GPS
based system, FAA will be able to see information such as
registration number, precise location, aircraft dimensions, etc.
However, the rules were published May 27, 2010 and the DOD
submitted comments to the FAA of ADS-B compromising the safety
of special flights and missions. This lag in time is significant in
understanding the threat that emerged over the past ten years,
before implementation the ADS-B out system can be considered
already out of date.
On January 12, 2020, Ronald J. Reisman (NASA Ames Research
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Center) published research entitled,” Air Traffic Management
Blockchain Infrastructure for Security, Authentication, and Privacy
“. Mr. Reisman outlines the vulnerabilities of ADS-B for civil and
military aviation and provides the solution of blockchain. “The
design innovation is the use of an open source permissioned
blockchain framework to enable aircraft privacy and anonymity
while providing a secure and efficient method for communication
with air traffic services, operations support, or other authorized
entities,” Notes Mr. Reisman (Global Business Outlook, 2020). Mr.
Reisman’s scalable framework will include certificate authority,
smart contract support, and higher-bandwidth communication
channels for private information that may be used for secure
communication between any specific aircraft and any particular
authorized member (Global Business Outlook, 2020) The blockchain
would essential provide a method to encrypting the ADS-B
transmissions. Aviation Blockchain Infrastructure (ABI) design that
enables aircraft to communicate effectively, securely, and privately
with air traffic management and other properly authorized entities
(Reisman, 2019). In the case of unmanned aircrafts, blockchain
brings security to Radio Frequency by keeping a high-speed,
assured ledger of airspace activity and information regarding the
drone and its operator, and distributing it to all appropriate parties
(Chantz, 2016).
Figure 6-2: Notional Design of Blockchain-Mitigated Channels
of Communication
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Source: (Reisman, 2019)
Figure 6-2 shows the Notional design of blockchain-mitigated
channels of communication. Chain code (aka ‘Smart Contracts’)
routes the information appropriately between aircraft and the
ground-based ATM and other support services (Reisman, 2019).
ABI proposed by Mr. Reisman is based on Hyperledger Fabric, a
Linux based opensource tools and blockchains with contributions
from Intel, IBM, and SAP. Hyperledger Fabric allows for the creation
of a private and permissioned blockchain. Through services called
“private channels” as a means to communicate private information
at a comparatively high bandwidth. These private channels may be
used to pass a private key (or time-key data structure) suitable for
encrypting ADS-B Out transmissions between any specific aircraft
and any particular authorized member in accordance with the
terms of the smart contracts associated with the particular private
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channel (and subnet). The use of ciphertext enables ADS-B users
to maintain privacy and anonymity from general public while also
providing a secure and efficient method for communication with
authorized entities, such as Air Traffic Services or Airline
Operations Services (Reisman, 2019).
Blockchain to encrypt ADS-B transmissions is in the testing
phases. While this is a solution for right now, we need to look ahead
to understand how blockchain, as ADS-B could become present new
risks verses a solution in particular verticals of aviation.
Blockchain Vulnerabilities
First document blockchain successful hack occurred in 2011. A
simple case of compromised credentials. Victorious hacks of
blockchains have continued along with the sophistication of attacks.
Manipulation

of

signatures,

overwriting

transactions,

etc.

Prominently the attacks on blockchains come back to one of the
basic security issues that no vertical has solved, compromise of
the company employees and systems. It is amazing to see social
engineering techniques that can date back to the days of Frank
Abagnale Jr. are still just as effective as they were in 1960’s. A simple
act of piggybacking through a secure door, picking up items that
were left on the printer, and photographic diagrams with IP
addresses can lead to a system’s compromise. Below are additional
blockchain attacks that could lead to breaking the blockchain:
Blockchain Attack Scenarios (Anwar, 2019)
• A 51% Attack
The majority of Blockchains use the prove of work to
communicate the verified transactions in the block. The
mining for the prove of work entails the nodes spend large
amounts

of

trustworthy

computing
enough

to

power
add

to

prove

information

themselves
about

new

transactions to the database (Orcutt, February)
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• Blockchain Protocol Code Bugs
Bad actors exploit those loopholes
• Routing Attacks
Bad Actors can intercept communication channels with a
compromise of ISP
• Smart Contract Bugs/Compromise
If a smart contract is changed it the blockchain is gravely
impacted. Since transactions cannot be undone, a “fork” in
the blockchain (a new branch of the blockchain) will need to
occur to bring the process back up.
• Sybil Attack
The attacker is running multiple fake nodes on a blockchain
network that can block receiving and transmission of blocks.
• Direct Denial of Service (DDoS)
Flooding the network with requests to stop all functions.
There are critics that claim the decentralization of the
blockchain reduces the risk of DDoS. However, several
successful attacks DD0S on blockchains have taken place.
Blockchain Unmanned Aircrafts
Blockchain brings new functionality to the unmanned aircraft
industry. The UAS vertical has struggled with air traffic control,
identity management, insurance, and security. In march 2017, IBM
patent

filing

outlines

using

distributed

ledger

technology

(blockchain) can provide effective techniques for managing data
related to commercial and recreational drones, particularly when a
security risk level is considered to be relatively high (Cant, 2019).
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IBM was not alone, Intel, Accenture, and numerous individuals
applied for unmanned aircraft technology patents. Walmart out
applied all organizations with their unmanned aircraft technology
patents.

From

pizza

cooking

delivery

to

compromise

of

communication while delivery is in progress.
U.S. Unmanned Aircraft Patents
The patents filed over the past seven years referencing unmanned
aircrafts and blockchain give an indication of the direction of the
technology. China globally leads the way with 62% of the blockchain
patents applications (IAM, 2019). The United States is at a mere 22%
globally with blockchain patents applications (IAM, 2019). However,
Korea grants 54 % of the blockchain patents filed (IAM, 2019). These
numbers are concerning for the United States, blockchain security
and process will be the future of all verticals not just in the drone
industry. Highlighted below are a few of the newsworthy United
States patents.
IBM patent application for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Date
Management highlights the use of blockchain securing the
unmanned aerial data. “The chain can be considered a chronicle
of a UAV’s path through time. When a transaction is conducted,
the corresponding UAV parameters are sent to one or more of the
computing nodes in the system for validation. The one or more
computing nodes establish a validity of the transaction and generate
a new block. Once the new block has been calculated, it can be
appended to the stakeholder’s UAV blockchain. Among many other
advantages, the use of a blockchain infrastructure helps in
identifying misbehaving UAVs by multiple parties and such activities
are recorded in an immutable ledger.” (United States of America
Patent No. US2018/027024A, 2019)
One of Walmart’s patents outlines security for electronic
communications

in

connection

with

a

package

delivery.

“Authentication can be performed at the delivery communication
and control system and/or other security systems by visual
recognition such as facial recognition, biometric fingerprint
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analysis, and so on, audio recognition such as voice signatures,
biometric recognition via a fingerprint or retinal scanning device
(not shown) at the unmanned vehicle, blockchain recognition for
scanning a blockchain signature or key for authentication, and so
on.” (United States of America Patent No. US2018/0205682A, 2018).
In 2019, Walmart filed a patent application for Cloning Drones Using
Blockchain. This Walmart patent application focuses on data
integrity, “A blockchain ledger may store any kind of information
that may be stored in any other format or medium, for example, a
large list of instructions of different types, navigational information,
and maps. In such a way, a same software profile may be deployed
across the cloned drone” (Foxley, 2019)
Countering a Blockchain Unmanned Aircraft Attack
Published research of countering a blockchain unmanned aircraft
attack is a sparse. However, a counter technique can be developed
by applying known flaws of blockchain technology. A successful
attack involves multiply vectors. Using the following vectors an
affective counterattack can be formulated:

• If blockchain is used for synchronized unmanned aircraft
attack by a bad actor, it can be determined the decentralized
algorithm requires will require significantly lower
communications bandwidth. Therefore, sharing intel on
obstacle-free regions in their immediate vicinity (Ferrer, 2017).

• As referenced in the beginning of the chapter, SSL certificates
are used encrypt the blockchain. When a flaw in the
encryption algorithm arises, or as computing power continues
to become stronger, the encrypted data may then be
decrypted to reveal private details (Fitzpatrick, 2019). In 2017,
industry drone manufacture DJI had an incident of SSL
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certificate leak. Leading cloud security systems, for example
Imperva’s Incapsula, compromised undisclosed amount of
customer SSL certificates. Imperva has seven out of 10 global
telecom providers, half of the top ten United States
commercial banks, along with other prominent industries
(Imperva, 2018).

• The UAV sensor system consists of the sensory equipment of
the UAV together with integrated pre-processing
functionalities. For common military UAVs these sensors are
often cameras with different capabilities. UAVs may be
equipped with further sensors, such as INS, GPS and radar
(Hartmann & Steup, 2018). Sensors with external references are
more susceptible to jamming and spoofing than sensors with
internal references. External references generally impose a risk
to the integrity of the system (Hartmann & Steup, 2018).

Taking these vulnerabilities into consideration the following steps
can be used to counter a blockchain unmanned aircraft attack. The
methods below are homegrown hacking methods and purchased
commercial solutions.

• Skyjack Drone Hack, developed by hacker and researcher Samy
Kamkar. Drone that flies around seeking Seeks wireless signal
of any other drone in area. Forcefully disconnects wireless
connection of true owner of target drone. Authenticates with
target drone pretending to be its owner (O’Malley, 2019)
• SSL interception proxy using Burp Suite, using the steps below
(Vanunu, Barda, & Zaikin, 2018):
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1. Open our Burp Suit Certificate and cast it to X509Certificate.
2. Load a KeyStore and put the certificate inside.
3. Create TrustManagerFactory and initialize it with the KeyStore
we just created that contains our Burp Suit certificate.
4. Overload the SSLContext and hook the TrustManager with our
TrustManager.

• Sensor Jamming: disruption to inter–drone communications by
manipulating UAS onboard sensors can be archived by Sensor
Jamming. Jamming sensors can impact GPS signals by giving
false GPS information (camera/gimbal dislocation, heading
sensor demagnetization, etc.). “High intensity light directed at
an optical sensor can blind it. GPS receivers can be cyberspoofed, which consists of transmitting a stronger, but false,
GPS signal to a receiver, resulting in inaccurate navigation.
Influencing the local magnetic field can have adverse effects
on both onboard hard drives and sensors that require
magnetic orientation to operate correctly.” (Boutros,
2015)(Humphreys, 2012)

Using proven techniques of signal jamming, SSL interception
proxy, and sensor jamming potentially counter a blockchain
unmanned aircraft attack. Evolving technology will continue to
change the characteristics of blockchain but the basic concept gives
the layout of the process.
Next Counter-UAS Hurdle – 5G Communication, Blockchain,
Unmanned Aircrafts
What will the combination of 5G Communication and Blockchain
bring to UAS? Counter-UAS? 5G is the fifth-generation mobile
network (Qualcomm, 2020). 5G is a unified platform that will
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support a larger range of bands (1GHz to millimeter-wave) and 100%
more traffic with latency of 1ms, along with other improvements.
The combination of 5G and blockchain will enable traffic
management to geofence unmanned aircrafts. “…envision the use
of the emerging 5G networking technology for that. 5G networking
technology is the next generation of cellular networks. It is designed
to provide much higher speed—larger bandwidth and smaller
latency—higher reliability and the ability to serve a larger number
of users, in comparison to 4G. To do that, the radio spectrum is
partitioned into bands, with different frequencies—from low to
extremely high.” (Tasevski, 2018). Blockchain will be used to reach
the consensus in the environment. 5G integrated at all levels of UAS
(physical, network, and joint communication) and blockchain will
bring greater control to air traffic management. China based studies
have researched the creation of UAS-based antenna array system
with high data rate and low service time can be created using 5G.
The UAS-based antenna data will be protected by blockchain (Bin
Li & Zhang, 2019). In the publication of Unmanned Aircrafts in the
Cyber Domain, (by the authors of this publication) gives the use case
of a cyber weapon deployed from a small UAS. The research points
to the use of this UAS cyber weapon to cause the 2017 collusions
of U.S. Navy Warships with commercial vessels. When reviewing the
research of that incident combined with the creation of UAS-based
antenna with 5G and blockchain, the threat level of advanced attack
of vessels increases. Just this incident alone justifies the need for
offensive security to be a priority for UAS commercial, military, and
hobbyist.
Figure 6-3: 5g Communications/ Blockchain Geofence for the
Financial District of Manhattan NYC
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Source: (Tasevski, 2018)
Challenges Facing Interdiction Methods for C-UAS
Unmanned aircrafts hobby, military and commercial have their
own unique attack methods, impacts, and risks. Geographic
location, event, and intention can determine the method of
prohibiting a drone attack. From a nation-state conflict to an
outdoor concert, reviewing the scenarios and using a risk model can
highlight the efficacy between C-UAS methods. With the addition
of blockchain, 5G communication, and the evolution of UAS
technology the risks/threats increase. Per contra, blockchain and
5G communication presents a substantial threat for the creation of
an effective C-UAS.
Conclusions
Blockchain represents a disruptive security technology that may
significantly improve the C-UAS supply chain management. It also
faces some stiff challenges because of inherent vulnerabilities.
Blockchain and 5 G communications are a mixed blessing and with
increased UAS technology, comes increased threats.
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[1] prohibiting or forbidding intercepting and preventing the
movement of something.
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Chapter 7: UAS Area /
Airspace Denial
J.P. HOOD

Student Learning Objectives:

The student will obtain an

understanding of how state entities deny potential known and
unknown adversaries from gaining access via UAS and air assets
into a protected area, resource or installation. Through the use of
real-world examples and case studies, the student will be able to
visualize and understand the intricacies and planning required for
state and local actors to adequately protect an area from possible
intrusion, exploitation and attack.
Key Concepts:
A2 / AD (Anti-Access / Area Denial) is primarily designed to
prevent or constrain the deployment of opposing forces into an
area of operations
Anti-Access: Denying an adversary the ability to enter and
operate military forces near, into or within a contested region.
Area-Denial: Used to reduce freedom of maneuver once an
adversary is within an area of operations.
IADS (Integrated Air Defense Systems)
Simply put, the act of an adversary to work against the actions
of another defines what anti-access or area denial environments
are. More formally, the U.S Department of Defense (DoD) Joint
Operational Access Concept (JOAC) defines these terms: “Antiaccess (A2) refers to those actions and capabilities, usually longrange, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an
operational area. Area denial (AD) refers to those actions and
capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an
opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the
operational area.” (Cuddington, 2015 )
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Figure 7-1 The Premise of Anti-Access / Area Denial

Source: (Stratfor, 2019)

Some examples of existing and emerging A2AD capabilities:

• Multi-layered integrated air defense systems (IADS), consisting
of modern fighter/attack aircraft, and fixed and mobile
surface-to-air missiles, coastal defense systems,
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• Cruise and ballistic missiles that can be launched from multiple
air, naval, and land-based platforms against land-based and
maritime targets,
• Long range artillery (LRA) and multi launch rocket systems
(MLRS),
• Diesel and nuclear submarines armed with supersonic seaskimming anti-ship cruise missiles and advanced torpedoes;
• Ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force,
• Advanced sea mines
• Kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite weapons and supporting
space launch and space surveillance infrastructure,
• Sophisticated cyber warfare capabilities,
• Electronic warfare capabilities,
• Various range ISR systems,
• Comprehensive reconnaissance-strike battle networks
covering the air, surface and undersea domains; and
• Hardened and buried closed fiber-optic command and control
(C2) networks tying together various systems of the battle
network,
• Special Forces
(Erdogan, behorizon.com)
Recent Rise in A2-AD Ideologies and Challenges
As potential near peer adversaries to the US such as China, Russia,
Iran and North Korea continue to gain technological ground and
modernize multi layered defense networks, the US DoD and State
Department have realized that control of the commons will soon
be challenged and an increased understanding of A2-AD concepts
is necessary in order to develop ways to mitigate, penetrate and
exploit adversarial defense networks. The US’s continued reliance
on UAS as platforms to act as ISR and communications relays as
well as deliver precision guided munitions has proven to be a more
realistic way to counter the growing security threats posed by ever
more robust adversarial A2-AD systems. Nathan Freier from the
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Centers for Strategic and International Studies effectively codified
through a series of question and answers why A2-AD concepts
continue to remain a major theme at the forefront of military
operational planning.
From the widest strategic perspective, U.S. access challenges
manifest across traditional instruments of power. To the extent that
these challenges adversely affect the security and prosperity of the
United States and its allies, an open and stable international system,
and/or freedom to transit the global commons, they will require
coordinated U.S. government/allied responses to restore access. By
definition, this will routinely involve military forces. (Freier, 2012)
This is not meant to suggest that all access challenges are military
in origin and character. In the Asia-Pacific region, for example,
China is as much or more an active political and economic
challenger—seeking to raise myriad barriers to U.S. influence—as
it is a military competitor. Likewise, in the Middle East, Iran has
some dangerous military capabilities but successfully avoids direct
military confrontation with the United States, advances its interests,
and limits U.S. freedom of action most often through cost-imposing
political subterfuge. What is certain, however, is that when
adversaries

effectively

combine

political,

economic,

and

informational tools with important military capabilities, the access
challenge becomes more acute and potent. (Freier, 2012)
U.S. military forces have a unique responsibility in helping secure
access during times of peace, increased hostilities, and open
conflict. The latter is the most demanding and, as of late, the subject
of the greatest body of conceptual work. Under routine
circumstances, maintenance of credible deterrent capabilities
forward in key regions provides a stabilizing influence, actively
underwrites the security of U.S./partner interests, and secures a
concrete platform from which to expand presence and conduct
operations in the event of heightened tensions or hostilities. (Freier,
2012)
In the event of war or major violent conflict, U.S. forces will face
a variety of A2/AD challenges that will originate both from the
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hostile designs of thinking adversaries and from the “unstructured”
lethality of contagious instability. In virtually every instance,
forward-stationed U.S. forces will be insufficient to overcome lethal
or fundamentally disruptive A2/AD challenges and effectively
resolve the crisis by themselves. Therefore, future combat
operations—whether coercive air and sea campaigns or more wideranging joint interventions—will require the United States and its
partners to project substantial military capability over considerable
strategic and operational distances. A2/AD challenges frustrate our
ability to do so. (Freier, 2012)
Thus, at the “business end” of opposed operations, U.S. forces
will increasingly compete with a diverse collection of adversaries
for dominance across multiple domains—air, sea, land, space, and
cyberspace. This will often occur without the benefit of extensive
fixed U.S. regional basing and with “local” U.S. infrastructure under
substantial pressure from hostile action. As a consequence, the
character of specific lethal access challenges, their diversity, and
their sophistication will differ significantly. In combination, the real
constraints of finite military capability, the increasing lethality of
virtually every conceivable contingency environment from peace
operations to regional war, and lower U.S. risk tolerance make deep
thought about lethal or fundamentally disruptive A2/AD challenges
an urgent strategic priority. (Freier, 2012)
Anti-Access Challenges
To U.S. strategists, A2 challenges are intended to exclude our
forces from a foreign theater or deny effective use and transit of
the global commons. More broadly, A2 challenges might first involve
political and economic exclusion, where competitor states actively
attempt to deny the United States the broad political and economic
influence it has long enjoyed. In military terms, this may translate
into blanket denial of basing, staging, transit, or over-flight rights.
(Freier, 2012)
Under more hostile circumstances, lethal A2 instruments include
sophisticated longer-range adversary capabilities and methods like
Chapter 7: UAS Area / Airspace Denial | 159

ballistic missiles, submarines, weapons of mass destruction, and
offensive space and cyberspace assets. Equally dangerous but less
technical A2 methods might include terrorism or proxy warfare
employed by U.S. opponents to open alternative “fronts,” distract
attention, and impose excessive costs politically. (Freier, 2012)
Hostile A2 capabilities and methods are intended first to see U.S.
risk calculations breach “high” or “unacceptable” levels during
planning in order to prevent U.S. regional intervention altogether.
But, in the event of active hostilities, adversaries would employ their
lethal A2 assets from a distance to keep the United States at arm’s
length, perhaps deny introduction of U.S. forces and capabilities
in substantial numbers, and barring either outcome, exact
prohibitively high costs on the United States when and if U.S. forces
attempt to breach an opponent’s A2 defenses. Given China’s
increased assertiveness, current military capability, and raw
potential, an acute, sophisticated, and comprehensive A2 challenge
is emerging in Asia. There is clearly some grand strategic risk
associated with excessively militarizing the nature of the
competition between the United States and China, as the locus of
real competition may lie substantially outside the reach of DoD and
the military instrument. (Freier, 2012)
Area Denial Challenges
Over the near to mid-term, lethal area denial (AD) challenges
present U.S. strategists with the most prolific barriers to effective
theater entry and operation. Every conceivable contingency
employment of air, sea, or ground forces will need to overcome
significant AD obstacles. Lethal AD threats manifest at close range.
Their effects begin accruing as U.S. forces enter a hostile or
uncertain theater to conduct joint operations, and in the end, they
complicate our attempts to establish an effective presence in, over,
or in range of an adversary’s territory or interests. Lethal or
disruptive AD challenges are present and can attack U.S.
vulnerabilities in all five key domains—air, sea, land, space, and
cyberspace.
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They do so first by providing the means to physically resist U.S.
entry into theater. Subsequently, they limit freedom of action once
U.S. forces have arrived. Then, they frustrate our efforts to rapidly
achieve favorable strategic and operational outcomes. And, finally,
they threaten to impose very high costs on U.S. forces should
extended military operations become unavoidable. Like A2
challenges, AD threats can poison U.S. risk calculations well before
the initiation of an operation by increasing the mission’s perceived
degree of difficulty. After entry, AD challenges force U.S.
decisionmakers to persistently question the mounting costs
associated with continued operations. (Freier, 2012)
Lethal AD capabilities range from the sophisticated to the crude
but effective. They include cruise and ballistic missiles; weapons
of mass destruction; mines; guided rockets, mortars, and artillery;
electronic warfare; and short-range/man-portable air defense and
anti-armor

systems.

Revolutions

in

information;

personal

computing, communications, and networking; and irregular and
hybrid forms of warfare—combined with the proliferation of
precision

weapons

lethality—substantially

and
widen

the

improvised
universe

of

battlefield
effective

AD

adversaries from individuals and loosely organized groups to
sophisticated

regional

powers.

Likewise,

the

networked

mobilization of foreign popular, nonviolent resistance may also
prove to be a significant challenge to freedom of action in the
future as well. To the extent U.S. opponents can leverage all of these
capabilities and methods both directly and through proxies, the
more the AD challenge will expand geometrically. As noted above,
an effective combination of political, economic, and informational
methods with sophisticated lethal and/or disruptive AD capabilities
will make any specific challenge more resilient and potent. (Freier,
2012)
Whereas lethal A2 challenges are virtually always the product of
deliberate enemy design, AD challenges don’t have to be. They can
be “structured” or “unstructured.” Iran’s hybrid “mosaic defense,”
for example, is structured. Though highly unconventional, it is part
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of a coherent cost-imposing strategy. Its combination of ballistic
and cruise missiles, unconventional naval forces, and hybrid ground
defenses—matched with tight Persian Gulf geography, Iran’s
physical depth, and its deep ties to regional proxies—offer a complex
structured AD challenge that strategic and operational planners
would have to account for in the event of hostilities. (Freier, 2012)
U.S. forces are likely to face unstructured AD challenges in the
course of interventions conducted under conditions of widespread
disorder, where local authorities have little or no control over
outcomes. Imagine military operations conducted in the same Iran
described above; this time, however, after failure of the regime and
in the midst of an ongoing civil war. U.S. forces might face multiple
competing adversaries all boasting some relatively sophisticated,
disruptive, and lethal AD capability but employing it all haphazardly
under no discernible centralized command and control, making
comprehensive defeat more problematic. (Freier, 2012)
Figure 7-2 Overcoming Adversarial Defenses
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Source: Image Attribute: Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)
in an Anti-Access, Area Denial Theatre/ Source: McNeal &
Associates (Associates, 2019)
According to the “Air-Sea Battle” concept, the general U.S.
solution to the A2/AD issue is to develop a network of integrated
forces capable of defeating the enemy across all modern war
fighting domains: air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. (US
Department of Defense, 2013) This concept recognizes that
adversary forces will likely attack without warning and forward
friendly forces will be in the A2/AD environment from the outset of
hostilities and must provide an immediate and effective response.
(Cuddington, 2015 )
Case Study: Countering Growing Chinese A2/AD in the Indo
Pacific Region
The United States has long enjoyed “command of the commons”:
worldwide freedom of movement on and under the seas and in the
air above 15,000 feet, with the ability to deny this same freedom
to enemies. This command has contributed to a remarkable era
of military primacy for U.S. arms against potential state rivals.
(Cuddington, 2015 )
Over the past few decades, state actors such as China have begun
to establish themselves in the pacific region, challenging the US’s
ability to project power in the region. China is one of the most
significant A2/AD threats at this time. China not only deters the
United States from deploying into the Western Pacific, but also
threatens to disrupt nearby operations such as around Taiwan or
the South China Sea. (Cuddington, Jeff, 2016)
While U.S. advanced fighters and bombers have inherent
advantages against China’s defenses, these aircraft are not immune
and are very limited in availability. A majority of American fighters,
bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and cruise missiles remain
extremely vulnerable. China’s integrated air defense system is
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virtually impossible to penetrate with current U.S. fourthgeneration aircraft. (Posen, 2003)
Furthermore, China is expected to increase its threat range with
the development of the S-400 (currently operational) missile
system, extending their air defense coverage out to over 200
nautical miles. (Cuddington, Jeff, 2016)
Many observers now fear that this era may be coming to an end
in the Western Pacific. For more than a generation, China has been
deploying a series of interrelated missile, sensor, guidance, and
other technologies designed to deny freedom of movement to
hostile powers in the air and waters off its coast. As this program has
matured, China’s ability to restrict hostile access has improved, and
its military reach has expanded. Many now believe that this “A2/
AD” (anti-access, area denial) capability will eventually be highly
effective in excluding the United States from parts of the Western
Pacific that it has traditionally controlled. Some even fear that China
will ultimately be able to extend a zone of exclusion out to, or
beyond, what is often called the “Second Island Chain”—a line that
connects Japan, Guam, and Papua-New Guinea at distances of up to
3,000 kilometers from China. A Chinese A2/AD capability reaching
anywhere near this far would pose major challenges for US security
policy. (Defense, 2006)
To avert this outcome, the United States has embarked on an
approach often called AirSea Battle (ASB). Named to suggest the
Cold War continental doctrine of “Air-Land Battle” (ALB), AirSea
Battle is designed to preserve U.S. access to the Western Pacific by
combining passive defenses against Chinese missile attack with an
emphasis on offensive action to destroy or disable the forces that
China would use to establish A2/AD. This offensive action would use
“cross-domain synergy” among U.S. space, cyber, air, and maritime
forces (hence the moniker “AirSea”) to blind or suppress Chinese
sensors. The heart of the concept, however, lies in physically
destroying the Chinese weapons and infrastructure that underpin
A2/AD. As Chinese programs mature, achieving this objective will
require U.S. air strikes against potentially thou- sands of Chinese
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missile launchers, command posts, sensors, supply net- works, and
communication systems deployed across the heart of mainland
China—some as many as 2,000 kilometers inland. Accomplishing this
mission will require a major improvement in the U.S. Air Force’s and
Navy’s ability to and distant targets and penetrate heavily defended
airspace from bases that are either hard enough or distant enough
to survive Chinese attack, while hunting down mobile missile
launchers and command posts spread over mil- lions of square
kilometers of the Chinese interior. The requirements for this
mission are typically assumed to include a major restructuring of
the Air Force to de-emphasize short-range fighters such as the
F-35 or F-22 in favor of longer-range strike bombers; development
of a follow-on stealthy long-range bomber to replace the B-2, and
its procurement in far greater numbers than its predecessor; the
development of unmanned long-range carrier strike aircraft; and
heavy

investment

in

missile

defenses

and

information

infrastructure. The result would be an ambitious modernization
agenda in service of an extremely demanding military campaign to
batter down A2/AD by striking targets deep in mainland China, far
afield from the maritime domains to which the United States seeks
access. (US Department of Defense, 2013)
Figure 7-3 Air Space Denial: Russian A2AD Strategy and Its
Implications for NATO
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Source:

(behorizon.org,

russian-a2ad-strategy-and-its-

implications-for-nato/ , 2019)
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
The integrated air defense system (IADS) threat today remains
a formidable challenge to air operations in nearly any foreseeable
major conflict. IADS modernization, coupled with significant
advancements in multi- domain military operations (Cyber, Global
C4ISR, Offensive Strike, Threats to Coalition Basing, etc.), poses a
significant area denial threat to U.S. air dominance that was virtually
guaranteed in past military operations. Fundamentally, the
foundational pillars of the IADS kill chain have remained unchanged
for decades; with mature processes and equipment widely fielded to
perform indications and warning (I&W), find/fix, track, engage, and
assessment functions. ((NASIC), 2019)
Battle Management Advancements: for the past 10+ years there
has been significant advancement with adversary global C4ISR
capabilities and their overall holistic approach to integrating
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disparate sources into a common, fused C4ISR infrastructure
supporting IADS. While many advanced C4ISR concepts remain in
their infancy, adversary current capabilities to process data globally
in a timely, actionable manner poses a significant obstacle to U.S.
global airpower and air operations. ((NASIC), 2019)
Weapons Control Advancements: since 2010, adversary IADS
modernization has included deployment of long-range anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) weaponry, supported by a vast deployment of
layered tactical systems to augment long-range capabilities. These
modern weapon systems threaten nearly every aspect of our
counter-IADS / suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD)
capabilities. Many of the emerging capabilities focus on the denial
of airborne ISR and increasing the threat to 4th /5th Generation
aircraft, cruise missiles, precision guided munitions, and UAVs.
((NASIC), 2019)
Understanding Emerging Vulnerable Gap
The potential exists for significant future developments to occur
in the following technologies and concepts that are emerging but
are not yet fully integrated and or operational:
• (U) Hypersonic defense
• (U) Cyber-enabled IADS
• Roll-out of modern directed energy weapons; combating
airborne platforms at tactical ranges
• Full integration of “Big Data,” artificial intelligence, and mature
net centric IADS operations
While adversary IADS capabilities continue to advance and pose
a significant threat to U.S. air dominance, there are still critical
vulnerabilities at nearly every echelon. C4I dependencies and
centralized processes permeate these systems – and create
opportunities for exploitation. ((NASIC), 2019)
Russian A2AD Case Study
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Russia’s recently deployed advanced A2AD capabilities such as;
long range precision air defense systems, fighters and bombers,
littoral anti-ship capabilities and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare),
mid-range mobile missile systems, new classes of quieter
submarines equipped with long range land attack missiles, counterspace, cyberspace, & EW weapons; and WMD assets in Kaliningrad
in Black Sea and partly in Syria have changed the military
environment.

With

additional

deployments

-thanks

to

modernization expected by 2020s- battlefield will be more
complicated than ever. These A2AD capabilities allow Russia to have
a new strategic buffer zone between NATO and Russia, but this
time within Alliance` own territory. They provide the ability to target
a large part of the Europe to influence, deter and deny NATO’s
potential operations in the High North, Baltic, Black Sea and East
Mediterranean regions. (Busch, 2016)
The figure below depicts only a part of the Russian A2AD
capabilities.
Figure 7-4 Russian A2AD Strategy Against NATO
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Source: HIS Janes; IISS Military Balance 2015 & (behorizon.org,
russian-a2ad-strategy-and-its-implications-for-nato/ , 2019)
Current C-UAS A2AD Civil Applications
As the need for more complex area defense for countering illicit
drone operations continues to grow, private industry has not
forgotten the needs for companies and individual consumers to
protect their personal and intellectual properties. Companies such
as DeDrone and Drone Shield currently offer a range of integrable
systems that are able to detect, track and deter commercial drones
from entering private or localized airspace. The greatest risks to
the public remain large open-air sporting venues / gatherings as
well as domestic infrastructure / open to the air resources. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and US Customs and
Border

Protection

technologies.

will

benefit

greatly

from

using

such

Local integrated systems will be able to stop

intruding drones from entering the US. These UAS have been
reported carrying payloads containing contraband and narcotics.
Drone Shield has developed Drone Sentry X that can intercept
incurring drones. Federal prisons have also implemented similar
systems from DeDrone in order to intercept and halt drone
deliverables from entering a prison yard.
Figure 7-5 Drone Shield Drone Sentry
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Source: (droneshield, droneshield.com/sentry, 2020)
Figure 7-6 Drone Sentry X

Source: (droneshield, dronesentry-x , 2020)
Conclusions
A2-AD and IADS are now center stage during all levels of
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operational planning conducted by the DoD. C-UAS considerations
/ technologies are the latest addition to planning and coordinating
an effective area defense from aerial intrusions. While drones
continue to operate in political grey areas focused on gaining access
and intelligence, governments and military forces are continuing
to seek non-kinetic technological means of tracking, denying and
engaging these systems. Experts in C-UAS must be able to
understand the unique challenges posed by fast moving systems
with ever increasing standoff ranges. They must be able to
recommend and employ systems that effectively counter these
threats while at the same time adhere to international and domestic
laws regarding vehicles in flight keeping the public safe from harm.
Innovative thinking at longer ranges will become more and more
crucial. Advances in emerging technologies such as hypersonic
vehicles that could potentially be delivered via UAS will continue
to drive the need for a more dynamically integrated defense
network(s). Decision processes will be forced to become that much
faster in order to effectively defend against these new threats.
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Chapter 8: Emerging
Interdiction Technologies
J.P. HOOD

Student Learning Objectives
The student will obtain an understanding of how the technologies
affecting C-UAS trends are changing and advancing at a rapid pace.
Everything from crude yet refined kinetic systems, hypersonic
vehicle deliverables and cyber enhanced technologies are being
developed to counter UAS incursion into protected air space. The
student must be able to grasp new ideas, understand and maintain
current doctrine and ideologies while thinking dynamically in order
to remain relevant in the C-UAS realm.
Hypersonic Threats
A hypersonic missile travels at speeds of Mach 5 and higher – five
times faster than the speed of sound (3836 mph), which is around
1 mile per second. Some missiles, such as Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal
air-launched ballistic missile, are allegedly capable of reaching
Mach

10

speeds

(7672

mph)

and

distances

up

to

1200

miles. (Bosbotinis, 2018)
A Hypersonic Cruise missile is a type of missile that reaches its
target with the help of a high-speed jet engine that allows it to
travel at extreme speeds, in excess of Mach-5. It is non-ballistic –
the opposite of traditional Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)
which utilizes gravitational forces to reach its target. (Bosbotinis,
2018)
When hypersonic missiles become operational, the gap between
missile defense systems and missile offence will be huge. Simply
put, there is no single operational missile defense system that is
capable of intercepting a hypersonic missile. Hypersonic missile
research and development remains at the classified level, however
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in recent months many governments have announced successful
tests and future projects. (Bosbotinis, 2018)
Hypersonic missiles offer a number of advantages over subsonic
and

supersonic

weapons,

particularly

with

regard

to

the

prosecution of time-critical targets (for example, mobile ballistic
missile launchers), where the additional speed of a hypersonic
weapon is valuable. It can also overcome the defenses of heavily
defended targets (such as an aircraft carrier). The development and
deployment of hypersonic weapon systems will provide states with
significantly enhanced strike capabilities and potentially, the means
to coerce. This will be the case where a major regional power, such
as Russia, may seek to coerce a neighbor, leveraging the threat of
hypersonic strikes against critical targets. As such, the proliferation
of hypersonic capabilities to regional states could also be
destabilizing, upsetting local balances of power. However, it could
also strengthen deterrence. (Bosbotinis, 2018)
Figure 8-1: Boeing X-51 Hypersonic
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Source: (Boyd, 2019)
Hypersonic technology comes from using a scramjet (supersonic
combustion ramjet) which is a variant of a ramjet airbreathing jet
engine in which combustion takes place in supersonic airflow. As in
ramjets, a scramjet relies on high vehicle speed to compress the
incoming air forcefully before combustion (hence ramjet), but
whereas a ramjet decelerates the air to subsonic velocities before
combustion, the airflow in a scramjet is supersonic throughout the
entire engine. That allows the scramjet to operate efficiently at
extremely high speeds. (Urzay, 2018)
Figure 8-2 Scramjet Engine Principles

Source: (Urzay, 2018)
Hypersonic Countermeasures
Although there are no current countermeasures in place,
technologies such as directed energy weapons, particle beams and
other non-kinetic weapons will be likely candidates for an effective
defense against hypersonic missiles. “Hypersonic weapons reduce
the time required to prosecute a target (especially compared to
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current subsonic cruise missiles), the warning time available to an
adversary, and the time available for defensive systems to engage
the incoming threat,” says Bosbotinis. Although hypersonic threats
would pose a significant challenge to current surface-to-air and
air-to-air missile systems, such systems would, particularly in the
conventional precision strike role, require a robust intelligence,
surveillance,

target

acquisition

and

reconnaissance

(ISTAR)

network. (Bosbotinis, 2018)
Directed Energy Weapons
As

UAS

systems

continue

to

advance

in

speed

and

maneuverability, enabling to remain outside of the engagement
envelopes of traditional air defense systems, directed energy
weapons have become the go to for low, slow and small UAS
defense. These systems range in size from man portable equipment
sets to permanent fixed sites. These systems typically offer a more
cost effective and much safer way to deter, deny and destroy small
tactical UAS with in a protected area of operations / facility.
In the fall of 2019, The US Air Force (USAF) has received the
first anti-unmanned aerial system (UAS) laser weapon system from
Raytheon to tackle the threat of enemy drones. The high-energy
laser weapon system features an advanced variant of Raytheon’s
Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS). It uses electro-optical /
infrared sensors to detect and track enemy drones. Once the UAS
is identified and targeted, the laser weapon system can engage
the threat and neutralize it instantly. The technology involves a
high-energy laser weapon system (HELWS) mounted on a small allterrain vehicle. A single charge is enough for the HELWS to provide
dozens of precise laser shots. Furthermore, the weapon system
supports pairing with a generator on the field to provide a nearly
infinite number of shots. (Media, 2019)
Figure 8-3: Raytheon Mobile High Energy Laser System
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Source: (Raytheon, 2019)
The Raytheon company’s advanced high-power microwave and
high-energy laser defeated dozens of drone targets in a U.S. Air
Force demonstration at the White Sands Missile Range in New
Mexico in the Spring of 2019. Airmen took control of both the
microwave and laser systems after just one day’s training. They used
an Xbox-style controller to direct the laser and a joystick to operate
the high-power microwave in real-world scenarios at the U.S. Army
White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The HEL system, paired
with Raytheon’s Multi-spectral Targeting System of sensors, uses
invisible beams of light. Mounted on a small, all-terrain, militarized
vehicle, the system detects, identifies, tracks and engages
drones. Raytheon’s HPM uses microwave energy to disrupt drone
guidance systems. High-power microwave operators can focus the
beam to bring down drone swarms. With a consistent power supply,
an

HPM

system

can

provide

virtually

unlimited

protection. (Raytheon, 2019)
On July 17th, 2019 a variant of the Marine Air Defense Integrated
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System (MADIS) family of counter drone systems, the Light Marine
Air

Defense

Integrated

System

(LMADIS),

in

use

by

the

USMC, downed an Iranian drone in the Persian Gulf, which flew
within 1,000 yards of a US Navy Vessel. The LMADIS is the product
of a rapid development effort by Ascent Vision Technologies (AVT),
the USMC Ground Based Air Defense team, and other partner
suppliers. (BiancaV, 2019)
Figure 8-4: Ascent Vision Technologies Marine Air Defense
Integrated System (MADIS)

Source: (BiancaV, 2019)
The Drone Gun MkIII is a compact, lightweight drone
countermeasure designed for one hand operation. The product
provides a safe countermeasure against a wide range of drone
models. It allows for a controlled management of drone payload
such as explosives, with no damage to common drones models or
surrounding environment due to the drones generally responding
via a vertical controlled landing on the spot, or returning back to the
starting point (assisting to track the operator), with an immediate
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cease of video back to the drone pilot. RF disruption activation will
also interfere with any live video streaming, first person view (FPV),
back to the remote controller halting the collection of video footage
and intelligence by the drone operator. (Shield, 2019)
Figure 8-5: Drone Gun MKIII

Source: (Shield, 2019)
Extreme Long-Range Cannon
In 2017, the US Army established a collection of cross-functional
teams (CFTs) aimed at rapidly pushing forward key technologies to
advance the services’ next generation of capabilities. One of those
teams was the Long-Range Precision Fires “pilot,” an effort to
develop the next generation of Army artillery—including “deep fires,”
an artillery capability that can strike at strategic targets well within
an adversary’s defenses. These systems seek to achieve a range of
1,000 nautical miles or more. There’s strong incentive for the Army
to succeed because an extreme-long-range gun could help deal
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with the difficulty posed by adversaries with advanced over-thehorizon radar, shore defenses, and air defense systems—such as the
kind being put in place by China in the South China Sea. (Gallagher,
2019)
Cyber-Enabled IADS
Figure 8-6: Typical Layered Russian Air IADS

Source: (Col Joseph Speed, 2019)
In order to allow friendly aircraft to conduct missions and support
joint air power operations across the spectrum of warfare – from
peacekeeping to high-intensity conflicts – NATO has nurtured
developments in the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
mission. However, the newest generation of complex and capable
enemy air defense assets threatens to overwhelm NATO’s current
SEAD abilities. (COL Speed USAF, 2018).
Over the last 20 years, potential adversaries of the Alliance have
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studied western military capabilities and have developed robust A2/
AD capabilities in response. Examples are abundant and include
threats such as the Russian SA-20 ‘Gargoyle’ and SA-21 ‘Growler’, the
Chinese – built HQ-9, and the Dong-Feng 21. These capabilities are
tailored to deny the ‘western way of war’ by precluding access to
what is arguably the west’s most potent influencer – air power. (COL
Speed USAF, 2018)
Additionally, many state and non-state actors have been
creatively employing military and commercial technologies to
develop a range of capabilities for symmetric, asymmetric, and
hybrid military activities, including AD. The technological trends
include the following: anti-stealth technology, hypersonic weapons,
cyber warfare, and access to and/or denial of space capabilities, to
name a few. For example, Russian long-range surface to air systems
now employ radar with anti-stealth technologies such as the
‘NNIIRT 1L119 Nebo SVU/RLM-M Nebo M’ mobile VHF active
electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. In the realm of
hypersonic, the Russians have an air-launched missile, the ‘Dagger’,
which can reach and maintain Mach 10. In addition, China is
developing anti-satellite capabilities such as the ‘Dong Neng 2 &
3’ exo-atmospheric vehicles. Primarily, these are direct-ascent
missiles designed to ram and destroy satellites. (COL Speed USAF,
2018)
Advances in computing power and digital signal processing are
allowing for more capable AD radars. These systems employ
advanced techniques to improve acquisition range and target size
detection and possess increased resistance to electronic attack or
deception. In addition, new ideas in electromagnetic spectrum
management are allowing radar technology to become more passive
than active, which significantly complicates locating and targeting
such sites. For instance, Russia is developing passive coherent radar
designed for stealthy detection of moving aerial, ground and abovewater targets in the protected area of important facilities. While
passive radar systems are already being employed in both ground
and air platforms, they are normally used to locate platforms vice
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engage them. That being said, passive radars will likely be able
to target and guide weapons against air threats soon, significantly
complicating the SEAD mission.
Adversaries’ legacy systems of hierarchical data management and
links are being replaced with multi-node, high-capacity, efficacy
networks, contributing to highly resilient, redundant, and robust
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The resiliency of
future C4ISR may be augmented by space-based technologies –
such as micro-satellite constellations – making an Integrated Air
Defense System (IADS) even more effective and agile. In addition,
it is quite possible that a nodular system might enable air defense
systems to continue to support operations through ‘remote’
operations, even if some parts of the IADS are damaged or
destroyed. A current example of this is Russia’s experimentation
with multi-node quantum networks. In effect, suppressing or
destroying local air defense assets, which are linked into a multinode network, may not provide effective suppression of the enemy
IADS. (COL Speed USAF, 2018)
The growing ability to operate systems remotely will not only
increase range of detection but will also increase remote crew
survivability. ‘Remoting’ operations and unmanned technologies
may not only increase the survivability of an IADS, but they will
likely extend its detection and targeting capabilities by hundreds
of miles. For example, the advancements in space technology may
extend the ‘remoting’ capabilities of an IADS to altitudes extending
into space. The combination of the aforementioned activities may
increase the passiveness of an IADS, deny its detection and
targeting, and make it resilient to most SEAD activities. (COL Speed
USAF, 2018)
Lastly, over the next twenty years very long-range surface-to-air
weapons, with advanced seeker guidance, smart warheads, and new
propulsion technologies, may be employed in enemy AD missions. In
particular, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) engagement zones may be
extended up to 500 km. One need look no further than the Russian
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S-500 next-generation SAM system to see the lethality of future
AD. Disturbingly, this particular missile system could enter service
as early as 2020. These new long-range weapons’ technologies may
contribute to a highly mobile, flexible IADS when combined with
increases in computing power and decreasing size of hardware and
processors. (COL Speed USAF, 2018)
IADS of the future are becoming even more lethal, agile whole
remaining difficult to detect on the battlefield. While the US will
continue to remain the dominate force through the air and space,
potential adversaries will most likely continue to heavily invest in
ways to undermine advances in aerial capabilities. These AD
systems have already become so advanced that the US military and
other nations are re-looking long range kinetic means to counter
them. Maintaining an adaptive and dynamic frame of mind will be
crucial in identifying and ultimately defeating these emerging
threats, ensuring continued success on the battlefields of the
future.
Big Data and Artificial Intelligence Integration
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the theory and development of
computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require
human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition,
decision-making, and translation between languages. Big data is the
field that treats ways to analyze, systematically extract information
from, or otherwise deal with data sets that are too large or complex
to be dealt with by traditional data-processing applications.
The incorporation of Artificial Intelligence into defense strategies
has already begun to transform NATO’s ISR and defense capabilities
in regard to the assimilation and processing of data in order to
effectively identify targets. Science and technology advancements
are helping to shape both the requirements and solutions for new
approaches in order to meet NATO capability needs.
These capabilities will ultimately enhance military decisionmaking

and

accelerate

the

acquisition

of

actionable

intelligence. The focus was on the impact on the OODA (observe,
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orient, decide, act) loop. We can see major impacts from AI, machine
learning and big data in the observe function in terms of being able
collect and assimilate large amounts of data and then process that
efficiently and effectively to identify potential targets. This then
helps orient towards specific areas of interest or targets of interest
that you are looking for through your ISR capabilities. (Bayley, 2018)
These techniques can also be used in a defensive manner as well.
Enhanced systems can potentially be used to detect, track and
decide whether or not to engage a threat based on stored data
sets and pre-determined patterns. This could potentially remove
humans from the decision-making process but at the same time
could reduce the time required to engage faster moving, more
technologically advanced threats.

Conclusions
C-UAS technologies are changing and advancing. Hypersonic
missiles, Directed Energy weapons (also covered in Chapter 10),
long- range cannons, mobile drone guns and Cyber -enabled IADS
represent steps in the future of Counter-UAS countermeasures.
Much of the research work on these fine weapons is classified,
necessitating only a brief open source treatment by the authors
about this subject.
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Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic:
Military Avionics,
EW,CW,DE,SCADA Defenses
R. K. NICHOLS

Student Objectives
Chapter 9 is a potpourri of non-kinetic technologies for C-UAS.
The student will be introduced to military avionics systems and
the roles they play in the defense matrix. Avionics are the primary
target of C-UAS efforts. A side-theme throughout this chapter is
that most military manned aviation roles can be filled with the
less costly unmanned option at reduced human liability. One of the
most interesting roles is the maritime patrol aviation (MPA) and is
singled out for coverage. Four areas will be explored in more detail:
electronic warfare (EW), cyber warfare (CW), directed energy (DE)
weapons and acoustic defenses. SWARMs continue to be a concern
and are addressed. (Osborn, 2019)
What Is the Counter -UAS Problem?
The risk of successful terrorist attacks on USA Air Defense
Systems (ADS) via sUAS/UASs is greater because of improving
commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones,
capable

of

carrying

sophisticated

imaging

equipment

and

significant payloads, are readily available to the public. A range of
terrorist, insurgent, criminal, corporate, and activist threat groups
have demonstrated their ability to use civilian drones and gather
intelligence. How does the country defend against a growing UAS
threat? This is also known as the counter – UAS Problem. General
James

D

Mattis,

SECDEF

summed

up

the

Problem

succinctly: (Nichols, et al., 2019)
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“Unmanned

Aircraft

are

being

developed

with

more

technologically systems and capabilities. They can duplicate some
of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both surveillance/
reconnaissance and attack missions. They can be small enough and
/ or slow enough to elude detection by standard early warning
sensor systems and could pose a formidable threat to friendly
forces.” (Chairman, 2012)
Operational Protection from Hostile UAS Attacks – A Helicopter
View
“According to LCDR Boutros of the Navy War College, developing
technologies do not paint a pleasant picture of counter – UAS
problem (Boutros, Operational Protection 2015). UAS has seen a
widespread proliferation among both state and non-state actors.
This is a cause for concern to US Operational Commanders.”
(Boutros, 2015) General James D Mattis, SECDEF concluded:
“The proliferation of low cost, tactical unmanned aerial systems
demand we think about this potential threat now… we must
understand the threat these systems present to our joint force and
develop the tactics, techniques and procedures to counter the
problem.” (Chairman, 2012) (Myer, 2013)
Joint Publication (JP) 3-01 identifies friendly assets that an
adversary may attack during a campaign using UAS. A Theater
Commander must plan for counter – UAS actions against air defense
sites, logistics centers, and national critical infrastructure.
(Boutros, 2015) “Due to their small size and unique flying signatures,
many UAS are difficult to detect, identify, track, and engage with
current joint air defense systems. The increasing proliferation of
global UAS has exposed a critical vulnerability in the protection
function of operational commanders, requiring joint efforts to
include intelligence, Electronic Warfare (EW), cyber warfare, (CW)
and FIRES.” (Boutros, 2015)
But UAS are not invincible. Neutralizing threats or mitigating risk
includes active and passive defense methods with kinetic and nonkinetic FIRES.[1] (US DoD – JP 3-0, 2012)
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Countering UAS Air Threats
Advanced UAS can carry large payloads great distances. US
Predator and Global Hawk UAS, [See Figure 9-1] “Chinese
Pterodactyl [See Figure 9-2] and Soring Dragon counterparts, and
Iranian Ababil can carry at least 500 Kg payloads greater than 300
km.” (Boutros, 2015) “They can be armed or unarmed, with ISR
payloads, communications relays, Over-The-Horizon (OTH) target
acquisition, and precision strike capabilities.” (Boutros, 2015)
“Shorter range, tactical, small/micro UAS may not have the
distance or payload capacity of more advanced systems, but they
can impact a campaign (or US Homeland Defense) in equally serious
ways. Because of their size, their heat signatures are almost
nonexistent. They easily evade detection. They offer more freedom
of action. They can be launched from within US air defense zones
and fly to their targets in less time than it takes for a coordinated
response.” (Boutros, 2015) [Nightmare alert: Imagine a SWARM of
UAS carrying small potent binary bomb payloads attacking a US
Carrier at port less than one mile away from the UAS launch point.]
The enemy can effectively balance space, time, and force (arguably
frequency too). (Beaudoin, 2011) “Small UAS (sUAS) can perform
short-range ISR, be outfitted with explosive charges or chemical
and biological agents for aerial dispersion, or simply fly over troops
or civilians to demoralize.” (Boutros, 2015) [Nightmare alert: Given
the effectiveness of enemy use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, a
mobile, airborne version would take the Problem to an entirely new
level!] (Nichols R.-0. , 2016)
Vulnerabilities Perspective
“sUAS are vulnerable to kinetic and non-kinetic outside influence
in six different areas; their link to a ground station, the ground
station itself, the aircrafts various sensors, avionics, cyber weapons,
directed energy weapons (DE) and acoustical weapons (AW).” The
military recognizes the first three factors, the authors concentrate
on the latter group.
Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses | 191

“In 2009 Iraqi insurgents successfully hacked into US Reaper
drones, crashing them.”

(Boutros, 2015) (Horowitz, 2014). “In

September of 2011, ground control stations at Creech AFB were
infected by a virus, temporarily grounding the entire UAS fleet.”
(Boutros, 2015) (Hartman, 2013) UAS onboard sensors can be
manipulated in many ways. “High intensity light directed at an
optical sensor can blind it. GPS receivers can be cyber-spoofed,
which consists of transmitting a stronger, but false, GPS signal to
a receiver, resulting in inaccurate navigation. Influencing the local
magnetic field can have adverse effects on both onboard hard drives
and sensors that require magnetic orientation to operate correctly.”
(Boutros, 2015) (Hartman, 2013) The object is to better understand
UAS subsystems, to facilitate exploiting their weaknesses.
Figure 9-1 Global Hawk

Source: (Rogoway, 2018)
Figure 9-2 Chinese Pterodactyl
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Source: (Defence, 2014)
The author’s research suggests that: The hostile technology of
remote-controlled warfare is difficult to control or abort; the best
defense (counter – UAS) is to address the root drivers of these
threats. The threat-roots are SAA, SCADA and avionics. SAA and
SCADA are vulnerable to both cyber and EW weapons. An EMS
subset of special interest are acoustical countermeasures as
research

has

confirmed

their

effectiveness

against

SWARMS. (Nichols, et al., 2019)
Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense Systems (ADS),
Attacks By sUAS and Countermeasures
A simplified, non-classified view of the US Air Defense System
(ADS) against a hostile UAS attack occurs in two stages:
1. Early Detection and Identification of “Danger Close” (Myer,
2013) [2]
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2. Applied appropriate countermeasures with secondary goal of
restricted collateral damage.
The traditional ADS family of tools for Detection include:
1. Active Radar Surveillance – generate waves, use rebound
echoes on UAS to locate, estimate distance, approach speed,
size, penetration vector and short-term trajectory, and
2. Passive Monitoring – covers electromagnetic spectrum via
visible, thermal infrared, radio waves on common
communications channels.
When considering hostile UAS defense planners need to consider
several issues. The US ADS is optimized for missiles and aircraft
deployed at high altitude and speeds. ADS data fusion (detection,
identification, weapon lock-on, execute countermeasures) works
better with larger targets, not very small ones like UAS / sUAS.
US ADS is effectively reactive for longer ranges. Close reactive
engagements are sub-optimal. US ADS are not optimal for sUAS
/UAS. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) Neither were Saudi Arabian ADS against
the Iranian attack on oilfields. (Gallagher, 2019)
“There are clear vulnerabilities of the US ADS to UAS:
• sUAS can be launched into action close to target(s), less than 1
mile.
• sUAS exhibit a small Radar signature. The detection phase is
hindered.
• Reactive dictates quick response near target. This is not always
possible.
• sUAS / UAS are designed for slow, low flight. Low flying sUAS
avoids Radar identification.
• sUAS / UAS electric motors are both quiet and have limited
thermal signature. This makes for difficult detection for noise.
• sUAS /UAS operate in urban areas. Urban sphere presents
additional problems and potential collateral damage.” (Nichols
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R.-0. , 2016)

Conventional Countermeasures Against sUAS /UAS
There are two families of conventional countermeasures used to
disrupt /destroy hostile UAS/sUAS systems (Regulatory ~ locked in
firmware GPS No-Fly Zones, Registration, FAA rules excluded).
Active Measures – Designed to incapacitate, destroy the sUAS/
UAS threat in a direct way (Ground-to- Air Defense (GTA), missiles
or, acoustical gun, or simple cyber rifle or DE weapon )
However, there are some defensive issues to be considered:
• GTA efficiency against sUAS, reactive targets are reduced, even
less efficient in urban zones where public at risk.
• Simultaneous attacks on multiple fronts very difficult to apply
and defense measures are mitigated. [3]

UAS countermeasures research is improving. The goal is to
increase ability of GTA to react and improve capabilities to a defined
to a saturation limit. Team formation allows decoys and shields.
SWARM formation is easier to detect. Arrival of a cloud of robot
drones is hard to mask, but tough to neutralize. Commercial
company Liteye has developed an Anti-UAV Defense System (AUDS)
which are able to detect, track, and disrupt sUAS operation by
pulsed, brief focused broadcast of direction frequency jamming.
Liteye has also developed a mobile version call M-AUDS. (Liteye,
2018) China has developed a “5-sec” laser weapon to shoot down
sUAS at low altitude (500 m) with a 10KW high energy laser beam.
Its range is 1.2 mi and handles sUAS speeds up to 112 mph. (Nichols
R.-0. , 2016)
Passive – Designed to protect indirectly; physical protections
around target, decoys, shields, organized roadblocks, nets, jamming
of sensors of the aggressor, GPS total or partial cyber-Spoof of
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signals. Passive countermeasures have some positive outcomes.
Decoys can be effective if the ADS know what the sensors employed
for sUAS Kamikaze attack and how they are used in the SAA
subsystem. Communication jamming is effective against level 1 & 2
drones which require pilot interaction. It can disrupt inter–drone
communications required for either team or SWARM formations.
Sensor Jamming – especially GPS signals – giving false GPS
information, camera/gimbal dislocation, and heading sensor
demagnetization is effective regardless of automation.
The 2011 Iranian incident taught US ADS planner’s lessons about
passive spoofing waypoints and Loss of Signal (LOS) via GPS. LOS
is an emergency condition. sUAS/UAS have programmed responses.
One of those responses may be,” return to waypoint”. Two types of
spoofs were executed. A complete spoof uses the friendly SAA to
estimate course, groundspeed, time to target to force a LOS and
final waypoint change. A partial spoof reports false positions, during
LOS and changes waypoints for perceived emergency conditions.
Both spoofs are difficult to detect & effective (Editor, 2012)
Aggressor

Counter-Countermeasures

Specific

to

UAS

Deployment – SWARM
The authors contend that a UAS SWARM attack is practically
unstoppable unless the defender (US ADS) exhibits strong
collaboration and ability to match/identify the SWARM locations
in a timely matter. This requires combined active and passive
measures. This portends the ADS computer networks must process,
detect, identify, and target information (and make critical decisions)
significantly faster and more effectively than their enemies. Cost
is an additional vulnerability factor. SWARMS can be assembled,
delivered, and targeted in a relatively inexpensive weapons package.
A SWARM can use local counter jamming on target nets. (Nichols
R.-0. , 2016)
Implications from Attack by Iran on Saudi Arabian Oil Fields
On 14 September 2019, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed their
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attack

on

the

Abqaiq

and

Khurais

oilfields

in

Saudi

Arabia. (Gallagher, 2019) The effect was to temporarily take out 5%
of the global oil production capacity. (Gallagher, 2019) Houthi rebels
claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that 10 drones (mixed
origins) and 17 missiles were deployed. (Lister, 2019) See Figure 9-3.
Ballistic missile attacks by the Houthis have been previously
deployed using old Soviet and Iranian “Scud” SRBMs. No prior
attack, since the Yemen conflict began four years ago, has
interrupted oil supplies.
The Houthis have sent dozens of drones and short-range ballistic
missiles against Saudi Arabia in the past two years. Many have been
intercepted by Saudi Air Defenses; others have fallen harmlessly.
Very few have caused limited damage and casualties. (Lister, 2019)
The Abqaiq oilfield is 800 miles from Houthi-held parts of Yemen.
The drones used were from North Korean Iranian and Chinese
origins. (Lister, 2019) The Iranian drones were dubbed the UAVX and have a range of 740 – 930 miles. This is a step up from
the SRBMs that were based on North Korean technology with a
maximum range of 186 miles. (Lister, 2019) The Chinese drones
have several names: “Qaseth-1” (“Striker-1”), a rebrand of the Iranian
Ababil-2 UAV and the “Mirsad-1” used by Hezbollah until
2018. (Gallagher, 2019) The step-up in the conflict game is the Iranian
clone, KH-55 with a range of 1,550 miles. These were reportedly used
in the Saudi Arabian oil field attacks. (Gallagher, 2019)
The take-away from this attack is not just the loss of global oil
processing capacity but the vulnerability and exposure of the Saudi
Arabian Advanced Air defenses. Most of the Saudi Arabian ADS are
designed to defend against traditional threats and are ill-equipped
to tackle the asymmetrical aerial threats such as drones. The
vulnerability is enhanced when so many essential oil-related
infrastructure parts are concentrated in a small area: storage,
processing, compressor trains and distribution. (Lister, 2019)
Think of this problem more globally. China, North Korea and Iran
[refer to as CNKI cooperation] are aggressively cooperating on
drone technologies for use against a major oil production region.
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The technology is cost-effective as well as human capital efficient.
Drones substituting for manned aircraft.
Figure 9-3 shows A haze of smoke is seen from the attacked oil
plant in Saudi Arabia

Source:

(Sheena

McKenzie,

2019)

https://www.cnn.com/

middleeast/live-news/saudi-oil-attack-dle-intl/
h_1ab7e8469e98525f887c3a4e588dde8a
Let’s expand the threat. Refer to Figure 9-4. Note that the Strait
of Hormuz lies between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Bahrain, Qatar,
UAE and Oman in the sandwich. Between the Gulf of Oran and
the Persian Gulf, about 20% of the global oil movement / supply
travels through the Strait of Hormuz. (EIA, 2019) The US 5th Fleet
currently protects this oil flow. There have been several clashes
between Iranian vessels and US Vessels. Drones cross over the US
Fleet every day and test its patience.
The key theme for this chapter is non – kinetic C-UAS
technologies.

Remember, payloads can be anything: CBRN
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deployment devices, drugs, surveillance packages, shaped charges,
lasers, super resolution cameras, weather instruments, GPS/GNSS
cyber weapons, missiles, etc.
The problem is twofold: what is the risk assessment for CNKI
drone technologies cooperation acted on either target (US 5th Fleet
or Saudi Oil Fields -both in range of

KH-55’s) and what

countermeasure technologies are available to counter the threats
presented and to mitigate those risks and system vulnerabilities?
Military Avionics
Avionics is a generic name for a diverse set of functions being
provided by AVIation electrONICS. Moir and Seabridge provide a
fair history of the Avionics since the word was coined in 1930s.
(Moir I. &., 2006) As avionics systems have evolved, the level of
functional integration has increased dramatically. Technology has
actually blurred functional boundaries. The outcome of this
evolution has been to increase performance; sensor types;
functionality; cost; integration; complexity; supportability and
reuse; software / executable programs; memory; throughput;
reliability; data handling; data links; and obsolescence. (Moir I. &.,
2006)
The result has been to decrease size; weight; power consumption;
and technology windows. (Moir I. &., 2006) The basic military
avionics system according to the DoD standards is shown in Figure
9-5.
Military Aviation Roles
The authors contend with all due respect to USAF, USN, USMC,
USA that most manned (piloted) military aircraft roles can be
replaced by unmanned aircraft systems. The military was quick to
understand the opportunities offered to them by the ability to leave
the ground and gain the advantage of height in the battlefield.
Military aircraft perform a variety of aviation roles using fixedwing and rotary-wing aircraft. The roles define the type of aircraft
because of the specialist nature of the tasks. Several aircraft types
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are designed for multi-roles or to change roles during the mission
(aka swing-roles). Military aviation roles are driven by advances in
the technology of sensors and avionics not by pilot abilities. (Moir
I. &., 2006) More sensitive and effective sensor systems are capable
of detecting targets, the use of stealth techniques increases the
effectiveness of delivery platforms and increased capability of onboard computing systems.
Drones compact these sensor technologies. They eliminate
wasted space. They can process on-board data close to their
manned counterparts. Clearly cheaper to produce, they are
expendable in battle.
In a military defense environment, a variety of military avionics
systems exist[4]:
1) Air Superiority – Deny the enemy the airspace over the
battlefield, thus allowing ground forces to rein freely in destroying
ground targets.
2) Ground Attack – Assist tactical situation on the battlefield
[close air support (CAS)]. This role includes the ability of designating
targets by laser and precision bombing.
3) Strategic Bomber -The mission is to penetrate deep into enemy
territory and to carry out strikes to weaken defenses.
4) Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) – The mission is huge, to cover
60% of the earth’s surface ( water). The MPA is the most complex
of systems aircraft with the demanding role embracing a broad
spectrum of tactical and strategic tasks / tools, as well as, support
for civilian and humanitarian activities. (Moir I. &., 2006) It includes
sub-roles of Anti-surface unit warfare (ASuW); and Anti-submarine
Warfare (ASW); Search and Rescue (SAR); Exclusive Economic Zone
Protection (EEZP); and Customs and Excise Cooperation (C&EC).
Each of these are broken down further into associated tasks /
architectures as shown in Table 9-1 & 9-2. Figures 9-6 & 9-7 show
two examples (P-3 Orion and Saab Swordfish) MPAs.
MPA interests the author because of his work on UAVs and
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intelligence gathering by Chinese in the Spratly Islands and his
research into acoustic defenses / countermeasures against hostile
SWARMS. Even with all of its complexity a good portion of MPA
missions can be accomplished by unmanned aircraft systems.[5]
Table 9-2 shows typical MPA platform architecture. Figure 9-8
shows the MQ-4C Triton BAMS MPA (unmanned). Note how
powerful the UAS is and how well it meets the requirements of the
MPA role.
Figure 9-4 Strait of Hormuz

Source: (Stratfor, 2019)
5) Battlefield Surveillance -The mission is providing detailed
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knowledge if the tactical scenario on the battlefield with real-time
intelligence of enemy and friendly forces.
6) Airborne Early Warning – Early detection and warning of
airborne attack is critical to give air superiority and defensive forces
sufficient time to prepare a sound defense. (Moir I. &., 2006)
7) Electronic Warfare (EW) – The role is composed of four
subgroups: Electronic countermeasures (ECM) or jamming are
common forms of EW used to disrupt communications or enemy
radars. Electronic support measures (ESM) – actions taken to
intercept, locate, record and analyze radiated electromagnetic
energy for the purpose of gaining tactical advantage. Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) consists of Communications Intelligence
(COMINT), Radar Intelligence (RADINT), Electronic Intelligence
(ELINT) and Measurement and Signal Intelligence (MASINT).[6]
8)

Photographic

Reconnaissance

–

This

role

includes

photographic imagery (IMINT) used to confirm SIGINT intelligence.
9) Air-to-air refueling – This role is required to extend range
or endurance. This role is not easily replaced by UAS -to- UAS
refueling. In 2018, Dr Saeed Kahn, Kansas State University,
developed a method of drone-to-drone transfer of energy to
replenish a UAV battery in flight.
10) Troop / material Transport – Logistics is the primary goal for
this role . There is significant initial work on UAMs but as of this
writing, this role is not replaceable (safely) by unmanned A/C.
11) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) – Many UAS have evolved
to perform roles described in the previous list with ever-increasing
performance and intelligence. (Nichols, et al., 2019)
The basic avionics system has the following major systems:
Navigation, Communications, Sensors, Mission System and Displays
and Control. Each major has several subsystems, for example,
Sensors include Radar, ESM, Electro-Optical, Defensive Aids, and
the author adds Acoustical. (Moir I. &., 2006)
Figure 9-5 A Military Avionics System
202 | Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses

Source: p27, https://www.slideshare.net/solohermelin/8-fighteraircraft-avionicspart-i
Table 9-1 MPA Roles and Tasks
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ASuW

ASW

SAR

EEZP

Reconnaissance

CAS to task
forces &
convoys

Location of
survivors

Oil rig
Anti-illegal
surveillance immigration

Shadowing

Open ocean
search

Dropping of
survival
equipment

Fishery
protection

Strike against
surface vessels

Extended
tracking of
submerged
targets

Scene-of-action
Pollution
commander for
detection &
rescue
dispersal
operations

Anti-terrorist
operations

Escort to
rescue
helicopters

Anti-drug
smuggling

Tactical support
Deterrence
of maritime strike of hostile
aircraft
submarines

C&EC

Anti-gun
running

Cooperation
Over-the-horizon
Cooperation
with
targeting for
with rescue
friendly
friendly vessels
services
submarines
Intelligence
collection

Intelligence
collection

Escort of
aircraft in
difficulties

Communications
relay
Limited airborne
early warning
capability

Source: (Moir I. &., 2006), pp.16-17

Table 9-2 Typical Maritime Patrol Aircraft Platform
Architecture[7]
Source: (Moir I. &., 2006), p23
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Avionics

Communications

Mission System

Navigation GPS /GNSS

VHF

Maritime Radar

FMS

UHF

Electro-optics turret

Autopilot

HF

ESM

ADF

SHF SatCom

DASS

DME

Link 16-

MAD

TACAN

Link 11

Acoustic Systems

TCAS

Marine Band

Mission Recording

Landing Aids

Shortwave

Data loader

GPWS

Cameras

LPI RadAlt

Oceanographic database

Air data

Mission computing

Digital Map

Mission crew workstations

Homing

Intelligence databases

Direction Finding (DF)
MDP
Displays & Controls
IFF /SSR
Avionics data bus

Figure 9-6 P-3 Orion MPA
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Source: https://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-thetop-10-maritime-patrol-aircraft/
P-3 Orion MPA Example
The P-3 Orion is a long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) with
multi-mission capabilities. Its 16-hour fly-time and high ferry range
of 8,944 km make it the top MPA in the world. The aircraft was
developed by Lockheed Martin principally for the US Navy. The
aircraft entered service in 1962 and is currently in service with 21
operators in 17 countries worldwide.
The aircraft can conduct a variety of missions such as maritime
/ over-land patrol, anti-submarine warfare, anti-piracy, antiterrorism,

drug

interdiction

and

the

prevention

of

illegal

immigration. Lockheed Martin offers a P-3 Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU)
program to extend the aircraft’s service life by 20 to 25 years.
The aircraft can be equipped with infrared and electro-optical
(EO) sensors, as well as special imaging radar to detect objects
at long ranges. Its large internal weapons bay and ten external
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hardpoints can house a range of weapons. Four Allison T56-A-14
engines provide the P-3 Orion with a long-range cruise speed of
350k at 25,000ft. (Naval Technology Team, 2019)
Figure 9-7 MPA Example – Swordfish

Source:

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/boeing-saab-in-race-

for-s-koreas-maritime-patrol-aircraft-order.524698/

Saab Swordfish MPA
The Saab Swordfish MPA is a multi-mission maritime patrol
aircraft that is capable of conducting maritime ISR, maritime
counterterrorism, anti-piracy, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and
anti-surface warfare (ASuW) missions. High dash speed and long
endurance make the Saab Swordfish MPA an ideal maritime patrol
aircraft.
The Saab Swordfish MPA comes with an advanced sensor and
C4I package comprising 360° rotating multi-mode maritime
surveillance radar, electro-optical sensors with laser payload,
automatic identification system (AIS), identification friend or foe
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(IFF), electronic warfare and self-protection system, SATCOM, and
tactical data links. It also features four weapon hardpoints to carry
weaponry load.
Based on the Global 6000 business jet, the Swordfish MPA has
a maximum cruise speed of 450k and a long-range cruise speed
of 360k. It can remain airborne for 11.5 hours and conduct
patrols. (Naval Technology Team, 2019)
Figure 9-8 MQ-4C Triton BAMS MPA (unmanned)

Source: (Naval Technology Team, 2019)
MQ-4C Triton BAMS MPA UAS
MQ-4C Triton is a new broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS)
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) unveiled by Northrop Grumman
for the US Navy. The UAS will complement the navy’s Maritime
Patrol and Reconnaissance Force family of systems, delivering
SIGNIT (signals intelligence), C4ISR and maritime strike capabilities.
The US Navy intends to procure 68 MQ-4C Triton UAS to carry
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out surveillance missions, along with the manned P-8 Poseidon
maritime patrol aircraft. Appendix 9-2 details the MQ-4C design
features.
C-UAS Premise [8]
Let’s restate the major premise that almost all manned and
unmanned systems used in military aviation are vulnerable to
attack. (DTRA, 2019) Hostile actions are both kinetic and nonkinetic against the avionics systems. The following sections are
concerned with the latter sphere which includes directed energy
(DE), cyber warfare, (CW), electronic warfare, (EW), and a specialized
EMS subset acoustical countermeasure (AC)s. [9] All these may
defensively apply to hostile unmanned aircraft systems.[10]
Figure 9-9 High-Power Microwave Weapon to Destroy or
Disable Swarms of Unmanned Aircraft

Source: (Military & Aerospace Electronics, 2019)
Effects of Directed Energy (DE) Weapons (EDEW)
Directed energy weapons make up diverse types of weapons such
as lasers, particle beams, microwaves and even bullets. All DE
weapons are just devices that deposit energy in targets, and that
energy which must be deposited to achieve a given level of damage
is relatively insensitive to the type of weapon employed. (Nielsen,
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2012)[11] American DE weapons may, in fact, change the way future
wars will be fought. (Beason, 2005)
Energy cannot be deposited in a target unless it is first delivered
to the target. This is called propagation of energy. This subject was
covered in: (Adamy D. , 2001), (Adamy D. , 2009), and (Nichols, et al.,
2019) There is always some loss of energy during propagation. The
DE must deliver more energy than needed to damage the target, to
compensate for the loss along the way. DE weapon design depends
on two factors: First, the anticipated target, which determines the
energy required for damage. Second, the anticipated scenario
(range, environment, time, etc. See Table 9-3) which determines
how much energy must be produced to ensure that an adequate
amount energy is delivered in the time available. (Nielsen, 2012)
Table 9-3 Battlespace Dimensions
Dimension Function

Action
Direction of Weapons

Latitude

Friendly Force Location

Longitude

Enemy Force Location

Maneuver of Forces

Speed of Maneuver

Timeliness of Attack

Timing of Weapon Release

Enemy Vulnerability

Bandwidth Required

Rate of Information Flow

Bandwidth Available

Interference

Elevation

Time

Frequency

Frequency of Transmissions

Vulnerability to Jamming

Vulnerability to Intercept

Source: (Adamy D. -0., 2015)
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Energy required for damage
Damage may be defined as Soft damage which is an upset to the
UAS computers to hard damage meaning the complete vaporization
of the UAS in the air. The former is sensitive to the details of the
attack,

the

hardness

of

chips,

the

computer(s)

details,

communications, circuits and sub circuits. Vaporization produces
immediate feedback as to target status – catastrophic. Determining
how much energy a weapon must produce to damage a target, two
things must be known: how much energy it takes to damage the
target, and what fraction of the energy generated will be lost in
propagating to it. (Nielsen, 2012)
Ice Cube
Consider the energy required (damage level) to vaporize an ice
cube. [12] Pull an ice cube from the refrigerator. Its temperature
is below the temperature it will melt. First, we must raise the
temperature to melting temperature. The energy required is
proportional to both the necessary ΔT rise and the amount of ice in
the cube. From thermodynamics, the expression covering this is:
E = mC (Tm-Ti), where E is energy required in Joules, m = mass
of ice cube in grams, Ti = the initial temperature in Celsius, Tm=
melting temperature, C is the heat capacity constant of
proportionality (J/gm x o C).[13] So, E = 2100 Joules of energy
required to raise it to the melting point. This is not enough. We
must melt the ice cube. Heat of fusion (Lm) is the amount of energy
required to convert 1 gm of solid to 1 gm of liquid. With an additional
16,700 Joules, we now have a small water puddle. But our object
is to vaporize the ice cube – hard damage. Using the specific heat
equation again, E = mC (Tv-Tm), we require an additional 21,000
Joules to raise the ice cube as molten water to vapor at the same
temperature by supplying the heat of vaporization, Lv = 2,440 Joules
per gm of water. This means an additional 122,000 Joules of energy
are required. The total amount of energy needed to vaporize an ice
cube of 50 gm is 161,000 Joules. Lv accounts for about 75% of the
required energy.
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10,000 Joules
(Nielsen, 2012) gives a table of thermal properties of Aluminum,
Copper, Magnesium, Iron and Titanium. It shows that most solid
materials (See Table 9-4) have density on the order of 1 – 10 gm
/cubic centimeter and that 10,000 Joules is sufficient energy to
vaporize about one cubic centimeter of anything! 10,000 Joules is a
magic number because it is close to the energy delivered by a wide
range of DEs. (Nielsen, 2012) A typical rifle round has about 10 gm
and is fired at a muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s. (Halsam, 1982) This
corresponds to a kinetic energy (KE) of (mv 2 /2) of 5,000 Joules.
A roman Catapult could throw a 20 Kg stone over 200 meters. The
KE required for this use is about 40,000 Joules. (Foley, March, 1979)
A medieval crossbow could launch an 85-gm bolt over 275 meters.
This required 13,000 Joules. (Vernard Foley, January, 1985)
Table 9-4 Thermal Properties of Common Materials

Density
Material

Gm/
cm3

Melting
Heat
Heat
Vaporization
Heat of
Point,
Capacity of
Point, Tv
Vaporization
Tm
Fusion
(J/
0C
(J/gm)
0C
gm0C)
(J/gm)

Aluminum

2.7

660

2500

0.9

400

1100

Copper

8.96

1100

2600

0.38

210

4700

Magnesium 1.74

650

1100

1.0

370

5300

Iron

7.9

1500

3000

0.46

250

6300

Titanium

4.5

1700

3700

0.52

320

8800

Source: Table 1-1 (Nielsen, 2012)
Energy Alone Sufficient for Hard Damage?
In a nutshell, no. A nuclear bomb releases a lot of energy. One
Kiloton yields 4,000,000,000,000 Joules. Well above the 10,000
Joule criterion, but at a distance of less than a mile from detonation,
212 | Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses

a concrete structure is undamaged. Over the same range an artillery
shell with only 10,000 Joules of energy could easily destroy such
a structure. Consider also the sun. It delivers about 5,000 Joules
of energy over every square centimeter of the earth’s surface, yet
we see no cars melting or people fried. Clearly, the energy must
be delivered over a small region and in a short time to the target.
Energy is not the silver bullet for damage. We must consider also
density of energy on the target (Joules per square centimeter),[14]
the rate of energy delivery, or power (Joules/ sec or Watts). The
nuclear bomb is not a DE weapon like the artillery shell. Much of
the energy released does not intersect with the concrete structure
and is “wasted”. The artillery shell is a DE and concentrates all of
its energy right to the target in question. If we spread the energy
of the bomb over a surface of a sphere at a range of one mile, the
energy density is only 13 Joules per square centimeter, far less that
the DE artillery shell density of 10,000 Joules per square centimeter.
With the spreading of blast energy accounted for, the nuclear bomb
is consistent with other weapon types. (Nielsen, 2012)[15]
Energy Delivery Rate
If energy is delivered over too long a period, it is not effective in
damaging the target UAS. The target can shed energy as rapidly as it
is deposited. Cars in a parking lot, (unfortunately fatal to youngsters
or animals left in the car) until they become so hot that they radiate
energy away as rapidly as its deposited, so they don’t heat up to a
point of sustained damage. After that they heat up to a constant
temperature. Only if energy is delivered more rapidly than the
target can handle it will damage ensue. (Nielsen, 2012)
From thermodynamics, we know that energy can be transferred
away (lost in propagation) from a target by conduction, convection
and radiation.
Thermal

conduction

losses

(energy

flow

or

“downhill”

temperature gradient (slope of curve of temperature v distance)
from hot regions to cold regions moving the temperature to
equilibrium in the system). The equation for thermal conduction is
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U = -k(dT / dx)

Equation 9-1

Where U = rate of flow of energy across a surface, J/cm2 sec
dT /dx = the slope of the temperature curve, degrees / cm
k = constant of proportionality called thermal conductivity[16] in
J/ sec cm deg
Energy flows until the temperature is the same everywhere in the
system.
Convection (heat loss by macroscopic motion of molecules). Think
of an attic fan moving hot air out of the attic, where motion is
induced by the fan blades. The expression for wind induced
convection for temperature v distance:
dT /dt = – V dT/ dx

Equation 9-2

Where V = wind velocity
T = temperature in time at point x
dT /dx is the rate of change of Temperature in time at point x
For a target to lose energy by conduction or convection, it must
be immersed in the atmosphere, water or some fluid medium to
supply the necessary molecules to carry the energy away.
Black Body[17] radiation can occur in space or in a vacuum.
Molecule movement is not just random, they vibrate, rotate and
incorporate energy in their internal structure.
The total intensity of radiation emerging from the surface of a
Black Body, S (Watts/cm2) is:
S = σ T4

Equation 9-3

Where σ = Stefan-Boltzmann constant = 5.67 x 10-12 (Watts/cm2
K4), K= Kelvin temperature.
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Implications
Damaging targets depends not only on delivering energy, but
also concentrating the energy in both space and time. In space
we deliver about 10,000 Joules per cm2 of target surface, either at
a single point, (bullet) or over the whole surface, as in a nuclear
weapon. In time, energy must be delivered more rapidly than the
target can shed energy through conduction, convection and
radiation loss mechanisms. The fluence (Joules / cm2) or Intensity
(Watts /cm2) necessary to damage a target will vary with time or
pulse width that the weapon engages the target.[18]
Energy Losses in Propagation
There are two types of energy losses in propagation: the
spreading of energy such that it does not interact with the target,
and the wasting of energy in interactions with a physical medium,
such as the atmosphere, through which it passes to destroy the
target. Type one occurs whether the weapon or target is located on
earth or in the vacuum of space. Type two occurs primarily when
weapon or target lies within the atmosphere. Table 9-5 shows the
Energy losses in propagation as a function of weapon type and loss
mechanisms.
Table 9-5 Energy losses in Propagation
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Weapon Type

Energy Loss Mechanism

Kinetic Energy (bullets, rockets) Atmospheric Drag
Lasers

Absorption by molecules
Scattering by molecules
Absorption by aerosols (small particles)
Scattering by aerosols

Microwaves

Absorption by molecules
Scattering by molecules
Absorption by water droplets
Scattering by water droplets

Particle Beams

Energy losses to electrons
Scattering from nuclei
Scattering from electrons
Radiation

Source: (Nielsen, 2012)
Advanced DE research is both fascinating and mostly classified.
Below are examples of military systems that may be used for C-UAS
defenses.
Directed

Energy

(DE)

Counter

Weapons,

High-Powered

Microwave (HPM) Defenses, High-Power Lasers (HPL)
The US Air Force Research Laboratory is investing US$16 million
in further field assessment of Raytheon’s Phaser High Power
Microwave System outside the continental U.S. [See Figure 9-9]
The testing phase will span over 12 months in which the Phaser
will engage simulated and real unmanned aerial systems threats.
The evaluation will explore the effectiveness of Phaser’s counterdrone engagement without disrupting the necessary installation
operations.
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The effectiveness of Phaser against drones has already been
demonstrated at the Army MFIX exercise in 2018, when the system
eliminated 33 drones, 2-3 at a time. Currently mounted on a
shipping container-like box, Raytheon plans to significantly reduce
the size in future versions.
AFRL already evaluates two other HPM systems – the Tactical
High-Power Operational Responder (THOR), [ See Figure 9-10] that
deploys as a means to provide base defense against drones, and
‘Counter-Electronic High-Power Microwave Extended-Range Air
Base Air Defense’ system, or CHIMERA, designed to engage multiple
targets over a larger area.
The HPM contract follows a separate Air Force contract in which
Raytheon will build two prototype high-energy laser systems, also
to be deployed overseas. The HPM and HEL systems can be used
independently or together to counter-unmanned aerial system
threats. “There’s more than one way to defeat a drone,” said Dr.
Thomas

Bussing,

Raytheon

Advanced

Missile

Systems

vice

president. “We are delivering the world’s first defensive directed
energy systems that can be used alone or in tandem to defeat
enemy drones at the speed of light.” (Eshel, 2019)
Figure 9-10 THOR
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Source: (Eshel, 2019)
Raytheon announces delivery of first laser counter-UAS system
to U.S. Air Force
U.S. defense contractor Raytheon Co announced that it
successfully delivered the first high-energy laser counterunmanned aerial system to the U.S. Air Force earlier this month.
In recent years, the Defense Department has assessed directed
energy weapons—more commonly known as “lasers”—as an
affordable alternative to traditional firepower to keep enemy drones
from tracking and targeting troops on the ground. The system will
be deployed overseas as part of a year-long Air Force experiment
to train operators and test the system’s effectiveness in real-world
conditions. See Figure 9-11.
Raytheon’s high-energy laser weapon system uses an advanced
variant of the company’s Multi-spectral Targeting System, an
electro-optical/infrared sensor, to detect, identify and track rogue
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drones. Once targeted, the system engages the threat, neutralizing
the UAS in a matter of seconds.
“Five years ago, few people worried about the drone threat,” said
Roy Azevedo, president of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems.
“Now, we hear about attacks or incursions all the time. Our
customers saw this coming and asked us to develop a ready-now
counter-UAS capability. We did just that by going from the
drawing board to delivery in less than 24 months.”
Raytheon installed its high-energy laser weapon system on a
small all-terrain vehicle. On a single charge from a standard
220-volt outlet, the HELWS can deliver intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance capability and dozens of precise laser shots.
It can also be paired with a generator to provide a nearly infinite
number of shots.
Raytheon Company is integrating multiple proven technologies to
counter the unmanned aerial system threat across a wide range of
scenarios – from commercial airports to forward operating bases to
crowded stadiums. Raytheon’s portfolio of sensors, command and
control systems, and kinetic and non-kinetic effectors covers all
aspects of the UAS threat. (Raytheon, 2019)
Figure 9-11 Raytheon announces delivery of first laser counterUAS system to U.S. Air Force
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Source: (Raytheon, 2019)
Modern Communication Threats to UAS
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are in widespread use for
reconnaissance, EW, and weapons delivery. They are extremely
dependent on interconnection with ground stations by command
and data links. (Adamy D. , 2001) The increased use of Low
Probability Intercept (LPI) has become a significant challenge to
electronic warfare (EW) communication links. (Adamy D. , 2001)
This chapter explores LPI and Jamming. The student should then
have enough background to understand the criticality of LPI and
Jamming of UAS communication links. Air defense missiles and
associated radars make significant use of interconnecting links.
(Adamy D. , 2001) SUAS sometimes use cellphones to command and
control the UAVs. Cell phones are widely used for command and
control function in nonsymmetrical warfare situations. (Adamy D.
, 2001) ISIS and other terrorist groups use cell phones to trigger
improvised explosive devices.
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Cybersecurity attacks on data communications links are highly
classified. Similarly, modern radar threats to hostile installations are
also generally classified. Before examining LPI and communications
signals/link- jamming, we first review the EW environment specific
to UAS. Time for a few definitions of terms.[19]
Information Operations (IO) and the part EW plays
Figure 9-12 shows the global view of Information operations. Note
how nicely all the prior definitions fit into the puzzle? Note that
EW is a key component of IO, but not the singular dominant puzzle
piece. [20]
Figure 9-12 Information Operations

Source:

http://c4isys.blogspot.com/2013/11/basics-of-information-

operations-24.html also Source: JP 3-13 (Joint Publication) and

Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses | 221

pertains to Information Operations (IO) in the United States.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf
Autonomy vs. Automation
Table 9-6 shows the normal five levels of automation that
characterize UAS systems with examples of commercial vehicles.
NASA presents a more detailed level of automation breakdown
based on the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) decision
loops. (Barnhart, 2012) However, Table 9-6 should suffice to
understand the cyber-purview. Level 1 slave and Level 2 Automated
(minimal) are commonly found on UAS sold at Amazon, Walmart,
and similar outlets. The pilot makes all the decisions and has
complete control of flying orders. Level 3 steps up the navigation
capabilities using an a priori mission plan.
Levels 4 and 5 add higher-level decision-making capabilities;
collision avoidance without human intervention, complex mission
planning in all weather conditions, expert systems intelligence
without human intervention i.e. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and
advanced Sense and Avoid systems (SAA). Level 5 is not
commercially available; many designers are well on their way to a
fully operational Level 5 UAS.
Table 9-6 UAS Automation Scale
Level 1: Slave – assisting piloting, reaction to disturbance
Level 2: Automated – maintains its flying orders and receives
higher level orders
For Levels 1 and 2 are common, require pilot intervention and
continuous communication link;
reasonable prices < $1500 US, small, weight < 10lbs: Drone Parrot,
Quad Flyer GAUI
Level 3: Automated Navigation (a priori mission plan)
For Level 3 micro-UAS premium (< $20,000 US): Dragonfly,
Microdrone Gmbh,
Fly-n-Sense, Mikrokopter
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Level 4: Response from contextual data Collision Avoidance (CA)
(w/o human intervention)
For Level 4 minimum knowledge of surrounding environment,
reacts to events, perform CA,
uses active SAA, requires mission plan
Level 5: Decision-Maker (expert system) from contextual data:
navigation in unknown environment,
complex missions, coordination and collaboration of signals
For Level 5 AI, decision making with heavy networked computer
support, perceptive sensors
for space and time, complex mission in unknown environments,
capable of intelligent adjustments
including mission rescheduling, keyword- adaptive control Levels
4 and 5 are confined
to laboratories. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016)
Table 9-7 UAS Collaboration shows four types of possible UAS
collaboration. At the lower end of a threat scale is the isolated UAS
or a small group of UAS. The advantages lie in a specific mission,
which may be piloted or autonomous. They carry light payloads and
are affordable. They are easy to assemble in the field. An example
is the Raven used by US Special Forces. The disadvantage
(countermeasure applied) is to identify the pilot or leader vehicle
and destroy/disable it. A UAS attack team is particularly effective
against divided attack targets, Level 3 allows automatic navigation,
synchronized actions, and limited updated mission information.
With increased team members, synchronization is not guaranteed.
Disabling part of the UAS Team does not guarantee that mission
failure. The real vulnerability of the UAS team is the Chief. All
synchronization and updates go through the Chief. Disable/destroy
the Chief and the Team is rendered useless. Determining who the
Chief is critical.
Far more dangerous is the Swarm configuration especially in the
higher levels of autonomous engagement. Swarms have several
advantages. They are efficient based on numbers; they demonstrate
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emergent

large

group

behaviors

and

reactions.

Even

not

controllable or automated, they show a decentralized intelligence –
think shoal of fish with evolving local rules. UAS Swarms are a highly
resistant form, not changing based on survivability of members.
There is no hierarchy like a team. Destroy part of the swarm and the
rest will continue their mission without abatement.
The two known countermeasures are: 1) Disrupt / Change the
Strategic Global View of Swarm (its only real vulnerability) and 2)
Force defender collaboration. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) China appears
to be the leader in innovative UAS swarm intelligence, through the
efforts of the Chinese Electronics Technology Group Corporation
(CETC). (Kania, 2017) This is not a threat to be underestimated.
Table 9-7 UAS Collaboration
Type 1: Isolated Individual UAS
Advantages: piloted or autonomous w/ specific mission to
perform. Small, easy to assemble, affordable, light payloads.
Countermeasures: Stop, Disable or Destroy Pilot, Threat removed.
Type 2: Group of Individual UASs (Isolated with own mission
but not coordinated)
Advantages: sphere of action may be different for each mission,
increased numbers, and increases success of attacks by defenses
saturation
Countermeasures: Stop, Disable, Discover and Deter or Destroy
Pilot(s), Threat(s) may be removed.
Type 3: Team of UASs (All members assigned specialized tasks
and coordinated by Chief)
Advantages: Particularly effective against divided attack targets,
Level 3 allows automatic navigation, synchronized actions, but no
update to mission plans based on field activities.
Disadvantages: Level 4 (w/o humans) yields surrounding
reactions but may lose synchronization between team members.
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Level 5 permits continuous updates, communications, commando
style.
Countermeasures: Stop, Disable or Destroy Team members.
Determine behavior logic and intervene. Survival of team members
is critical to defense actions. Threat mitigated.
Type 4: UAS Swarm (Uniform mass of undifferentiated
individual’s w/o Chief at level 4 or 5)
Advantages: Efficient based on numbers, emergent large group
behaviors

and

reactions,

not

controllable

or

automated,

decentralized intelligence – think shoal of fish w/ evolving local
rules; highly resistant form, not changing based on survivability of
members, no hierarchy
Countermeasures: Disrupt / Change the Strategic Global View of
Swarm (its only real vulnerability). Defender collaboration. (Kania,
2017)
Commercial Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Overview
There is a natural tendency to think that small unmanned aircraft
systems present no threat, especially to US defenses. They are
simply recreational or commercial toys. But they present a threat
to National Airspace (NAS) – especially near airports. Figure 9-13
shows the results of a sUAS crashing into a jetliner in 2016.
Figure 9-13 Drone Crash into 737-700 passenger jet while
landing at Mozambique
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Source: UK Express, http://www.express.co.uk/travel/articles/
751165/drone-boeing-737-plane-crash-mozambique.

Also

See:

https://youtu.be/2jzx8BpDuHE
USA FAA Part 107 special rule forbids use of sUAS within a fivemile radius of an airport. (FAA, 2018)
Table 9-8 shows some of the available options and each year
more capabilities are being added. Imaging, camera capabilities,
weatherproofing, and payloads all can be used to gather
intelligence, provide reconnaissance or deliver a lethal payload.
They are radar resistant and deploy with a very small heat signature,
so they can be in close target quickly, before defenders can activate
countermeasures.
Table 9-8 Commercial sUAS Parameters

• “Flying Characteristics Available as RTF (off-the-shelf Ready
to Fly); BNF (Bind and Fly –with custom transmitter); PNF (Plug
and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver, battery, and
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charger). RTF and BNF – no prior flight experience required.
• Models most rotary multicopter – quad (4), hexa (6) octo (8)
variants. Fixed wing used for deployments in agriculture,
public safety, emergency response and ISR (Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) many fully customizable to
achieve specific capabilities, flight time, payload capacity,
programmable flight, maximum speed and weather hardening.
• Average SUAS flight time 18 minutes, average range
approximately one mile, cost $600 US, dry conditions”
(Angelov, 2012)

Specifications affecting hostile UAS operations
• Payload capacity function (weight and size more than gimbal,
camera, battery) LIDAR or infrared or experimental sensors
require larger capacity and subject to easier detection.
• Range function (signal transmission, LOS, image relay distance,
battery and power constraints).
• Weather Proofing function (limited operating conditions,
mostly dry. Upgradable to near military grade to operate in
extreme conditions) Retrofit to harden for weather is a tradeoff for weight, cost, flight time and payload capacity unless no
of rotors increases.
• Imaging function (available medium –high resolution cameras
of > 12 megapixels, with still and video) Infrared and LIDAR
installable.
• Automated and Programmable Pilot / Follow Me settings
function (predetermined flight mission path based on GPS
coordinates (Fly-by-wire). Some with Follow Me autopilot
settings enable the SUAS to automatically follow the operator.
(Angelov, 2012)

Airborne Sensing Systems
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There are two technologies available for airborne sensing of
other aircraft; cooperative and non-cooperative. Cooperative
technologies receive radio signals from other aircraft’s onboard
equipment. Two requirements for cooperative behavior. First ATC
Transponder, which responds to ground-based secondary radar
interrogations for air traffic control (ATC) usage. Traffic Alert
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) uses the same technology in FAA
classes of airspace. Second is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance
– Broadcast systems (ADS-B). ADS-B technology uses the Global
Positioning System (GPS) or alternative navigational source to make
broadcasts of its own aircraft position, velocity, and data required
to avoid collisions. (Angelov, 2012) Table 9-9 shows typical sensor
coordinate systems. The first three cooperate with each other, the
latter five are non-cooperative technologies. (Angelov, 2012)
Table 9-9 Typical Sensor Coordinate Systems
Sensor

Technology

Coordinate

System
Active interrogation of Mode A/C transponder

Relative range,

altitude
TCAS

Relative range,

altitude
ADS-B

Latitude,

longitude, altitude, velocity
Electro-Optical

Bearing (azimuth

and elevation)
Laser /LIDAR
Onboard radar

Relative range
Relative range,

Bearing (azimuth & and elevation)
Ground-based radar

Range and

bearing from ground-reference
Acoustic

Bearing

Sensor Parameters
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Sensor technologies use standard parameters to provide a basis
for comparison and ISR performance. Table 9-10 Standard Sensor
Parameters shows the base set:
Table 9-10 Standard Sensor Parameters
Sensor

Function

“Field of View

Describes angular sector within sensor making

measurements. Outside this field of view, sensor is blind.
Range

Distance measured by sensor, within which some

good probability of detection of targets
Update Rate

Interval at which sensor provides measurements

Accuracy

Uncertainty of position measurement – usually

single dimension
Integrity

Probability that measurement falls beyond some

normal operation limit
Data Elements

Cooperative sensors – specific data to enhance

ISR platform, ex: trajectory, identity, intent” (Angelov, 2012)
SAA Critical Control Systems include circuitry to affect UAS
movement, landing, control of direction, detection, and correction
of the aircraft. Many of these functions are incorporated into a UAS
Autopilot, if capable.
Autopilot
Table 9-11 shows the common components found in UAS
autopilots. These provide the means for UAS to affect movement,
control,

communications,

detection,

emergency

operations,

battery, waypoint delivery, and payloads.
Table 9-11 Common components found in UAS autopilots

• “Main Program/Processor: processing sensor data &
implementation
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of control of UAV
• Magnetometer: measuring direction
• GPS: determine global position
• Airspeed/Altimeter: measure air speed & altitude
• UAV Wireless Communication: communicating with ground
station
• Power System: provides power to UAV
• Inertial Measurement Unit: measures movement of UAV
• Boot Loader Reset Switch loads programs into main program
board
• Actuators: receives commands from main processing board &
moves control surfaces
• Manual Flight Control: overrides autopilot & gives control of
UAV control surfaces to ground station” (Clothier R. R., 2011)
(Boutros, 2015)

SCADA
The security fault “low hanging fruit” in UAS systems is SCADA.
There are hundreds of millions of SCADA systems. They are used
to control every practical machine you can imagine. SCADA stands
for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. SCADA started in
the 1940’s to control manufacturing processes such as flow rates,
temperatures, valves, pressure, density, chemical, mechanical
processes of all kinds. See Figure 9-14 for Legacy SCADA system for
Chemical Plant. (Nichols R., Nov 28-30, 2006)
SCADA systems have improved significantly over the decades in
all areas except one – SECURITY. SCADA systems are a security
sieve. Figures 9-15 & 9-16 show examples of SCADA Architectures.
(Nichols R., Nov 28-30, 2006) An interesting example are the
automated/computerized systems in modern cars.
Figure 9-14 for Legacy SCADA system for Chemical Plant.
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Source: (Nichols R. , Nov 28-30, 2006)
Everything is controlled by SCADA; tires, engine, seat belts, safety
bags, oil pressure, even door locks. However, cyber hackers can
exploit SCADA to disable a car remotely, with the driver still in
it! Greenburg, Wired (2015). Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the
Highway—With Me in It. (Greenburg, 2015)
“UAS ARE JUST FLYING SCADA MACHINES!” (Nichols R.-0. ,
2016) Table 9-12 SCADA shows the principle functions that apply to
all SCADA systems, especially UAS.
Table 9-12 SCADA Functions
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
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facilitate management with remote access to real-time data
• Channel to issue automated or operator-driven supervisory
commands to remote station control devices
• A human–machine interface (HMI) is responsible for data
presentation to human operator
•

Composed by a console that makes it possible to monitor &
control process

• Remote terminal units (RTUs) are microprocessor-controlled
electronic devices that interface sensors to SCADA by
transmitting telemetry data
• Is a process control system for computerized real-time
monitoring and control
• Typically consists of:
◦ Master Control Unit (MCU)
◦ Remote Terminal Unit (s) (RTU)
◦ Communication Links
• Supervisory system is responsible for:
◦ Data acquisition
◦ Control activities on process
• Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are final actuators used
as field devices
• Communication infrastructure connecting supervisory system
to RTUs
• Various process & analytical instrumentation
• RTU’s Alarm Systems
◦ Doors
◦ Battery Backup
◦ Low Power/Loss of Power Alarm
◦ Power Protection
◦ Passwords for Keypads, PC ports
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◦ Log Alarm (or Event) When Local User Plugs PC in or Signs
On
◦ Log Event when Local User Changes Values
Figure 9-15 UAS SCADA System Internals

Source: (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against
Enemy Counter Measures, 2019)
SCADA systems have plenty of cyber related vulnerabilities. Most
are connected to computers. Those vulnerabilities multiply when
connected to the Internet. SCADA systems differ from the IT
structures. (Shapiro, 2006) Table 9-13 Sample SCADA Design
Vulnerabilities apply to all systems including UAS. (Nichols R. , Nov
28-30, 2006)There are so many design flaws and vulnerabilities in
SCADA systems that the US government has a special SCADA testing
lab in Utah and has published copious recommendations to improve
security. (NTSB, 2009)
Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses | 233

Table 9-13 Examples of SCADA Design Vulnerabilities

• Ease of operation outweighs security
• Commonly set up on operating systems with known
vulnerabilities
• Poor authentication systems in place
• Remote access allowed for maintenance &/or IT support
• Interconnectivity to vulnerable corporate networks
• Weak access control lists on firewalls
• Proper Network Access Control (NAC) is most crucial to
prevent unauthorized connection within network
• First target of compromise for an attacker
• No use of standard IT defense software
• Wireless technology common
• System connect to unsecured remote processors
• SCADA software not designed with robust security features
• Public information often available on specific systems
• Poor physical security on remote access points
• No use of standard IT defense software
• Wireless technology common
• System connect to unsecured remote processors
• SCADA software not designed with robust security features
• Public information often available on specific systems
• Poor physical security on remote access points. (Kilman, 2003)

Attack Vectors
A brief overview of UAS Attack Vectors (by no means the
exhaustive list) is demonstrated in Table 9-14. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016)
Table 9-14 Common Attack Vectors
234 | Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses

“Common Vectors
• Backdoors & holes in network perimeter
• Protocol vulnerabilities
• Attacks on field devices through cyber means Database attacks
• Communications hijacking & Man-in-the-middle attacks
• Cinderella attack on time provision & synchronization
• Bogus input data to controller introduced by compromised
sensors &/or exploited network link between controller &
sensors
• Manipulated & misleading output data to actuators/reactors
from controller due to tempered actors/reactors or
compromised network link between controller & actuators
• Controller historian changes – feed forward control
• Distributed Denial of Service – missing deadlines of needed
task actions
• Backdoors and holes in network perimeter
• Vulnerabilities in common protocols
• Attacks on field devices through cyber means
• Database attacks
• Communications hijacking and Man-in-the-middle attacks
• Cinderella attack on time provision and synchronization
• To a control engineer, possible attacks can be grouped into
following categories:
• Bogus input data to controller introduced by compromised
sensors and/or exploited network link between controller and
sensors
• Manipulated and misleading output data to actuators/reactors
from controller due to tempered actors/reactors or
compromised network link between controller and actuators
• Controller historian
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• Denial of Service – missing deadlines of needed task actions
Attacks on Software:
• No Privilege Separation in Embedded Operating System
• Buffer Overflow
• Structured Query Language Injection
Possible UAS Attack Hardware / Software
• SkyJack© [21]
• Aircrack-ng© [22]
• Node-ar-drone©
• Raspberry Pi©
• Parrot AR. Drone -2©
• Alfa© AWUS036H wireless adapter
• Edimax© EW-7811Un wireless adapter
• Snoopy© [23]
Attacks on Communication Stack
• Network Layer
• Transport Layer
• Application Layer
Auxiliary tools:
• Password Theft
• Wireshark
• Man-In-the-Middle Attacks
• Trojan Horse Virus
• Distributed Denial of Service Attacks” (Nichols R.-0. , 2016)

Cyber – Attack Taxonomy
UAS SCADA systems susceptible to a broad range of cyber and
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network specific attacks on the SAA modules in the aircraft and
communication structures from the ground or satellite links. These
represent system threats and vulnerabilities of the UAS structure,
increasing the risk of hostile use or takeover. (Nichols R. , Nov
28-30, 2006)A UAS Cyber Attack Taxonomy is an organized view
of potential cyber threats to UAS assets. The Taxonomy is a list
of agents that increase risk of a successful attack on US UAS ADS
assets. The risk of success of terrorist attacks on USA Air Defense
Systems (ADS) via UASs is higher because of improving commercial
capabilities and accessibility.
A qualitative view of information risk (also a measure of cyberattack lethality) in a system such as SAA or computer network is
expressed as:
Risk = (Threats x Vulnerabilities x Impact /
Countermeasures)

Equation 9-4

And at time state 0, this equation can be reduced to
Risk ~ function (Threats / Countermeasures)
Equation 9-5
(Nichols R.-0. , 2016)[24]
At time state =0, where Vulnerabilities & Impact are constants and
drop out of the equation.
Threats are real, and if applied in the absence of appropriate
countermeasures, will increase the likelihood of a successful cyberattack. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the system that a threat
may or may not exploit. Vulnerabilities essentially in the system, ab
initio. Threats can be mitigated or improved based on the attack
circumstances. Impact is an after-the-fact accounting of the cyberattack. No matter what the magnitude, it is a constant.
Countermeasures are a host of technologies that can be applied
to mitigate threats and reduce Risk. Increased Threats means
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increased Risk. Increased Countermeasures means decreased Risk.
In practice, these equations require a qualitative legend to make
comparable cases. Conversely, decreased threats means decreased
Risk and decreased countermeasures means increased Risk.
(Nichols R.-0. , 2016)Some authors use Vulnerabilities to assess Risk.
(Garcia, 2006) Therefor our cyber-attack taxonomy must work for
either Risk approach. There are many approaches to evaluating Risk.
The authors choose the simplest approach to understand the attack
vectors.
Software – Based Vulnerabilities
“Military UAS defense systems deploy widely used software in
their network devices: Operating systems, open source software,
routers, radio frequency devices, Internet Connection Sharing (ICS)
and SAA SCADA.” (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) UAS ground system
network

software

may

have

the

standard

vulnerabilities;

“hardcoded passwords, backdoors in firmware, insecure protocols,
Remote Command Execution (RCE), default passwords for HumanMachine

Interfaces

(HMIs),

Insecure

authentication

and

authorization, malicious hardware, critical infrastructure systems
have hardcoded passwords embedded in firmware which may allow
attackers to gain complete access to system.” (Sood A.K. & Enbody,
2014) It doesn’t end there.
Other software-based vulnerabilities: “Backdoors exist for
support or remote access purposes, Hardcoded passwords easily
obtained by: Reverse engineering firmware, analyzing functional
components,” (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) Remote Code Execution
(RCE) which is an attacker’s ability to execute attacker’s commands
on target machine or target process remotely. Another RCE
vulnerability is a software bug that gives attacker way to execute
arbitrary code or ability to trigger arbitrary code execution from
one machine on another. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016)
Unfortunately,” Remote Code Execution (RCE) can be triggered
by exploiting security flaws in: Operating system components,
browsers,” ICS, SCADA, routers, Microsoft Office, Adobe Reader, and
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Java. Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a powerful threat to UAS and
supporting computer systems. “Attackers exploit security issues;
buffer overflows (stack, heap, integer), use-after free errors, race
conditions, memory corruption, privilege escalations and dangling
pointers.”
Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities keeps growing and
RCE vulnerabilities allow “attackers to execute arbitrary code on
compromised systems, drive-by downloads, spear phishing attacks.”
(Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014)
ICS/SCADA is particularly vulnerable to remote code execution
vulnerabilities. Another form is SQL injections, “which exploits
weaknesses in web applications to allow attackers’ queries to be
executed directly in backend database” and allow attackers to
extract sensitive information such as credentials, emails, critical
documents, intelligence. “Data stolen using SQL injection can
provide critical information for advanced UAS targeted attacks.”
(Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014)
The final group in the software- based vulnerabilities set is
“insecure authentication and file uploading flaws. These allow
remote attackers to access critical systems by exploiting weak
authentication design and uploading malicious code or firmware.
This security issue persists due to inability of systems to implement
granular control through proper authentication and authorization
checks. File uploading attacks exploit a system’s inability to
determine type of files being uploaded on server.” (Sood A.K. &
Enbody, 2014)
Hardware-based Vulnerabilities
The US sometimes picks the wrong vendors to supply its UAS
critical hardware. Hardware imported from China includes
backdoor access to hardware after deployment. “Exported Chinese
manufacturing units compromised military-grade FPGA computer
chips, circuits, and counterfeit devices, such as scanners.” “Zombie
Zero malware has been implanted in software of scanner hardware
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manufactured in China as part of attack targeting shipping and
logistics industries, especially printers. When scanners are
connected to networks, they provide platforms for compromising
networks. Counterfeit devices and circuits developed in China for
U.S. military and defense contractors to be used in warships,
missiles, airplanes and UAS.” (Sood A.K. & Enbody, 2014) (Threat to all
nations that receive hardware pre-installed with malware.) (Nichols
R.-0. , 2016)
“Hardware based vulnerabilities observed in actual attacks on
military defense systems (Army) and applications include the
following; backdoors and hardcoded passwords, compromised
GPS Satellite Communication

(SATCOM) systems,” SCADA

systems vulnerable to buffer overflows, and compromised GPS
SATCOM systems. The Navy had its share of hardware-based
threats;

Remote

Code

Execution

–

“XMLDOM

Zero-day

vulnerability was exploited to attack U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars’
website, SQL injections, Royal Navy website hacked, U.S. Army
website hacked, insecure protocols, spoofing and hijacking and
attacks to spoof GPS communication to control U.S. drones.” (Sood
A.K. & Enbody, 2014)
Wireless attacks are the most generic form of hacking. “Strategies
to compromise a system’s ability to be controlled by rightful owner
include:
• Password Theft
• Wireshark
• Man-In-the-Middle Attacks
• Trojan Horse Virus
• Gain Scheduling Fuzzing,
• Digital Update Rate,
• Distributed Denial of Service,
• Buffer Overflow.”(Rani, 2015)
Forms of MIM attacks are:
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• URL manipulation
• Rogue Domain Name Server
• Address Resolution Protocol poisoning
• Duplication of Media Access Control
• False Emails” (Rani, 2015)
Gain Scheduling attack methods Sensor spoofing to cause mode
confusion,
• Overriding gains through hacking,
• Infinite switching between gains, will cause loss of control,
• Causing Denial of Service (DOS) between controller gain block,
and UAS controller block by overloading the on-board
processor.” (Kim, 2012)
Other possible Attacks on UAS Systems
• Autopilot Hardware Attack. (Kim, 2012)
• Wireless Attack. (Nichols R.-0., 2016)
• Control System Security. (Kim, 2012)
• Application Logic Security. (Nichols R.-0. , 20

Electronic Warfare (EW) – UAS Purview[25]
Warfare is conducted by adversaries who go to great pains to
understand their enemy’s intentions, strengths, weaknesses, and to
minimize the threats to their own forces and territory.
The detection and interception of messages/data, combined with
ground

observations,

provide

an

ability

to

observe

troop

movements and facilitate counteractions by opposing forces. UAS
plays a significant role in these missions.
Communication Links for UAS are critical and must be secured
Modern

warfare

is

conducted

in

a

rich

electromagnetic

environment with radio communications and radar signals from
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many sources. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) / UAV / UUV
/ Drones are an integral part of modern warfare.

UAS

communications networks and links to ground stations are critical
to the successful military use of UAS. Securing UAS links from EW
attacks is a fundamental concern to military planners and civilian
authorities.

UAS

BLOS

communications

require

stable

communications. Disrupting these communications links is a goal of
hostile forces.
The key role of EW is to search these radio-frequency bands to
cull information that can be used for intelligence analysis or by
front-line operators. The information gathered may affect a tactical
advantage on the battlefield, or in any stage before or after. (Moir I.
a., 2006)
Adamy (2001) is correct when he suggests that the, “key to
understanding EW principles (particularly the RF) part is to
understand radio propagation theory. Understanding propagation
leads logically to understanding how they are intercepted, jammed or
protected.” [26]
Main Contention
It is the author’s contention that UAS communication links are
vulnerable and must be evaluated to protect US Unmanned Aircraft
in the cyber or electronic domain. Further, those links may be
electronically jammed, cyber-spoofed (especially navigational), or
made ineffective with electronic or cyber or directed energy or
acoustic interference.[27]
Communications Jamming -UAS
The purpose of communication is to move information from one
location to another. All the following types of transmitted signals are
communications:

• “Voice or non-voice communications (video or digital format)”;
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• “Command signals to control remotely located assets;”
• “Data returned from remotely located equipment”;
• “Location and motion of friendly or enemy assets (land, sea, or
air);”
• UAS communications links from it ground station for control of
the aircraft;
•

UAS communications links from another aircraft or satellite
affecting its flying characteristics;

• UAS communication signals (from any source) that affect the
SAA / navigation / payload / waypoints;
• Computer-to-computer communications;
• Data links;
• Weapon-firing links;
• ISR data links;
• Cell phones.

Figure 9-16 High -Level C4 Operational Concept Incorporating
UAS

Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses | 243

Source: (DoD-03, 2015)
“The purpose of communications jamming is to prevent the
transfer of information. Communications jamming requirements
depend on the signal modulation (strength), the geometry of the
link, and the transmitted power.” (Adamy D. , 2009) Another way to
think of jamming is a method to “interfere with the enemy’s use of
the electromagnetic spectrum. Use of EMS involves the transmission
of information from one point to another”. (Adamy D. , 2009)
“The basic technique of jamming is to add an interfering signal,”
along with the desired signal, into an enemy’s receiver. “Jamming
becomes effective when the interfering signal is strong enough to
overwhelm the desired signal.” This prevents the enemy from
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recovering the information from the desired signal. (Adamy D. ,
2009) There are two possible methods for a successful jam: either
the jamming signal is stronger than the desired “signal or the
combined signals received have characteristics that prevented the
processor from properly extracting the desired information.”
(Adamy D. , 2009) A simple case of jamming unintentionally is when
your AM news station (listening in the car) becomes overwhelmed
by junk music. You can hear the beginning of the interference as
noise, then the junk signal is strong, then as the car moves out of
the area, the AM news station regains its status. (Adamy D. , 2009)
The cardinal rule of jamming is that you jam the receiver, NOT the
transmitter. (Adamy D. , 2001)
“The primary difference between radar and communication
jamming is in the geometry. Whereas a typical radar has both the
transmitter and the associated receiver at the same location, a
communication link, because its job is to take information from one
location to another, always has its receiver in a different location
from that of the transmitter.” (Adamy D. L., 2004)
Communication is often done using transceivers (each including
both transmitter and receiver), but only the receiver at location B in
the figure is jammed. If transceivers are in use and one desires to
jam the link in the other direction, the jamming signal must reach
location A.” (Adamy D. L., 2004)
Another difference of radar jamming is that the radar signal
makes a round trip to the target, so the received signal power is
below the transmitted power by the fourth power of the distance
(often stated as 40 log range). Since the jammer power is
transmitted one way, it is only reduced by the square of distance.”
(Adamy D. L., 2004) Table 9-15 shows the Types of Jamming. (Adamy
D. , 2001)
To be effective, the jammer must get its signal into the enemy’s
receiver – through the associated antenna, input filters, and
processing gates. This depends on the signal strength the jammer
transmits in the direction of the receiver and the distance and
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propagation conditions between the jammer and the receiver.
(Adamy D. , 2009)
Table 9-15 Types of Jamming

Type of
Jamming

Purpose

Interferes with enemy ability to pass information over
Communications a communication link
jamming

Radar jamming

Cover jamming

Deceptive
jamming

Decoy

Causes radar to fail to acquire its target, to stop
tracking target, or to output false information

Reduces the quality of the desired signal so that it
cannot be properly processed, or the info is lost /
unrecoverable
Causes radar to improperly process its return signal
to indicate the correct range or angle to target

Looks like the target more than the actual target;
causes a guided weapon to attack the decoy rather
than intended target

Source: (Adamy D. , 2001)

Jammer-to-Signal Ratio
The real test of jammer effectiveness is the effectiveness with
which information flow is stopped. “A jammer interferes with
communication by injecting an undesired signal into the target,
receiver along with any desired signals that are being received.”
(Adamy D. , 2009) “The obstructing signal must be strong enough
that the receiver cannot recover the required information from the
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desired signals.” The ratio of the jamming signal to the desired signal
is known as the jamming–to-signal ratio (J/S), stated in dB.[28]
Effective J/S depends on the transmitted modulation, but the
Adamy formula works in general. (Adamy D. , 2001)
The formula for communication J/S is:
J / S = ERPJ – ERPS – LJ + LS + G RJ – G R

Equation

9-6
Where: J/S = the ratio of the jammer power to the desired signal
power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB
ERPJ the effective radiated power of the jammer in dBm
ERPS

the effective radiated power of the desired signal

transmitter, in dBm
LJ

the propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi[29]

LS

The propagation loss from the desired signal transmitter,

in dBm
GRJ

the receiving antenna gain in the direction of the jammer,

in dBi
GR

The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the desired

signal transmitter, in dBi.” (Adamy D. , 2001)
Many UAS (especially UAV or sUAS ) have a target receiving
antenna with a 360-degree azimuth coverage. They use whips or
monopoles. They are inexpensive. With a 360-degree antenna, the
communications J/S equation simplifies to:
J / S = ERPJ – ERPS – LJ + LS

Equation 9-7

The receiving antenna has the same gain toward the jammer and
the desired signal transmitter. The two gain terms cancel out.
(Adamy D. , 2009)
A J /S calculation would indicate a successful jam when the
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desired signal fully compromised. (Adamy D. , 2001) The terminology
is slightly different for the power terms (removing the “effective
radiated” and using “power total” instead). The principle is still
the same. (Adamy D. , 2009) See Appendix 9-3 for example J/S
calculation.
US Army Field Manual FM 34-40-7 (23 Nov 1992) Communications
Jamming Handbook, presents three alternative methods for
calculating the jamming power required and distance to target.
For the designer of an anti-UAS Drone gun, (Figure 9-17) which
transmits a jammer signal to a UAS to overwhelm the desired
ground station command signals, one needs the know the power
and height of the drone. Since the drone is moving the jammer
signal must radiate in such a manner that it covers a volume of space
until target “UAS lock.”
Drone gun – Chinese alternative
A Chinese firm makes an anti-drone gun that costs about $35,000
USD and operates on 5.8 GHz and 2.4 GHz.[30] 80% of consumer
drones operate on these frequencies. “The gun tricks the drone into
thinking it has lost connection with its controller.” “RC signal lost”
is flashed on drone screen – aircraft returning to home point.” The
drone can be recovered intact. This gun has an operational limit of
about 700 meters (0.43496 miles).
Figure 9-17 Drone Jammer Model KWT-FZQ.
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Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A
Manufacturer:

Globaldroneuav.com

https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammereffective-drone-controller.html Appendix 9-1 details this antidrone gun.[31]
Calculating the minimum of “amount of jammer power output
required in watts” for this easy drone capture would be of interest.
(Army, 1992) Appendix 9-4 of FM 34-70 (Army, 1992)gives a slightly
different version of the Adamy equation 9-5:
P j = P t x K x (H t / H j )2 x (D j / D t )N
Equation 9-8
Where:
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P j = Minimum amount of jammer power output required , in
watts
P t = Power output of the enemy drone, in watts
H j = Elevation of the jammer location above sea level, feet
H t = Elevation of enemy transmitter location above sea level, in
feet
D j = Jammer location – to-target receiver location distance, in
km
D t = Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver location, in
km
K = 2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers (jamming tuner
accuracy)
N = Terrain and ground conductivity factors
5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity
4 = Moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground
conductivity
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity
F = Frequency in MHz (Army, 1992)
“Note: The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy
transmitter location does not include the height or length of the
antenna above the ground. (Army, 1992) It is the location deviation
above sea level.
Given the following parameters:
P j = Minimum amount of jammer power output required , in
watts = (SOLVE)
P t = Power output of the enemy transmitter -to drone, in watts
= 5 watts
H j = Elevation of the jammer location above sea level, feet, use
385m =.385 km
H t = Elevation of enemy transmitter location above sea level, in
feet use 386m =.386 km
D j = Jammer location – to-target receiver location distance, in
km = 700 m = 0.700 km
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D t = Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver location, in
km = 372m = 0.372 km
K = 2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers (jamming tuner
accuracy) = 2
N = Terrain and ground conductivity factor = Use 4 for moderate
terrain with fair to good ground conductivity (Army, 1992)
F = Frequency in MHz, use 37.5 MHz in the band
Parameters were chosen so that the height ratio would drop-out
and the distance would induce some ground conductivity effects
consistent with the FM 34-40-7 examples.
Plugging the numbers and solving for P:
P j = 5 x 2 x (1)2 x (0.7 / 0.372)4 = 10 x (1.88) 4

= 10 x

12.46 = 125 watts
So, under these hypothetical conditions the jammer gun requires
125 watts (2 60-watt light bulbs) to take down the drone.
Theoretically, if the jammer was using a log periodic array (LPA)
the power could be cut in half to 62.5 watts (1 bulb). Now if this
calculation is reasonable, the buyer is spending $35,000 USD to take
down a small irritating drone (invasion of privacy) using a 60-watt
bulb. A double-aught shotgun shell with a 12-gauge Remington and
yellow shooter sunglasses will have the same effect (might even be
more satisfying) for 1/100 the cost. The medium size drones present
a more interesting case. More power is needed to lock on to the
higher altitude UAS. The term of interest in the jamming equation
from FM 34-40 -7 is the ratio of the distances to the fourth power
(or second power for perfect terrain). That can have a major impact
on jammer output power. (Army, 1992)
Radar Range Equation
Equation 9-9 is not the only place we see a term taken to the
4th power. The famous “Radar Range Equation is dominated by the
R4 factor in the denominator. There is no corresponding function
in the numerator of equation 9-9, with an exponent greater than
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unity. (Toomay, 1982) There is no magic bullet to achieve a highperformance system. If low cross section targets are to be engaged,
a combination of high-power, high gain, large aperture, and low
noise needs to be dictated.” (Toomay, 1982)
The standard Radar Range Equation (RRE) is:
S / N = (P GTArσ ) / [(4π)2 R4 KTS LS ]

Equation

9-9
Where:
S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio, dB
P = Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of peak power,
Mw
GT = Gain of the transmit antenna, dB
Ar = Receive antenna effective area, m2
σ = Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2
R4 = Energy density received at detected target range, R, nm
K = Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component)
TS = Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above absolute
zero
LS = Losses existing in the system (lumped together), dB
Inherent in equation 9-9, is the fact that the range of the radar to
a “detected object can be calculated by: R = ct / 2, where c is the
speed of light (3 x 108 m/s) x time , in sec. also, λ = c / f, where λ is
the wavelength in Hz, and frequency, f is the cycles/second for the
sinusoidal oscillator.” (Toomay, 1982)
The point of this diversion into Radar history was that the
performance of both the jamming equation and the radar range
equation are affected by a power of 4th exponent. This affects
equipment design, cost, effectiveness of detection or capture.
“The principles of a primitive radar are formed. Figure 9-18
diagrams its functions. A burst of electromagnetic energy,
oscillating at a predetermined frequency is generated and radiates
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into free space from an antenna. A clock is started. The
electromagnetic energy propagates outward at the speed of light,
reradiating (scattering) from objects it encounters along its path.
Part of the scattered energy returns to the radar (is received) and
can be detected there because it imitates the frequency and
duration of the transmitted pulse.” (Toomay, 1982)
Figure 9-19 shows a simple surveillance RADAR. Compare this to
2019 version in Figure 9-20 which requires computer simulations to
sort out the parameters.
Figure 9-18 Simple Radar Block Diagram

Source:

Simple

Radar

PPTX

by

Linkedin

SlideShare

(2018)

https://www.slideshare.net/remotesensor1/radar-transmitter-4-1
A full derivation of all the terms, the radar spherical geometry and
derivations of subset equations are in all legacy and modern radar
texts and papers.
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Figure 9-19 Simple Surveillance Radar

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, (1994)
Complex RADAR / RES Simulations
Figure 9-20 shows that RADARS can be quite complex. They lend
themselves to computer simulation to determine optimum
parameters for a variety of systems.
Advancement of computer technologies and computer networks
opens the possibilities of effective modeling of progressively
sophisticated electronics. Nowadays, the time spent on the
procedures of modeling complex radio electronic systems (RES) has
been tangibly shortened. The shortened time spent on computation
and steadily promoted adequacy of computer models to real
systems and waveforms make it possible to transform the process
of designing sophisticated systems (radars, air defense missile
systems, their components and subsystems) based on modeling.
Information circulates about real facts of full-scale designing of
large-size aerial vehicles using adequate computer models.
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Objects of modeling:
• RES with easily changeable structure and parameters;
• various signals circulating in radio electronic systems and in
air;
• objects controlling such systems, for example, missiles in the
process of guidance;
• influence of physical factors on quality and parameters of the
processes described (ambient temperature, humidity, pressure,
influence of the atmosphere on propagation of radio waves,
etc.).
Computer modeling radically simplifies and saves time expenditure
on developing complex RES, considerably alleviates the designer’s
qualification requirements, minimizes physical modeling and
financial costs.
They are used for:
• optimization of the structure and parameters of newly
developed radars, ADMS, EW assets;
• analysis of effectiveness of operation of Radars (ADMS), EW
assets in complex jamming environments, facing the use of
intensive maneuvers by the targets, etc.;
• researching the principal operational and technical
characteristics of radars, ADMS, EW assets (detection
envelope, kill envelope, tracking accuracy, etc.)
ADMS computer modeling systems are designed for:
• analysis of the processes of target detection and tracking in
surveillance radars
• analysis of the processes of detection, reception of targeting,
detection and acquisition of targets (lock-on) by tracking
radars;
• analysis of the process of target lock-on and tracking by an air
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defense missile (SAM);
• analysis of the process of missile flight, collision with target,
warhead detonation and effectiveness of the kill;
• selection and substantiation of the ADMS structure and
parameters.

The modeling system comprises:
• models of the detection radar;
• models of the tracking radar;
• models of the missile motion;
• models of the missile signal;
• models of influence of the atmosphere on propagation of radio
waves;
• models of motion of the target(s);
• models of target echoes;
• models of clutters induces by volume- and surface-distributed
reflectors;
• models of jamming;
• models of multipath caused by influence of the Earth;
• models of the atmosphere.

Figure 9-20 Computer modeling of sophisticated radio
electronic systems
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Source: (radiotechnika – Republic of Belarus, 2019)
Conclusions
UAS are vulnerable to a variety of non-kinetic defenses, to wit:
IO, cyber, EW, and as we shall see next chapter, acoustic. UAS are
also vulnerable to DE weapons[32] UAS avionics is a prime target for
both cyber and EW C-UAS defenses. SAA and SCADA systems are
most susceptible to cyber-attacks.
Discussion Question

• There is a closely related science that intersects with EW and
that is Cyber. There are distinct parallels and intersections
between Cyber and EW. For instance, the sister of signal
spreading techniques is encryption. See Figure 9-21 showing
the intersection of Cyber, EW, and Spectrum Warfare
designated as Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEA)[33] [34]
[35] [36] The reader will research all major C-UAS
intersections viewed in Figure 9-21 and provide examples.
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Figure 9-21 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

Source: FM 3- 38 (2014)
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Appendix 9-1 Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A[37]
Source: (LRAD Corporation, 2019)
Manufacturer:

Globaldroneuav.com

https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammereffective-drone-controller.html
Functions and features

1. Full range cover within three frequency section and highpower transmission helps to achieve the ideal effects.
2. Fast trigger, easy use and daughter switch design make control
more ease and comfort.
3. Dual lithium batteries for power supply last work time longer.
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4. The strong internal line connector and external fuses port
make the whole vehicle and component parts fastened
securely.
5. All aluminum alloy case body design and glass fiber material
for antenna cover make its appearance lighter and faster.
ce dimension ：（mm）L×W×H；1323mm×403mm×341 mm
Weight（
（Kg）
）:4.7kg±0.2kg（mainframe + battery）
0.6kg±0.1kg（sighting telescope）
Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A
Manufacturer:

Globaldroneuav.com

https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammereffective-drone-controller.html

Appearance dimension ：（mm）L×W×H；1323mm×403mm×341
mm
Weight（
（Kg）
）:4.7kg±0.2kg（mainframe + battery）
0.6kg±0.1kg（sighting telescope）
Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A
Manufacturer:

Globaldroneuav.com

https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammereffective-drone-controller.html
Technical parameters
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SN

Parameter name：

Parameter index record：

1

Power supply-

Work voltage V

2

Work current A

≤9A@DC14.8V

3

Work time

≥1.5h

4

Radio Frequency

Work frequency range MHz

5

Output power dBm

40dBm@1550～1620MHz（±1dB）

6

37dBm@2400～2483MHz（±1dB）

7

37dBm@5725～5852MHz（±1dB）

8

Out of band rejection

＜-36dBm@30～1000MHz

Specification

9

&environment

＜-30dBm@≥1GHz

Weight

10

Dimension

1323mm×403mm×341 mm, with battery an

11

Work environment humidity

≥95%

12

Work temperature

-25℃～55℃

13

Storage temperature

-40℃～70℃

Appearance

dimension ：（mm）L×W×H；1323mm×403mm×341

mm
Weight（
（Kg）
）:4.7kg±0.2kg（mainframe + battery）
0.6kg±0.1kg（sighting telescope）
Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A
Manufacturer:

Globaldroneuav.com

https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammereffective-drone-controller.html

Appendix 9-2 MQ-4C Triton design features
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The MQ-4C Triton is based on the RQ-4N, a maritime variant of
the RQ-4B Global Hawk. The main aluminum fuselage is of semimonocoque construction, while the V-tail, engine nacelle and aft
fuselage are made of composite materials. The forward fuselage is
strengthened for housing sensors and the radomes are provided
with lightning protection, and hail and bird-strike resistance.
The UAS has a length of 14.5m, height of 4.7m and a wingspan
of 39.9m. It can hold a maximum internal payload of 1,452kg and
external payload of 1,089kg.
Mission capabilities of MQ-4C Triton BAMS UAS
The MQ-4C is a high-altitude, long-endurance UAS, suitable for
conducting continuous sustained operations over an area of
interest at long ranges. It relays maritime intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) information directly to the maritime
commander.
The UAS can be deployed in a range of missions such as maritime
surveillance, battle damage assessment, port surveillance and
communication relay. It will also support other units of naval
aviation to conduct maritime interdiction, anti-surface warfare
(ASuW), battle-space management and targeting missions.
The MQ-4C is capable of providing persistent maritime
surveillance and reconnaissance coverage of wide oceanographic
and littoral zones at a mission radius of 2,000 nautical miles. The
UAS can fly 24 hours a day, seven days a week with 80% effective
time on station (ETOS).
Payloads of Northrop’s unmanned system
The payload is composed 360° field of regard (FOR) sensors
including multifunction active sensor (MFAS) electronically steered
array radar, electro-optical / infrared (EO/IR) sensor, automatic
identification system (AIS) receiver and electronic support
measures (ESM). The payload also includes communications relay
equipment and Link-16.
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The MTS-B multispectral targeting system performs auto-target
tracking and produces high-resolution imagery at multiple fieldof-views and full motion video. The AN/ZLQ-1 ESM uses specific
emitter identification (SEI) to track and detect emitters of interest.
Engine and performance of the US’s UAS.
MQ-4C Triton is powered by a Rolls-Royce AE3007H turbofan
engine. It is an advance variant of the AE3007 engine in service with
the Citation X and the Embraer Regional Jet. The engine generates
a thrust of 8,500lb.
The UAS can fly at a maximum altitude of 60,000ft. It has a gross
take-off weight of 14,628kg. Its maximum unrefueled range is 9,950
nautical miles and endurance is 30 hours. The maximum speed is
357mph.
Ground control station
The UAS is operated from ground stations manned by a four-man
crew, including an air vehicle operator, a mission commander and
two sensor operators. The UAS can fly 24 hours a day, seven days a
week with 80% effective time on station (ETOS).
The ground station includes launch and recovery element (LRE)
and a mission control element (MCE). The MCE performs mission
planning,

launch

and

recovery,

image

processing

and

communications monitoring. The LRE controls related ground
support

equipment

as

well

as

landing

and

take-off

operations. (Naval Technology Team, 2019)

Appendix 9-3: J/S Calculation Example

272 | Chapter 9: Non- Kinetic: Military Avionics, EW,CW,DE,SCADA
Defenses

Source: Cagalj, M. (2014) & Adamy, D, (2001) EW 101
Quote from manufacturer Globaldroneuav.com: (Adamy D. , 2009)
Endnotes
[1]FIRES definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon systems to
create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.
[2]

Danger Close Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/

magazine/issues/2013/May-June/Myer.html

Nov

14,

2013

– 1) danger close is included in the “method-of-engagement” line of
a call-for-fire request to indicate that friendly forces are close to
the target. … Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk
estimate distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used
to define danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of
incapacitation. 2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air
support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the
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term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for
fire which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity
of the target.
[3] See Team or SWARM formats, Tables 3-1 and 3-2 in (Nichols, et
al., 2019)
[4] (Moir I. &., 2006) provides data on all the listed military avionics
systems,

including

role

description,

key

performance

characteristics, profile, crew component, systems architecture,
major components (avionics, communications, mission systems and
weapons), and pictures of aircraft types in the role. The purpose of
this section is to detail one role, the Military Maritime Role (MPA)
to show that UASs can perform the role in support of the author’s
opening contention that manned (piloted) aircraft systems can be
replaced by unmanned (no crew) aircraft systems for a variety of the
key performance characteristics for less investment and reduced
liability to US forces. Every role listed reasonable fits within the
author’s contention, again presented without any intended
disrespect to our US military forces.
[5] Authors conclusions.
[6] These are legacy definitions from (Moir I. &., 2006) and are
included for functional purposes. Chapter 14 of (Nichols, et al., 2019)
update these definitions to USA and NATO categories. ES =
Electronic Warfare support ( old ESM); EA = Electronic attack –
which is the old ECM but also includes ASW and Directed Energy
(DE) weapons; and EP = Electronic Protection is the old ECCM.
[7] Again, the chosen material for Table 9-2 has legacy implications
by design. Many of the included systems have been significantly
upgraded and, in some cases, classified as to performance. All the
system names are found in the Abbreviations List. MPA represents a
huge category in tasks and is a primary user of acoustic data.
[8] The EW, CW and Acoustic Countermeasures discussions are
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updated from Chapter 3: Understanding Hostile Use and CyberVulnerabilities of UAS: Components, Autonomy v Automation,
Sensors, SAA, SCADA and Cyber Attack Taxonomy;” Chapter 8:”
Designing UAS Systems for Stealth;” Chapter 14: Exposing UAS
Vulnerabilities via EW and Countering with LPI Signals;” and
Chapter 19: Audiology, Acoustic Countermeasures against SWARMS
and Building IFF Libraries.” (Nichols, et al., 2019)
[9] The EW, CW and Acoustical sections are updated / illustrated
from our previous textbook (Nichols, et al., 2019)
[10] In (Nichols, et al., 2019), we studied the EMS, datalinks and
cyber-vulnerabilities of UAS. Here we consider electronic warfare
as a method of overwhelming, destroying, or controlling the
information, transmitted by communication datalinks, to alter the
mission of the UAS deployment. Chapter 14: Exposing UAS
Vulnerabilities via EW and Countering with LPI Signals;” in (Nichols,
et al., 2019) and (Moir I. &., 2006) in their Chapter 6 Electronic
Warfare

give

reasonable

discussions

of

the

fundamentals,

technologies, missions and key players for EW. They by no means
cover the field however, they serve as a starting point on the long
road of EW discoveries.
[11] Nuclear weapons may be characterized in terms of megatons,
bullets in terms of muzzle velocity, and particle beams in terms of
amperes of current. The commonality is amount of energy absorbed
by the target which leads to similar levels of damage achieved at
similar levels of energy deposited. (Nielsen, 2012)
[12] Joules is the preferred unit for DE. A joule is approximately the
energy required to lift a gallon of milk a distance of three feet or 1/
50,000 of the energy needed to brew a cup of 6 oz coffee. For us
old-time engineers for reference points: 1 BTU = 1055 J; 1 Calorie =
4.19 J; 1kw hr = 3.6 x 106 J; 1eV = 1.6 x 10-19 J and 1 erg = 10-7 J.
[13] For this example, C= 4.2 (J/gm x o C) and ice cube = 50 gm, Ti=
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-10 (o C), Tm= 0 (o C). (Lm) for water = 334 Joules / gm. So, 16,700
additional Joules are necessary to melt the ice cube of 50gm. Tv =
vaporization temperature, (100 o C),
[14] Aka called “Fluence” Units of fluence are 1 J/cm2 =104 J/m2
and 1 W /cm2 = 104 W/ m2
[15] The effect of area can be better understood by looking at the
energy delivery from the two atom bombs delivered against
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (Glasstone, 1977) Both weapons had yields
of about 20kT, they released about 8 x 1013 Joules of energy. At a
range of z of 0.1 mile (= 1.6 x 104 cm), the energy density would be
approximately 8 x 1013 Joules / 4πz2 = 2.5 x 104 J /cm2 or fluence.
So, when spreading of the blast energy is accounted for, the result
is consistent with other weapon types. Our damage energy density
sufficiency is 10,000 J / cm2 or fluence.
[16] Thermal conductivity varies for materials. Copper (good
conductor) = 4.2 J/cm sec deg whereas Air (thermal insulator) has a
value of 0.00042 J /cm sec deg. (Nielsen, 2012) Thermal conductivity
is not just a simple single order equation. Other effects are observed
changes in regional temperatures, effects of thermal conductivity,
thermal diffusion, / diffusivity, temperature propagation v time.
[17] Black Body radiation is a mathematical ideal surface that
absorbs all radiation incident upon it. In equilibrium it would radiate
more energy than any other object. (Nielsen, 2012)

[19] Definitions
Electronic warfare (EW) is defined as the art and science of
preserving the use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for
friendly use while denying its use by the enemy. (Adamy D. , 2001)
The EMS is from DC to light and beyond. EW covers the full radio
frequency spectrum, the infrared spectrum, and the ultraviolet
spectrum.
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Nichols (2000) defines Cybersecurity in terms of cyber-conflict.
(Nichols R. K., 2008) Alford (2000) authored effective definitions
for the DoD. These will illustrate the bigger picture of Information
Operations (IO) and the subset known as Electronic Warfare (EW).
Cybersecurity (in the context of Cyber conflict) is defined as, “the
broad tree of investigation and practice devoted to cybercrimes,
Computer Forensics (CF), Information Assurance (IA), Information
Security (INFOSEC), Communications Security (COMSEC), and
especially Cyber Counterintelligence (CCI).” (Nichols R. K., 2008)
“Cyber Warfare (CW / CyW). Any act intended to compel an
opponent to fulfill our national will, executed against the software
controlling processes within an opponent’s system. CyW
includes the following modes of cyber-attack; cyber infiltration,
cyber manipulation,
Cyber assault, and cyber raid.” (DAU, 2018) (DAU, 2018)
“Cyber Infiltration (CI / CyI). Penetration of the defenses of a
software-controlled system such
that the system can be compromised, disabled, manipulated,
assaulted, or raided.” (DAU, 2018) (DoD, 2018)
“Cyber Manipulation (CM / CyM). Following infiltration, the
control of a system via its software which leaves the system intact,
then uses the capabilities of the system to do damage.
For example, using an electric utility’s software to turn off power.”
(DAU, 2018) (DoD, 2018)
“Cyber Assault (CA / CyA). Following infiltration, the destruction
of software and data in the system, or attack that compromises
system capabilities.” (Alford, 2000) Includes viruses and system
overloads via e-mail (e-mail overflow).” (DoD, 2018; DoD, 2018)
“Cyber Raid (CR / CyR). Following infiltration, the manipulation
or acquisition of data within the system, which leaves the system
intact, results in transfer, destruction, or alteration of
data. For example, stealing e-mail or taking password lists from a
mail server.” (DAU, 2018) (DoD, 2018)
Cyber-Attack. See CyI, CyM, CyA, or CyR.
Cybercrime (CC / CyC). Cyber-attacks without the intent to
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affect national security or to further operations against national
security.” (Alford, 2000)
“C4ISR. The concept of Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” (DoD,
2018) (Kaye, 2001) See Figure 9-15 (C4ISystems, 2013)
Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as the art and science of
preserving the use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) for
friendly use, while denying its use by the enemy. (Adamy D. , 2001)
“Information Assurance (IA). Measures that protect and defend
information and information systems by ensuring their availability,
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.
These measures include providing for restoration of information
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction
capabilities.” (Barker, 2003) (Kaye, 2001)
“Information Operations (IO). The integrated employment of the
core

capabilities

of

electronic

warfare,

computer

network

operations, psychological operations, military deception, and
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and
related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp
adversarial human and automated decision-making process,
information, and information systems while protecting our own.”
(Barker, 2003) (Kaye, 2001)
“Information Superiority (IS). The capability to collect, process,
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. A newer
form of this is that: degree of dominance in the information domain
which permits the conduct of operations without effective
opposition.” (Alford, 2000) (Kaye, 2001)
“Information Warfare (IW). Information operations conducted
during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific
objectives over a specific adversary. IW is any action to Deny,
Exploit, Corrupt or Destroy the enemy’s information and its
functions, protecting those actions and exploiting our own military
information functions.” (Alford, 2000) (Kaye, 2001)
“Intentional Cyber Warfare Attack (ICWA). any attack through
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cyber-means to intentionally affect national security (cyber warfare)
or to further operations against national security.
Includes cyber-attacks by unintentional actors prompted by
intentional actors. (Also
see “unintentional cyber warfare attack.”) IA can be equated to
warfare; it is national policy at the level of warfare. Unintentional
Attack(UA) is basically crime. UA may be committed by a bungling
hacker or a professional cybercriminal, but the intent is self-serving
and not to further a national objective. This does not mean
unintentional attacks cannot affect policy or have devastating
effects.
Intentional Cyber Actors (I-actors). Individuals intentionally
prosecuting cyber warfare (cyber
operators, cyber troops, cyber warriors, cyber forces).” (Alford,
2000)
“Network

Centric

Operations

(NCO).

NCO

involves

the

development and employment of mission critical packages that are
the embodiment of the tenets of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
in operations across the full mission spectrum. These tenets state
that a robustly networked force improves information sharing and
collaboration, which enhances the quality of information, the quality
of awareness, and improves shared situational awareness. This
results in enhanced collaboration and enables self-synchronization
improving sustainability and increasing speed of command, which
ultimately result in dramatically increased mission effectiveness.
(Kaye, 2001)” (MORS, 2018) (Kaye, 2001)
OPSEC. (Operations Security) (DoD-01, 2018) “Determining what
information is publicly available in the normal course of operations
that can be used by a competitor or enemy to its advantage. OPSEC
is a common military practice that is also applied to civilian projects
such as the development of new products and technologies.
OPSEC – The Official Definition
(From JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.)
Operations Security (OPSEC) is a process of identifying critical
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information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant
to military operations and other activities to:
1.

Identify those operations that can be observed by

adversary intelligence systems,
2.

Determine what indicators adversary intelligence

systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together
to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries, and
3.

Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce

to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to
adversary exploitation.” (DoD-01, 2018)
“Psychological Operations (PO) Planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately the behavior of foreign entities.” (Alford, 2000) (Kaye,
2001)
“Psychological Warfare (PW / PSYWAR) The planned use of
propaganda and other psychological actions to influence the
opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of hostile foreign
groups.” (Kaye, 2001)
“Unintentional

Cyber

Actors

(U-actors).

Individuals

who

unintentionally attack, but affect
national security and are largely unaware of the international
ramifications of their actions.
Unintentional actors may be influenced by I-actors, but are
unaware they are being
manipulated to participate in cyber operations. U-actors include
anyone who commits
CyI, CyM, CyA, and CyR without the intent to affect national
security, or to further
operations against national security. This group also includes
individuals involved in
CyC, journalists, and industrial spies. The threat of journalists and
industrial spies
against systems including unintentional attacks caused by their
CyI efforts should be
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considered high.
Unintentional Cyber Warfare Attack (UCWA/ UA). Any attack
through cyber-means, without the intent to affect national security
(cybercrime).” (Alford, 2000)

[21] Skyjack Drone hack. Drone that flies around seeking Seeks
wireless signal of any other drone in area. Forcefully disconnects
wireless connection of true owner of target drone. Authenticates
with target drone pretending to be its owner. Feeds commands to
it and all other zombie drones SkyJack primarily a Perl application
which runs off a Linux. Detect drones by seeking out wireless
connections from MAC addresses.
[22] Aircrack-ng© To put wireless device into monitor mode to find
drones and drone owners. De-authenticate true owner of drone.
Once de-authenticated, connect as drone waiting for owner to
reconnect.
[23] Snoopy is Software that can hack into Wi-Fi and steal data
– attached to drones. Comprised of various existing technologies.
Uses Distributed tracking and profiling framework. Runs client-side
code on any device that has support for wireless monitor mode.
Collects probe-request and uploads to a central server. Exploits
handsets looking for wireless signal. Most leave their device WiFi setting on Spoof network available to Wi-Fi searchers to use.
Once connected to rogue network, data is stolen. Differs from other
rogue access points in way data is routed. Traffic is routed via an
OpenVPN connection to a central server. Able to observe traffic
from all drones in field at one point. Traffic manipulation only done
on server. Allows basic data exploration and mapping.
[24] Special thanks and credit to my co-author Dr. Julie J.C.H. Ryan
and Dan J. Ryan, Esq who were pioneers in the field information
security and its associated risks. (Randall K. Nichols, 2000)
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[25] Adamy sets the standards for EW instruction. Moir summarizes
the topic with respect to military operations, UAS, and military
avionics systems. (Moir I. a., 2006) (Toomay, 1982) and (Burch, 2015)
bring Radar to the non-specialist reader. A Google search on the
key = RADAR yields 296,000,000 results (0.49 seconds). There is
substantial material on the subject. The challenge is determining the
UAS applicability.
[26] Legacy EW definitions- EW was classically divided into: (Adamy
D. , 2001)
ESM – Electromagnetic Support Measures – the receiving part of
EW;
ECM – Electromagnetic Countermeasures – jamming, chaff, flares
used

to

interfere

with

operations

of

radars,

military

communications and heat-seeking weapons;
ECCM -Electronic Counter-Counter Measures – measures taken
in design or operation of radars or communications systems to
counter the effects of ECM.
Not included in the EW definitions were Anti-radiation Weapons
(ARW) and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW).
USA and NATO have updated these categories:
ES – Electronic warfare Support (old ESM)
EA – Electronic Attack – which is the old ECM but also includes
ASW and DE weapons;
EP – Electronic Protection – (old ECCM) (Adamy D. , 2001)
ES is different from Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is made
up of Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic
Intelligence (ELINT). All these fields involve the receiving of enemy
transmissions. (Adamy D. , 2001)
COMINT receives enemy communications signals to extract
intelligence.
ELINT uses enemy non-communications signals for determining
the enemy’s EMS signature so that countermeasures can be
developed. ELINT systems collect substantial data over large
periods to support detailed analysis.
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ES/ESM collects enemy signals, either communication or noncommunication, with the object to do something immediately about
those signals or the weapons associated with those signals. The
received signals might be jammed, or the information sent to a
lethal responder. Received signals can be used to type and locate the
enemy’s transmitter, locate enemy forces, weapons, distribution,
and electronic capability. (Adamy D. , 2001)
[27] This a main theme of this book. In addition, this section started
off with the answer – Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) as a
countermeasure to reduce risk of EA to the UAS missions. (Adamy
D. , 2009)
[28] Any number expressed in dB is logarithmic base 10. dB
mathematical concepts with examples may be found in Chapter 2 of
Adamy, D., (2001) EW 101. A value expressed in dB is a ratio converted
to logarithmic form. A linear number is converted to dB form by the
formula: N(dB) = 10 log (base 10) [N]. dB values are converted back
to linear format by the formula N = 10 **N (dB/10). dB numbers are
usually reference to some standard with constant value. A common
example is signal strength expressed in dBm = dB value of Power /
1 milliwatt, used to describe signal strength. For example, 4 watts
power level = 4000 mw. Divide by 1 mw standard then convert 4000
to dB = 10 log (4000) = 36.02 dBm. dB forms are used because of the
wide range of numbers and orders of magnitude for the EMS.
[29] dBi = dB value of antenna gain relative to the gain of an isotropic
antenna ( perfect antenna). 0 dBi is the gain of an omnidirectional
(isotropic) antenna.
[30] Video Report, Quote by Amy Hu. Data Expert Technology LTD,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o057LmNGsJA DLA 07312018
[31] Source: Tri-band Anti Drone Rifle KWT-FZQ/DG10-A
Manufacturer:

Globaldroneuav.com

https://globaldroneuav.com/Product/Police-drone-jammereffective-drone-controller.html
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[32] DE weapons are technically kinetic weapons with non-kinetic
interfaces. The author has included them because they are very cool
and represent a huge amount of classified advanced research for CUAS purposes.
[33] FM 3-38 (2014)
[34] Askin, O., Irmak, R, and Avseyer, M. (14 May 2015)
[35] CEA aka Cyber electronic warfare
[36] Student will research CEA and its parallels to EW (start with FM
3 – 38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities in CANVAS or use Google
to find the free PDF) How do these intersections support both
friendly and hostile actions on UAS systems in all classes? Develop
a PowerPoint presentation with your answers for class submission.
Look for tools like cyber offensive weapons against key UAS systems
and cyber defensive weapons/countermeasures that can be used
to thwart the cyber weapons that you have found in Open Source
literature (Non- CLASSIFIED). Try to develop a taxonomy around
your findings.
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PART III

SECTION 3: COUNTER
C-UAS
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Chapter 10: When the Other
Side Fights Back Cyberwarfare, Directed
Energy Weapons,
Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS
into Planning
R. K. NICHOLS

Student Objectives
All the C-UAS systems described in this chapter are known by
USA and friendly forces and, in general, by other countries (China,
Russia, terror states under CNKI, etc.) So, the object of this chapter
is to understand the lethal use of the EMS by:
• Study four classic direct energy weapons (DEW, Laser,
Microwave, Particle Beams) technologies
• Learn about acoustic countermeasures and their effects on
MEMS
• Sample real-world advanced UAS systems deployed in the
field. These UAS are able to fight back via EW and have both
kinetic and non-kinetic countermeasures against friendly CUAS systems.
What Happens When the Enemy Decides to Fight Back?
There needs to be plans /policies in place. The UK Government
has developed one and presented it to Parliament in October 2019.
In the UK Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy we read the
following objectives: (Norbiton, Oct 2019)
Chapter 10: When the Other Side
Fights Back - Cyberwarfare, Directed

1 The objective of the strategy is to reduce risk posed by the
highest-harm illegal use of drones,
2 The government’s strategy is to mitigate the malicious, criminal
use of drones, including threats to the UK’s national security and
critical infrastructure,
3 To develop a comprehensive understanding of the evolving risks
posed by the malicious and illegal use of drones,
4 To take a full spectrum approach to deter, detect and disrupt
the misuse of drones
5 To build strong relationships with industry to ensure products
meet the highest security standards
6 To empower police and other operational responders through
access to counter-drone capabilities and effective legislation,
training and guidance.[1]
(Norbiton, Oct 2019) document considers highest-harm risks
resulting from malicious use of drones:
• Facilitating terrorist attacks
• Facilitating crime, especially in the UK prisons
• Disrupting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)
• Potential use by hostile state actors

The two departments that are responsible for strategy and policy
associated with the illegal use of drones are Department of
Transport(DT) (responsible for the safe and lawful use of drones
within UK airspace) and the Home Office (HO) which has overall
responsibility for domestic counter-drone activity as part of its
wider security remit. (Norbiton, Oct 2019)
First Actions
Following the Gatwick drone sightings in December 2018, the
DT and the Center for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)
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put in place policies to reduce the vulnerability of sensitive sites to
drone incursions:

• Guidance for CNI operators, including airports on how to
assess drone risks and vulnerabilities, and training on available
counter -drone technologies.
• Standardized signage to clearly designate areas where drone
flights are prohibited, and providing information to the public
on how to report drone sightings,
• Setting security requirements for manufacturers and endusers of counter-drone equipment to safely test and refine
their equipment,
• Put in place significant additional classified steps to ensure
that UK airports are prepared to detect, deter, and disrupt
drone incursions.(Norbiton, Oct 2019)

Regulations
The Air Navigation Order (ANO) of 2016 established a number
of offenses regarding the irresponsible use of drones. (National
Archives, 2019) This is an extensive order much like the FAA multiple
instructions / regulations / drafts for flight certifications,
suitability, guidance and penalties for illegal use. APO 2016 was
updated to include more offenses after the Gatwick 2018 incidents.
On 30 November 2019, all sUAS drones must be registered and
owners / pilots must undertake competency testing.
The DT, in its 2018 consultation, Taking Flight: The Future of
Drones in the UK, (Transport, 2019) announced its intention to give
police new powers to enforce drone offenses under ANO 2016 by:

• Giving police the power to require a drone to be grounded,
• Giving police the power to require operators to produce
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evidence of registration and competency and provide the
identity of the operator
• Improving police powers to investigate where an offense has
been committed,
• Making an expansion to “no-fly zones” around airports from
1km to 5 km, effective March 2019,
• Improved Stop and Search power for offenses relating to flying
a drone in a restricted zone of an aerodrome.[2]
Compare this approach to the ineffectual California police handling
a drone operator misusing his drone during a huge and dangerous
wildfire. The drone forced rescue helicopters to avoid critical areas
and to be grounded. (Norman, 2019)
Practical Aviation Security in USA
An Airport Cooperative Research Project (ACRP), Unmanned
Aircraft Systems at Airports: A Primer researched the potential use
and

impact

of

ATC

systems,

airport

facility

standards,

environmental impact, safety management systems and community
outreach. (K. Neubauer, 2015) Unfortunately, the report failed to
envision the security threats posed by UAV operations away from an
airport.
Security Implications of UAV Operations (5 major threats)
The security threats from current enemy drone operations are
multiple:
1. A UAV can be used to conduct surveillance on airports or other
high-value targets (HVT)
2. A UAV can be purposely flown into a passenger
aircraft.(Example Figure 3-1 in (Nichols, et al., Unmanned
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019)
3. A UAV can be weaponized with a gun, DEW, Sonic systems,
lasers, IEDs, to attack a high-value targets, passing quietly over
the heads of security personnel and any security fencing or
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barriers
4. A UAV could combine weapons and surveillance and flown into
a number of specific targets
5. A UAV can be equipped with CBR element and dispense the
agent over an open-air assembly, stadium, ball park, mall or
concert. (Forrest, 2016)

Most of the authors’ 2nd edition was devoted to expanding the
threat landscape and countering the risks so determined. (Nichols,
et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) In this
text, the authors assume the enemy fights back. All the risks remain
and must be considered viable scenarios at some level of exposure
and mitigation. Several Russian and Chinese competitive systems
are discussed later in this chapter.
Important Changes in Electronic Warfare
The authors agree with Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, DEU
N, NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff that modern conflicts
will be fought in all dimensions possible and that Electronic Warfare
(EW) will be the key for modern conflict. (Commander Malte von
Spreckelsen, 2018)[3]
The modern “father” of Electronic Warfare technology is David L.
Adamy. In his textbook (Adamy D. L., 2015) he points out important
changes in EW (especially after the Iraq wars and the expansion of
UAS in the battlefield):

• The recognition of the electronic environment as a distinct
battlespace;
• New and extremely dangerous electronically guided weapons;
• New technologies that impact both the accuracy and lethality
of weapons.
Adamy defines radio emissions associated with threats as “threats.”
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This is not technically correct because things that explode or can
cause great damage are also threats. Adamy refers to signals as
threats, especially radar and radar-controlled weapons:
• Search and acquisition radars;
• Tracking radars;
• Radio links between radar processors and missiles
The other significant area defined by Adamy is communication
threats which include:
• Command and control communications;
• Data links between components of integrated air defense
systems;
• Command and data links connecting UAVs with their control
stations;
• Cell phone links when used for military purposes.(Adamy D. L.,
2015)

Adamy essentially focuses on ADS. Cmd. von Spreckelsen
considers integration of the EMS the entire battlespace to insure
effectiveness of IADS suppression. (Stathopoulos, 2018) See Figure
10-1.[4]
NATO has a pretty decent view on the threats it may encounter
on land, on and below sea, in the air, and in space. Furthermore,
cyberspace is increasingly considered by NATO as critical risk –
determinative. (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018)
“In its EW policy[5], NATO defines Electronic Warfare as ‘a
military action that exploits electromagnetic energy, both actively
and passively, to provide situational awareness and create offensive
and defensive effects’. It is warfare within the Electromagnetic
Spectrum (EMS) and (shown in Figure 10-2) involves the military use
of electromagnetic energy to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective
use of the EMS while protecting its use for friendly forces.”
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Figure 10-1 Integration of the Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)
into Every Operating Domain

Source: (Stathopoulos, 2018)
Figure 10-2 Electronic Warfare in today’s military environment
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Source: (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018)
Figure 10-2 is a complex reality. Study this in detail. Recognized
the importance of communications, cybersecurity, and EW
components. EW can have significant mission impact – even in
the simplest possible scenario. “For example, having an adversary
monitor one’s communications or eliminate one’s ability to
communicate or navigate can be catastrophic. Likewise, having an
adversary know the location of friendly forces based on their
electronic transmissions is highly undesirable and can put those
forces at a substantial disadvantage.” (Commander Malte von
Spreckelsen, 2018)
Recall from (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the
Cyber Domain, 2019) the EMS purview in Figure 10-3:
Figure 10-3 EMS Purview

Source: (TRS, 2018)
Now integrate the EMS information with the Battlespace
Dimensions in Table 9-3 from previous chapter (Nichols, et al.,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019):
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The point is that the security environment has changed
necessitating a refocus on EW, especially integrated with Cyber
capabilities. Russia and China have significantly upgraded their
capabilities to operate in the EMS. (Commander Malte von
Spreckelsen, 2018) These are not threats to be ignored.
Revisit Figure 9-21 showing the intersection of Cyber, EW, and
Spectrum Warfare designated as Cyber Electromagnetic Activities
(CEA).[6]
Cyberwarfare Purview
When our authors think Cyberwarfare, the consensus is that
cyber refers to information moved from computer to computer
over the Internet, within the network of computers comprising the
Internet. In Chapter 4 of the 2nd edition textbook (Nichols, et al.,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) the authors
expanded this definition

to measures on the information

superhighway to gain military advantage by gathering military
significant information from the enemy or interfering with the
enemy’s ability to move its own information over the Internet or
other networks or to process information within a computer or
finally to be able to make command decisions faster than the enemy
in all the domains. In Chapter 1 of this textbook, the authors
consider the role of information technologies (automated decisions,
artificial

intelligence

(weak

and

strong),

communications,

networking, remote sensing) and later in Chapter 4 the authors
consider issue of resiliency, i.e. planning for resiliency and
robustness expecting pushback, when secrecy is needed, how to
shield operations. In Chapter 9, the authors introduced SCADA
attacks and vulnerabilities and how important they were in terms of
UAS operations.
The uninitiated would see cyber warfare as conducted by the use
of malware. This is first level software whose purpose is destruction.
The tools in this view are simply viruses, worms, Trojan Horses,
spyware, rootkits, attacks on service, protocols storage or data in
transit. All these are useful. But the real meat especially for UAS,
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satellite, ground stations and mobile deployment units is SCADA and
its vulnerabilities.[7] This would be like calling Stuxnet just a virus!
Stuxnet was an exquisitely designed cyberweapon with vectoring
in on multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, specific manufacturer OS
/ maintenance SCADA attacks, multiple coordinating vectors of
attack, secret target acquisition in Iran. It had the huge effect of
delaying Iran’s nuclear buildup by destroying their centrifuge
processes from within by inducing cavitation and turning off
operator controls / alarms without detection. (Zetter, 2014) The
only property that Stuxnet didn’t have was self-destruction upon
discover

or

self-encryption

for

protection

against

countermeasures. Stuxnet was not discovered by Iran but
information was released publicly by commercial interests for
unknown reasons.
Cyber vs EW Battlespace (Parallels)
EW in legacy terms has three major subfields and another closely
related field:

• Electronic warfare (EW) support (ES), which involves hostile
intercept of enemy transmissions
• Electronic Attack (EA) in which enemy electronic sensors
(radars and communications; receivers) are degraded either
temporarily or permanently by transmission of signals
designed for that purpose;
• Electronic protection (EP), which is a set of measures designed
to protect friendly sensors from enemy EA actions;
• Decoys, which act as bait to cause enemy missile and gun
systems to acquire and track invalid targets.(Adamy D. -0.,
2015)
Cyber warfare (CW) involves attacks on military assets through
networks, including the internet. Electronic Warfare involves
attacks on military assets through electromagnetic propagation.
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Table 10-1 continues the legacy definitions comparison of CW and
EW functions.
Table 10-1 Comparison of EW and CW Functions in legacy
terms
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Operational
Function

EW

CW

Collect
information
from enemy

EW support,
listens to enemy
signals to
determine enemy
capabilities and
operating mode

Spyware, causes information to be
exported to a hostile location (or
friendly depending on the side
employed)

Electronically
interfere
with enemy’s
operational
capability

EA, either covers
received
information or
causes processing
to give inaccurate
outputs

Viruses, reduce available operating
memory or modify programs to
prevent proper processing outputs

Protect
friendly
capabilities
from enemy’s
electronic
interference

EP, prevents
enemy jamming
from impacting
operational
capabilities

Passwords, firewalls, VPNs,
hardware modifications,
cryptography,[8] steganography
[9],2-factor authentication, digital
signatures, prevent malware from
penetrating a computer and
breaching information security
protocols

Cause enemy
systems to
initiate
undesired
actions

Decoys, look and
act like valid
targets, when
acquired by
missile or gun
systems point
away from the real
target

Trojan Horses, rootkits, are hostile
software accepted by the enemy
computers because they appear
valid and have acceptable
credentials (Adamy D. -0., 2015)

Direct
damage or
destruction

DEW, Acoustic
grenades, lasers,
anti-satellite
weapons all hit the
UAS target from
outside and
destroy it by
delivering focused
energy in real time
on a small slice of
the target

Advanced Cyberweapons attack
SCADA and internal subsystems
causing them to act in unplanned
actions (fatal) to either over or
under perform a critical function or
subfunction, lose energy,
destabilize, or prevent operator
action on a critical fault (Nichols, et
al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in
the Cyber Domain, 2019)

EMS Environment
It can be deduced from Table 10-1 that the difference between
cyber warfare and EW has to do with how the hostile function is
introduced into the enemy’s systems. Historically, EW dealt with
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the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) as it was related to kinetic
threats. Radars that locate targets guide missiles to those targets
and detonate warheads. EW was purposed to make missiles unable
to hit those targets. This meant disrupting a receipt of a return
signal or preventing the missile uplink from delivering guidance
information. Enemy communications relate to command and
control (CC). Historically, this referred to kinetic attack protocols.
The purpose of EW was to prevent CC by the enemy. (Adamy D. -0.,
2015)
Computers and software are an integral part of almost every
aspect of modern warfare, and cyber warfare attacks on those
computers directly impacts kinetic attacks and the defenses against
those attacks. The new reality is that the EMS itself has become
a target of enemy actions. By denying USA use of the EMS, the
enemy can inflict significant economic damage upon society, put
our military forces at a disadvantage without firing a single shot or
dropping a single bomb.
The EMS environment is becoming more complex, congested,
and contested, making it imperative for Defense agency and
organizations to continually improve EW capabilities to enable
reliable use of the EMS.
NATO – EME, EMO
NATO, like DoD, is evolving how it conducts operations and
support of emerging technologies. The focus has shifted away from
isolated EW operations to joint Electromagnetic Operations (EMO)
in the electromagnetic environment (EME). (Commander Malte von
Spreckelsen, 2018).
The EMS is defined as the entire distribution of electromagnetic
radiation according to frequency or wavelength (Figure 10-3).[10]
Electromagnetic waves (EMW) travel at speed of light in a vacuum,
they do so across a wide range of wavelengths and corresponding
frequencies. EMS comprises the span of all electromagnetic
radiation (ER) and consists of many subranges called spectral bands
such as visible light or ultraviolet radiation. EME is the geophysical
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environment influenced by terrain, weather and atmospheric
conditions, which supports the radiation, propagation and
reception of ER across the entire EMS. (Commander Malte von
Spreckelsen, 2018)
Within NATO, EMO is the deliberate transmission and reception
of EM energy in EME for military operations. This includes
communications, navigation, attack, battlespace awareness, and
targeting. Figure 10-4 demonstrates that EMO not only enables
operations in each domain but also provides the thread which links
and integrates military forces across domain, and in cyberspace
and information environments. EMO is conducted by both friendly
and enemy forces. EMO often leads to contested, overlapping,
congested

or

interference

with

neutral

actors

in

the

EME. (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018)
DE Weapons
In Chapter 9, the authors looked at the basic principles of DE
weapons. UAS in flight (SWARMS or other configuration) are subject
to destruction by deployment of DE weapons. DE weapons are in a
class by themselves and represent huge portion research budgets
in USA, China and Russia. All military and large commercial UAS
are potential targets for DEW deployment. There are four types
of DE weapons, kinetic energy, lasers, microwave and particle
beams. (Nielsen, 2012) The approach taken is to discuss fundamental
concepts, then propagation (travel) towards the target, and lastly,
interaction with the target and the mechanisms by which the target
is destroyed.
Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW)
Kinetic energy (KE) weapons fir the definition of DEW because
their energy is aimed or directed at a target and intercepts a small
fraction of the target’s surface area. 10,000 Joules is a magic number
because it is close to the energy delivered by a wide range of DEWs.
10,000 Joules is sufficient energy to vaporize about one cubic
centimeter of anything! (Nielsen, 2012)
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Figure 10-4 EMO in EME

Source: (Commander Malte von Spreckelsen, 2018)
We need some understanding of the parameters and units
affecting target response and damage. Table 10-2 shows key
parameters, units, definitions, and comments
KEW damage targets with their energy of motion. This energy is
proportional to a projectile’s mass and the square of its velocity. In
space, projectile motion is determined by the gravitational force of
earth, along with the forces from the projectile’s launcher or onboard engine. Gravitational forces dominate a projectile’s trajectory,
and KE far exceed damage criteria. Stress in the target exceed
its internal strength, and it responds like a dense gas. Details of
projectile and target construction are of minor importance. In the
atmosphere, ranges are shorter and energies less due to
atmospheric drag. At lower energies forces internal to a target are
important. The target’s response depends on its construction and
end

engagement

scenario.

Projectile

design

for

efficient
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propagation and interaction is a priority and may be a compromise
with optimization for target interaction. (Nielsen, 2012)
Table 10-2 Parameters , Units affecting Target Response and
Damage

Parameter

Symbol Units

Definition Comments

Kinetic
Energy

K

Joules (J)

K= Mv2 /
2

M,v = Projectile mass,
velocity

Momentum ρ

Kg m/
sec

Mv

K and ρ are conserved
when particles collide

Force

F

Newtons
M dv/dt
(Nt)

Pressure

P

Nt/m 2

Force /
Area

Impulse

I

Nt sec

Force x
time

F or

Joules /
cm 2

Fluence[11]
Or
Intensity

I

Watts /
cm 2

KE /area

Also, F= dp/dt
Force/ Area = Energy /
Volume

Concentrated KE density
necessary to damage a
target measured as an
output of a radiation field
or laser beam

Source: (Nielsen, 2012)
The finite speed of KEW (10 km/sec or less) means that the time
to engage goes up with increasing distance and moving targets can
be engaged only if they are “led”[12] with computer calculations
made in advance on how to bring the weapon and target together.
There are three truths that hold for all types of DEW.
1. “Propagation in a vacuum follows well defined physical laws.
These account for adequate energy placement on the target by
the weapon. Long ranges associated with engagements in
space place severe constraints on the energy that the weapon
launcher requires to ensure lethal energies are brought to bear
on the target. Orbital motion counts for much of the energy in
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space. This energy is not free and comes from the energy in
the rocket engines which placed the weapons in orbit.(Nielsen,
2012)
2. In the atmosphere, ranges are much less than in space and
interactions results in greater energy losses. Therefore,
weapon characteristics / parameters (bullet shape, laser pulse
width, etc.) must be tailored to minimize these energy losses.
(Nielsen, 2012)
3. When a weapon encounters a target, energy must be
efficiently absorbed for damage to occur. This places
constraints on weapon parameters which may be conflict with
those necessary for efficient propagation. (Nielsen, 2012)

Lasers
A Laser is fundamentally nothing more than a device that can
produce an intense, or highly energetic, beam of light.[13] Light is
an EM band in the EMS and is subject to Maxwell’s wave equations.
(David H. Staelin, 1998) Here are the basic ideas about lasers as
weapons from (Nielsen, 2012):

1. Lasers are intense sources of ER with wavelengths from 10 to
0.4 μm and frequencies from about 3 x 10 13 to 8 x 10 14 Hz.
2. The materials with which lasers might interact are
characterized by an index of refraction, n, and the attenuation
coefficient, K. When light passes regions of different n, it is
bent according to the Law of Refraction. When light
propagates a distance, z, through a region whose attenuation
coefficient is K, its intensity is decreased by a factor of e (-Kz).
3. A laser with a wavelength, λ, emerging from an aperture of
diameter, D, can propagate a distance on the order of D2 / λ,
as a collimated beam.[14] Beyond this distance, it will diverge at
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an angle of θ ≈ λ / D. Figure 10-5 shows Collimated light for
Laser.
4. Decreases in intensity result from both diffraction and
attenuation. This results in a fraction of the beam’s energy
being reduced and reduces the amount of energy that can be
brought to bear on the target. Compensating parameters to
reduce this effect are energy level, pulse width, wavelength,
and diameter of the beam.
5. In the atmosphere, K, is highly dependent, made up of
contributions from absorption and scattering from both
molecules and particles.[15] If a beam becomes too intense,
free electrons in the atmosphere will multiply and breakdown,
forming an ionized plasma which will absorb the beam.
Following the breakdown, plasmas propagate toward the
source of laser light as combustion or detonation waves.[16]

Figure 10-5 Collimated light for Laser

Source: (Jackson, 2017)
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6. In the atmosphere, n, the index of refraction, can vary through
turbulence or through expansion induced by absorption of
laser light. The second effect results in beam expansion
(thermal blooming) or bending. These effects must be
compensated for in real time through adaptive optics.

7. When laser light encounters a target , a fraction of the light is
absorbed in the target surface, and manifests as heat.
Thresholds for melting and vaporization are established by the
criterion that energy is deposited so rapidly that it cannot be
carried away within the pulse width of the laser. Targets can be
damaged by erosion (thermal melting) or through momentum
transferred to the target surface by the evolving vapor jet
(mechanical damage).[17]” (Nielsen, 2012)

Actually, the torch cutting process is a good example of laser
optimization of intensity versus pulse width concept. Such optimum
considers propagation and interaction effects as they work together
to constrain the available operating parameters. Figure 10-6 Laser
technology processing activities used in manufacturing.[18]
Figure 10-6 laser processing activities as a function of the laser
pulse width
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Source: (National Academies of Sciences, 2018)
It may be concluded (extending the torch thinking) that there is
very little opportunity to damage targets in the atmosphere without
operating at intensities where potentially deleterious propagation
effects must be handled. Even melting through targets in times less
than seconds will be influenced by thermal blooming. If mechanical
damage is needed, the full range of propagation effects could
constrain the interaction between laser and target. [19]
Microwaves
Like lasers, microwaves travel through space, carrying energy and
are characterized by specific frequencies. Microwaves are another
form of ER, having a much longer wavelength and much lower
frequency than light. Microwaves have wavelengths of about 1 cm,
and frequencies on the order of 1010 Hertz, or 10 GHz. (See Figure
10-7) Microwaves have a long history of use in commercial devices.
Figure 10-7 Microwave portion of the EMS
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Source: (Micro Denshi Co.,Ltd., 2019)
Microwaves travel at the speed of light, c, (=3 x 108 m/sec) in a
vacuum. They have frequency, v, and wavelength, λ, related by the
expression v = c / λ. Microwave frequencies lie in the range of 0.1
– 100 GHz, and the associated wavelengths lie in the range 100 –
0.1 cm. Microwaves are unique in that their wavelengths are similar
in size to the physical objects they interact with. (Micro Denshi
Co.,Ltd., 2019)
Microwave Target Interaction
Microwaves are likely to damage targets through the soft kill
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mechanisms (similar to cyber-attacks on SCADA systems) – those
that exploit inherent target vulnerabilities. There are two types of
soft-kill: in-band and out-of-band. (Nielsen, 2012)

1. With in-band damage, microwaves enter target through its
antenna.(Adamy D. , 2009) This requires that the attacking
microwaves be of the same frequency as those the target is
tuned to receive. Damage occurs when the target’s circuits are
loaded beyond their design capacity. (Nielsen, 2012) The bestknown example of in-bound microwave attack is EW jamming,
a staple of CEA. (Adamy D. , 2009) Although there are shielding
methods in military UASs to reduce this microwave jamming
vulnerability, damage may still occur.

2. In out-of-bounds damage, microwaves enter the target
through the back door – apertures (again similar to some
cyber-attacks) which were not designed for entry. Damage
occurs as the microwaves are absorbed in thin, sensitive
electronic components, heating them to the point of
exhaustion and damage. (Nielsen, 2012)

Particle Beams
The fourth (DEW, Lasers, Microwaves and Particle Beams (aka
PB)) type of DEW that may be used against UASs are Particle Beams.
Particle beams are large numbers of atomic or sub-atomic particles
moving at relativistic velocities. [20] There are a large number of
particles in these beams. Their interactions among themselves is
as important as their interactions with the atmosphere and with
targets. Below are the main concepts as we delve into the
propagation and interaction forest of charged and neutral particle
beams. (Nielsen, 2012)
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1. There are two types of PB: charged and neutral. Charged PB
consist of particles such as electrons and photons which have
an electrical charge. Charged PB tend to spread because of
mutual repulsion of their particles. Neutral PB consist of
electrically neutral particles such as hydrogen atoms.(Nielsen,
2012)

2. A PB is characterized by the current it carries, the energy of its
particles, and its radius. These quantities are related to more
weapon related parameters such as intensity, through
relationships shown in Table 10-3. (Nielsen, 2012)
3.
Table 10-3 Quantities Used to Characterize Particle Beams (PB)
Fundamental Physics Beam Engineering

Weaponeering

Particle charge, q

Current, I

Beam intensity, S

I = nqvπw2

S= nKv

Kinetic Energy, K

Beam Fluence, F

Beam radius, w
Particle density, n

ϓ =1/(1-v2 /c2) 1/2 F= Stp
Particle velocity, v

K= (ϓ-1)mc2
Pulse width, tp

Pulse width, tp

Source: (Nielsen, 2012)

3. Real PB deviate from perfection, in which all the particles
propagate in the same direction with the same velocity. Lack of
perfection is expressed in PB brightness (current/area/per
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solid angle); divergence (angle which the PB envelope makes as
it expands); or temperature (small random fluctuations in
energy about the average value). (Nielsen, 2012)
4. Neutral PB can propagate only in a vacuum at altitudes greater
than about 100 km. Charged PB can propagate only in the
atmosphere at altitudes less than about 200 km.(Nielsen, 2012)
5. In propagating through the atmosphere, particles in the PM
lose energy by ionization of the background gas and radiation.
Further, if the PB contains heavy particles (photons or atomic
nuclei), it loses current from collisions. These negative effects
are reduced in magnitude as the atmospheric density is
reduced. PB can also become unstable and cease to propagate
when internal perturbations occur and grow. (Nielsen, 2012)
6. PB interact with targets just as they do with the atmosphere –
through ionization, bremsstrahlung,[21] and nuclear
interactions. The energy deposited into the target is a function
of its density. Energy losses from a PB propagating through the
atmosphere to a target are less than those within the target
itself.(Nielsen, 2012)
7. For PB in the atmosphere, the total time it takes to destroy a
target may be greater than the time required for a constant
beam to deposit sufficient energy on it, because of “holeboring” and suppression of instabilities.

PB Target Implications (especially large UAS)
In principle, PB should be ideal as DEW. Unlike lasers or
microwaves, their propagation is unaffected by weather, clouds, rain,
which add very little to the mass a PB might encounter on the
way to the target. PB are an all-weather weapon. Once the PB
encounters the target, the long penetration range of relativistic
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particles ensures that critical components on the interior of the
target will be rapidly engaged. Time is not wasted on eroding
protective layers of matter on the target surface. Shielding targets
against PB as a defensive countermeasure (CM) is not practical.
In practice, PB are not technologically “there” yet. Difficulties
in achieving stable propagation in the atmosphere has caused the
research funds to focus on space based neutral PB, where physical
problems of atmospheric propagation are replaced by engineering
problems of deployment into space and maintaining large
constellations of particle accelerators. (Nielsen, 2012)
So, of four DEW, it appears that only Lasers, Microwaves are
viable and cost-effective approaches. However, a new EMS team
player has joined the C-UAS fray. Sound. Sound has some very
nice properties and is useful as both a countermeasure and an
identifier in IFF systems. Sound as a CM was introduced in Chapter
19: Audiology, Acoustic Countermeasures against Swarms and
Building IFF Libraries of (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems
in the Cyber Domain, 2nd Edition, 2019) [22] A summary of findings
of this previous work follows.[23]
Acoustic Countermeasures and Building Identify Friend or Foe
(IFF) Acoustic Libraries –Revisiting the C-UAS Problem
The Risk of success of Terrorist Attacks on US Air Defense
Systems (ADS) via sUAS / UAS is higher and improving because of
commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones
capable of carrying sophisticated imaging equipment, significant
(potentially lethal) payloads and performing extensive Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions are readily available
to civilian market. They pose a significant threat to civilian and
military UAS operations and safety in the NAS. The highest
threats to ADS are presented by hostile UAS SWARMS.
Problem Solution
The author’s research suggests that UAS SWARMS can be both
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identified (IFF) and destabilized / mitigated /eliminated /
countered in the air by applying harsh acoustic countermeasures
at resonance frequencies. UAS (in any formation – especially
SWARMS) present detectable acoustic signatures that can be
collected in an IFF sound libraries and like fingerprints or DNA
they are unique to the make, model and origin manufacturer. Once
identified as hostile, UAS (SWARM units) may be destabilized by
harsh – explosive amplitude acoustic countermeasures to the
MEMS or rotor base of the UAS’s causing destabilization of the UAS
and grounding. Emergency and waypoint recovery functions do not
work under this approach.
Sound as a Weapon and Countermeasure
Next, we add sound to the group of DEWs. The approach taken is
to discuss fundamental concepts, then propagation (travel) towards
the target, and lastly, interaction with the target and the
mechanisms by which the target is destroyed.
Essentials of Audiology
The question is why would hitting a UAS going at 100+ mph or
more be susceptible to a loud noise hitting the MEMS under the
rotors or the rotors themselves? Why would this same noise or
variation thereof be capable of characterization of the UAS’s of a
hostile or friendly power? It is not something we can just take
for granted without understanding the essentials of audiology
underlying the process.
Detection Signatures
(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain,
2nd Edition, 2019) found that UAS / UAVs are detected by
their signatures: noise (acoustic), optical (visible), infrared (thermal)
and radar (radio). “These acoustic or electromagnetic emissions
occur at the following wavelengths: (Austin, 2010)

1. A) Noise (acoustic) [16 m-2 cm, or 20 – 16000 Hz]
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2. B) Optical (visible) [0.4 – 0.7 um]
3. C) Infrared (thermal) [0.75 um – 1 mm]
4. D) RADAR (radio) [3 mm – 3 cm]” (Austin, 2010)

“If the designer is to reduce the vehicle detectability to an
acceptable risk level, it is necessary to reduce the received
emissions or reflection of the above wavelengths (expressed as
frequencies) below the threshold signature value. A good portion
of the UAS signatures are a function of the operating height of air
vehicle.” (Austin, 2010) The concept of frequency as a fifth realm
can be elucidated in terms of targets, battlespace, and wavelengths.
(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain,
2nd Edition, 2019) One of the parameters, range was a serious
limitation on performance. Range has a significant impact on radio
transmission. Depending on the environment, the strength of a
received signal, T, is a function of the square or fourth power of a
distance, d, from the transmitter. (Adamy D. -0., 2015)
In Chapters 8 and 14 of (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft
Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2nd Edition, 2019), EMS was
presented with emphasis on sound frequencies, many out of human
hearing range. The author’s experiments were performed using DJI
Phantom 4 at 400 ft. This is not a tactical distance for a C-UAS
countermeasure. However, the LRAD 1000X made by LRAD
Corporation is effective to a 1.864 miles. See Figure 10-8. Appendix
10-2 gives the LRAD 1000X specifications. (LRAD Corporation, 2019)
Longer-range models are in pipeline. The upper end of noise –
Stealth acceptability is 17,150 Hz. The Stealth range is 20 Hz – 17,150
Hz. (Austin, 2010)
Figure 10-8 LRAD 1000x C-UAS
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Source: (LRAD Corporation, 2019) [24]
Designing a UAS for Stealth
Stealth means “to resist detection.” Stealth applies to the air
vehicle and materials visible to the enemy plus the internal SAA
systems that control / create noise, heat, electromagnetic
emanations, and changes in light. For ISR platforms and missions,
it is essential the UAS systems be undetected in operation. “It is
desirable not to alert the enemy (military) or criminals (police) to the
ISR operation.” It can be assumed that the enemy is using counterUAV operations and weapons. Stealth design protects the air
vehicle from these counter – UAV measures. Stealth in civilian
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operations results in minimal environmental disturbances. (Austin,
2010)
From a personal privacy standpoint or in civil airspace it is
desirable to have the UAV stealth features turned off. [It should be
as if we had flicked a switch.] (Austin, 2010) Thinking again about
a team or swarm of UAS, the low-hanging fruit target is US
communications. We depend on connectivity in everything we do:
daily

lives,

social

interactions,

business,

manufacturing,

government, transportation, computers and warfare to name just
a few in the extensive list. Connectivity is any technique for the
movement of information from one location or player to another.
Consider the economic impact of having our critical infrastructure
(banking, air transportation, etc.) shut down. Damaging the
connectivity of system is real damage. We measure connectivity
in terms of information flow. In warfare, this is called Information
Operations (IO). Fundamental to IO is the frequency at which the
information is transmitted or received. Returning to stealth with
respect to UAS design, we note that the intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance and weapons payload-delivery functions of UAS.
These are all IO operations and frequency is at the heart of their
success against or denial by the enemy. (Adamy D. -0., 2015)
Acoustic Signature Reductions
“Aircraft noise may be the first warning of its presence; however,
it may not immediately be directionally/locatable for detection.”
“UAS noise emanates predominantly from vortices, tips of wings,
rotors, or propellers. Lowering wingspan or blade span enhances
acoustical stealth.” Conventional propulsion systems are a concern
because of the noise of combustion. Electric motors develop
virtually no noise. “Reducing mass and aerodynamic drag of the
UAS reduces noise generation.” (Austin, 2010) The human ear is a
problem for the designer. “It is most sensitive to frequencies around
3500 Hz and can hear sound down to a practical threshold of 10
dB. For a given sound pressure level, attenuation of sound with
distance in air and insulating material varies as the square of the
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sound frequency. Low frequency sound presents a greater problem
for UAS stealth design.” (Austin, 2010)
Audiology Fundamentals

1. The science of sound is called acoustics, which a branch of
physics. Appendix 10-1 displays the principal physical
quantities in MKS, cgs, and English units. It is the starting point
of a trip uphill to resonance frequencies. Sound is small
portion of the EMS.
Figure 10-9 shows the conversion for sound and acoustic wave
period to frequency and back. (Adamy D. -0., 2015) Figure 10-10
shows the Sound EMS regions (Adamy D. -0., 2015)
Figure 10-9 Conversion for sound and acoustic wave period to
frequency and back

Source: (TRS S. , 2018)
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Figure 10-10 Sound EMS Regions

Source: (TRS S. , 2018)
Acoustic waves and Sound Waves in Air
2. Sound waves are EMS waves which propagate vibrations in air
molecules. The 1986 standard speed of sound, c, is 331.3 m/s
or 1125.33 ft/s at a temperature, T = 0 degrees Celsius.”(TRS S. ,
2018) “The formulas and equations for sound are

c = L x f; L = c /f = c x T; f=c /L

Equation 10-1

Where:
T = time- period or cycle duration and T = 1/ f and f = 1 / T.
The unit for frequency is Hertz = Hz =1/s. The unit for
wavelength, L is meters, m. The time-period or cycle duration, T
is sec, s. The wave speed or speed of sound, c, is meters/sec, m/
s.” (TRS S. , 2018)
(Austin, 2010) states that the design limit for UAS Stealth for
acoustic (noise) or sound waves is “[16 m-2 cm, or 20 – 16000 Hz].”
The Stealth range is 20 Hz – 17,150 Hz. [25]
3. Hearing range describes the range of frequencies that can
be heard by humans, (aka range of levels). The human range is
commonly given as 20 to 20,000 Hz, there is considerable
variation between individuals, especially at high frequencies,
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and a gradual loss of sensitivity to higher frequencies with age
is considered normal. Sensitivity also varies with frequency, as
shown by equal loudness contours. (Rosen, 2011) See Figure
10-11.[26]

Figure 10-11 Equal Loudness Contours

Source: Equal -Loudness Contours (Fletcher, 1933) (Rosen, 2011)
Intensity and Inverse Square Law

4. “Sound radiates outward in every direction from its source.
This constitutes a sphere that gets larger and larger with
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increasing distance from the source.”(Entokey, 2019) Figure
10-12 shows the relationship between Intensity and the Inverse
Square Law.(Uni-wuppertal, 2019) Intensity (I) (power divided
by area) decreases with distance from the original source
because of finite amount of power is spread over increasing
surface area. (Entokey, 2019) Proportionately less power falls
on the same unit of area with increasing distance from the
source. (Gelfand, 2004) [27] [28]

Figure 10-12: Inverse Square Law, Sound Intensity

Source: (Uni-wuppertal, 2019)

5. Figure 10-13 shows common decibel and Intensity levels within
the hearing range. This does not consider environment,
frequency differences or noise (discussed presently). It does
show the ease of which decibels may be used to rank the
sound intensity levels which vary greatly in magnitude.
Hearing aids are effective from about 6 –90 decibels. Above 90
dB, they can dampen but not eliminate the very loud sounds
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unless there is complete loss of hearing.

The Nature of Sound

6. Sound is defined as a form of vibration that propagates through
the air in the form of a wave. Vibration is the to-and-fro motion
(aka oscillation) of an object. Some examples are playground
swing, tuning fork prong, air molecules and UAS rotor blades
[circular motion]. The vibration is called sound when it is
transferred from air molecule to air molecule. This transfer
may be simple like a tuning fork or a very complex pattern like
the din in a school cafeteria. Naturally occurring sounds are
very complex. (Entokey, 2019) UAS sounds are not natural and
supported by machinery, hardware and software. Three
weaknesses of the UAS are the MEMS, gimbal assembly and
rotors. Although stealth mechanisms may be employed to
reduce noise emissions, the former parts are exposed. They do
produce discernable signatures.
7. A tuning fork illustrates the oscillations of sound. After being
struck, the tuning fork vibrates with a simple pattern that
repeats itself over time. (Entokey, 2019) Figure 10-14 shows that
the tuning fork when struck exerts a force on the air molecules
which alternatively exerts a high pressure (compression) and a
low pressure (rarefaction) zones. The zones exhibit wave
amplitude and wavelength as a function of air pressure and
distance. The sound wave is distributed in 360 degrees
through the air.

Figure 10-13 Shows common decibel and Intensity levels within
the hearing range.
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Source: (Carter, 2012)
Figure 10-14 diagrams tuning fork oscillations over time. Sounds
that are associated with simple harmonic motion are called pure
tones. Vertical displacement amount of the tuning fork prong
displacement around its resting position. Distance from left to right
represents progression of time. One complete round-trip or
replication of an oscillating motion is called a cycle. The number
of cycles occurring in one second is the frequency. The duration
of one cycle is called its period. This form of motion occurs when
a force is applied to an object having properties of elasticity and
inertia. Simple harmonic motion (SHM) shows the same course of
oscillations as in Figure 10-15 because they repeat themselves at
the same rate until friction causes dampening of the waveform.
(Entokey, 2019) and (Gelfand S. A., 2009)
Figure 10-14: Tuning for Oscillations
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Source: (Pierson, 2019)
Figure 10-15: Tuning fork oscillations over time

Source: (Entokey, 2019)
Other Parameters of Sound waves
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8. Probably the most useful SHM waveform is the sinusoidal wave
or sine wave.[29]
The number of times a waveform repeats itself in one second is
known as the frequency or cycles per second (CPS). (Gelfand S. A.,
2009)Two useful relationships are: f = 1/ t or t = 1/f; where f is the
frequency in cps and t is the period in seconds. Amplitude denote
the magnitude of the wave. The peak- to – peak amplitude is the
total vertical distance between negative and positive peaks. The
peak amplitude is the distance from the baseline to one peak. The
magnitude of sound at any instant is the instantaneous amplitude.
Wavelength (λ) is the distance traveled between one peak and the
next. (Gelfand, 2004) Wavelength formula is: λ = c / f, where c is
the speed of sound in air (344 m/s. f is the frequency of sound in
Hz. Similarly, frequency is inversely proportional to wavelength or
f = c / λ. (Gelfand S. A., 2009) Another interesting sound parameter
is Pitch. Pitch is the quality of sound and especially a musical tone
governed by the rate of vibrations producing it. It is the degree of
highness or lowness of sound. (Merriam-Webster, 2019)
Complex waves
9. When two or more pure-tone waves are combined, the result
is a complex wave. (Gelfand, 2004) They may contain any
number of frequencies. Complex periodic waves have
waveforms that repeat themselves. If they don’t, they are
aperiodic. Combining waves may reinforce themselves or
cancel themselves whether they are in phase or out. The
lowest frequency component of a complex periodic wave (like
a combination of sign waves) is called its fundamental
frequency. (Gelfand, 2004)
10. Harmonics are whole number or integral multiples of the
fundamental frequency. Waveforms show how amplitude
changes with time. (Gelfand, 2004) Fourier’s Theorem shows
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that complex sound waves can be mathematically dissected
into its pure tones. Of more interest to UAS designers are
aperiodic sounds which are made up of components that are
not harmonically related and do not repeat themselves over
time. The extreme cases of aperiodic sounds are transients and
random noise. A transient is an abrupt sound that is very brief
in duration. Random noise has a completely random waveform,
so it contains all possible frequencies in the same average
amplitude over the long run. Random noise is also called white
noise like white light because all possible frequencies are
represented.

Standing Waves and Resonance
11. We have arrived at the crux of the acoustic CM discussion, the
natural or resonating frequency. “The frequency(ies) at which a
body or medium vibrates most readily is called its natural or
resonant frequency(ies).”(Gelfand S. A., 2009) Differences in
resonance frequency ranges enable different devices to act as
filters by transmitting energy more readily for certain high,
low, or band-pass frequencies. UAS with multiple rotors
circulate the rotors to gain lift and / or hold steady / or
descend in altitude. Four, six, eight – rotor UAS maintain
control via internal SCADA systems and send critical
information through a MEMS component located at the
bottom of rotors. Rotor frequencies are coordinated,
monitored, and position -controlled through the MEMS and
in-board computers. Even though the rotor(s) motions are
spinning in circular fashion, the sound wave generation is not
curvilinear, or aperiodic but transferred up through the Y axis
and back again to its base as it ascends in altitude. There is a
tendency to maintain equilibrium in terms of position of the
UAS.
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12. The author contends that the UAS rotor systems act like
vibrating strings and resonance frequency information can be
approximated by this approach. An example of a vibrating
spring is when you “pluck” a guitar. The waves initiated move
outward toward the two tied ends of the string. The waves are
then reflected back, and they propagate in the opposite
directions. The result is a set of waves that are moving toward
each other, resulting in a perturbation sustained by continuing
reflections from the two ends. The superimposed waves
interact and propagate and appears as a pattern that is
standing still. Peaks (maximum displacement) and no
displacement (baseline crossings occur at fixed points along
the string.[30] Places along the spring where zero
displacement in the standing wave pattern are called nodes.
(Gelfand, 2004) Locations where the maximum displacement
occurs are called antinodes. See Figure 10-16.

Figure 10-16: Standing Wave

(Administrator, 2015)
13. “The fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest frequency
of a periodic waveform. It is generally denoted as ‘f’. The lowest
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resonating frequency of a vibrating object is called as
fundamental frequency.”(Administrator, 2015)
14. “Harmonic is a frequency, which is an integer multiple of the
fundamental frequency. The forced resonance vibrations of an
object are caused to produce standing waves. At the natural
frequency it forms a standing wave pattern. These patterns are
created at specific frequencies, they are called Harmonic
Frequencies or Harmonics.”(Administrator, 2015)
15. “The sound produced by a wave form at its harmonic
frequency is very clear, and at other frequencies we get noise,
and cannot hear the clear sound of waves. Harmonics may
occur in any shaped wave forms, but mostly they occur in sine
waves only. Non – sinusoidal wave forms, like triangular and
saw tooth wave forms are constructed by adding together the
harmonic frequencies. The word harmonic is generally used to
describe the distortions caused by different un- desirable
frequencies called noise, of a sine wave.”(Administrator, 2015)
16. “Node and antinodes occur in a wave form. So, the waves have
harmonic frequency in them. The fundamental frequency is the
smallest frequency in a harmonic. Hence there is only a single
anti-node occurs between them. This Antinode is middle of the
two nodes. So, from this we can say that the guitar string
produces longest wavelength and the lowest
frequency.”(Administrator, 2015)
17. “The lowest frequency produced by any instrument is called
the fundamental frequency. This is also known as first
harmonic of the wave. In words of fundamental frequency,
harmonics are the integer multiples of the fundamental
frequency.” (Ex: f,2f,3f,4f, etc.… are harmonics.) (Administrator,
2015)
18. “Because of multiple integers of fundamental frequency, we
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will have n number of harmonics like 1st harmonic, 2nd
harmonic,3rd harmonic, and so forth.”(Administrator, 2015)
“The fundamental frequency is also called as First harmonic. In
the first harmonic, we have two nodes and one antinode. he
numbers of antinodes are equal to the integer multiples of
specific harmonics. i.e., for 1st harmonic we have 1 antinode,
for 2nd harmonic we have 2 antinodes etc.”(Administrator,
2015)
MEMS
19. What is a MEMS and how does it relate to the UAS gyroscope?
As shown in Figure 10-17 MEMS Gyroscope, MEMS (MicroElectro-Mechanical-Systems) gyroscopes are located in the
rotor systems of most drones. Visualization of a MEMS
gyroscope is a single proof mass suspended above a substrate
The proof mass is free to oscillate in two perpendicular
directions, the drive and sense direction.(Said Emre Alper,
December 2008)

Resonance Effects on MEMS
20. Achieving resonance frequencies can have a significant effect
for countering hostile UAS:
• MEMS Gyroscope can be degraded using harsh acoustic noise
• MEMS Gyroscope has a resonant frequency that is related to
the physical characteristics of its structure (Usenix.org, 2019)
• MEMS Gyroscopes have resonant frequencies much higher
than can be heard (audible and ultrasonic ranges)
• Unexpected resonance output caused from an attack will cause
the rotor system to malfunction
• Rotors will spin at differing speeds causing the drone to become
unstable and crash
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Figure 10-17: MEMS Gyroscope

Source: (Said Emre Alper, December 2008)
Resonance Tuning
21. In the operation of MEMS gyroscopes, the bending changes
the capacitance between the sensing mass and the sensing
electrode, and this capacitance change is sensed as the output
of the gyroscope By using an additional feedback capacitor
connected to the sensing electrode, the resonant frequency
and the magnitude of the resonance effect can be tuned
Resonance can be induced by a malicious attacker, if resonant
frequencies exist in gyroscopes.(Nichols R. K., Hardening US
Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019)

What is the “so what” for Acoustics?
22. “Passive detection is much cheaper and cost effective to
operate vs a complex radar system for a single installation
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(limited by detection range ~350ft).MEMS gyroscopes
contained in rotor systems are very susceptible to malfunction
when struck with rough noise that resonates inside the MEMS.
Offensive acoustic systems are currently mounted, could
become man portable. Offensive systems are not detected by
National ELINT assets not looking for acoustic energy
signatures, enemy can remain hidden from detection when
using acoustics.”(Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned
Systems Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019)
23. What is an Acoustical attack on the UAS Gyroscope?
There are two possibilities: compromising the sound source or
drone on drone attack:
Compromising the Sound Source
• UAM with speakers (consider police and military operations or
search-and-rescue operations)(Usenix.org, 2019)
• Counter the source of the sound from the speaker with
different frequency sound
• Jamming attack aims to generate ultrasonic noises and cause
continuing vibration of the membrane on the sensor, which
make the measurements impossible
• Level of noise causes performance degradation
Drone on Drone Attack
• Taking a picture of a moving object from UAM
• An adversary drone equipped with a speaker could steer itself
toward a victim drone and generate a sound with the resonant
frequency of the victim’s gyroscope to drag it down(Usenix.org,
2019)
What are Countermeasures for Acoustic attack on Gyroscope
24. Countermeasures for attacks on gyroscope include: Physical
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Isolation – provide physical isolation from the sound noise;
Surrounding the gyroscope with foam would also be a simple
and inexpensive countermeasure; using a differential
comparator; using an additional gyroscope with a special
structure that responds only to the resonant frequency so the
application systems can cancel out the resonant output from
the main gyroscope and improving detect and cancel out
analog sensor input spoofing against CIEDs.(Nichols R. K.,
Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter
Measures, 2019)
In terms of UAS Countermeasures, why are Acoustics so
important? (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems
Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019)
25. They are important because:
• Offensive systems use ultrasonic frequency resonance
• Cannot be heard by humans when used to intercept a drone
• Passive systems are difficult, if not impossible, to detect
• Able to identify and track drone based on acoustic and/or
visual signature
• Acoustic detection systems are limited in range ~ 350 ft to 500
ft due to environmental variables BUT commercial companies
like LRAD, Corporation have developed long range acoustic
devices which can detect a UAS up to a mile away at altitude.
• Can be a cost-effective way to defend a small area –especially
against SWARM Attack
What are the Acoustic Detection Issues?
26. Detection relies on uniqueness of the UAS and hearing
capabilities at low frequencies:
• Detects drones by recognizing the unique sounds produced by
their motors
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• Rely on a library of sounds produced by known drones, which
are then matched to sounds detected in the operating
environment, however,
• The human ear is a problem for the designer
• It is most sensitive to frequencies around 3500 Hz and can
hear sound down to a practical threshold of 10 dB
• For a given sound pressure level, attenuation of sound with
distance in air and insulating material varies as the square of
the sound frequency
• Low frequency sound presents a greater problem for UAS
stealth design
• The greater noise problem is posed by smaller UAS using
piston engines
• Sound comes from their internal combustion and exhaust
systems
• Sound emission can be reduced with sound-absorptive
materials, silencers and mufflers and by directing the intake
and exhaust manifolds upward
• Level of sound detected depends on the level of background
noise for sound contrast
• Limited range to 500 feet (experimental and research – not
commercial or military)
• Noisy backgrounds (airports, city downtown) limit detection &
interdiction
• Drone tuning (changing the stock propellers) limits detection /
Interdiction
Is Acoustic Quieting possible?
27. “Yes, under certain conditions:
•

Disguise sounds from sensors to eliminate its noise and
passive echoes

• “Acoustic superiority” used by the Navy to mask detection of
U.S. submarines
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• Acoustic technology is “passive,” meaning it is engineered to
receive pings and “listen” without sending out a signal which
might reveal their location to an enemy
• Increased use of lower frequency active sonar and nonacoustic methods of detecting.”(Nichols R. K., Hardening US
Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter Measures, 2019)
28. How has the Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) used as a
sonic weapon?(LRAD, 2019)
It has been used primarily for denying GPS navigation:
GPS Denied Navigation
• GPS navigation relies on measuring the distance or delay, to
several known transmitters in order to triangulate the mobile
receiver’s position
• GPS-denied environment presents navigation challenges for
UAV and UAM
• These areas include urban canyons, forest canopy, etc.
• Strike Resonance frequency – which disrupts balance (vehicles
tilt, orientation & rotation)
UAS Collaboration – SWARM
A UAS SWARM as a uniform mass of undifferentiated individual’s
w/o Chief at automation level 4 or 5. SWARMs exhibit the following
advantages:
• Efficient based on numbers, emergent large group behaviors,
and reactions
• Not controllable or automated, decentralized intelligence
• Think shoal of fish w/ evolving local rules; highly resistant
form
• Not changing based on survivability of members, no hierarchy
SWARM Countermeasures include disruption, i.e. changing the
Strategic Global View of SWARM (its only real vulnerability),
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complete Defender collaboration with multiple kinetic and nonkinetic countermeasures, and use of Acoustic Countermeasures for
identification as friend or foe (IFF) based on a library of manufacture
detection signatures and complete , abrupt rotor disablement by
attacking the SWARM units with resonant, loud ( 100-140 dB) sound
noise aimed directly at the MEMS gyroscopes or close by on the
unit. [Think of glass breaking at resonance frequency or a
submarine under depth charge attack. The former breaks by superexcited molecules in the glass and literally shakes apart. The latter is
destroyed by violent shaking of the submarine so that its parts break
and flooding ensue. It is not necessary to hit the submarine directly
because explosions in water, hence sound waves and explosive
forces, carry very far and effectively to the target.]
South Korean experiment
A paper by Yunmonk son, et. Al. From the Korean advanced
institute of science and technology (KAIST), in the authors
judgement, is the seminal paper on taken down drones using sound
noise on gyroscope sensors! (Yunmonk Son, 2015) It is required
reading for my students.
(Yunmonk Son, 2015) describes the relationship between Sound
Pressure Level (SPL) and Sound Amplitude and derives the attack
distance, d as (in dB):
SPL = SPLref + 20 log (A / Aref )

Equation. 10-2

Where SPL = sound pressure level, SPLref is the reference, A and
Aref are the amplitudes of the source and reference point. Using
real-world experiments (Yunmonk Son, 2015) found that:
SPL = SPLref – 20 log (d / dref )

Equation. 10-3

Where d, dref are the attack scenario distances.
KAIST under (Yunmonk Son, 2015) primary conclusions are:
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• “Many sensing and actuation systems trust their
measurements and actuate according to them. Unfortunately,
this can lead to security vulnerabilities that cause critically
unintended actuations.
• The sound channel can be used as a side channel for MEMS
gyroscopes from a security point of view.
• 15 kinds of MEMS gyroscopes were tested, and seven of them
were found vulnerable to disruption using intentional noise.
• The output of the vulnerable MEMS gyroscopes was found
using a consumer-grade speaker to fluctuate up to dozens of
times as a result of the sound noise.
• Authors found that an attacker with only 30% of the amplitude
of the maximum sound noise could achieve the same result
(disruption) at the same distance.
• At 140 decibels, it would be possible to affect a vulnerable
drone up from around 40 meters away,
• Some drone gyroscopes have resonant frequencies in both the
audible and ultrasonic frequency ranges, making them
vulnerable to interference from intentional sound noise.
• Authors found that accelerometers integrated with MEMS
gyroscopes were also affected by high-power sound noise at
certain frequencies.”(Yunmonk Son, 2015)[31]

Noise
Loud and abrupt sound as a countermeasure also brings the
problem of exposure and loss. Chapter 17 of (Gelfand S. A., 2009)
discusses the effects of noise and hearing conservation. Chapter 20
of (Gelfand S. A., 2009) discusses occupational standards. Safety is
an important topic but outside the scope of this writing.
Real World C-UAS
Time to move from the theoretical into the practical. The balance
of this chapter will be devoted to a sample of deployed ADVANCED
UAS / C-UAS multi-mission systems globally. They can fight back!
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Chinese CH7
At the air show China 2018 in Zhuhai, South China, The UAV
– CH7 was unveiled. The CH7 is China’s new generation stealth
combat unmanned aerial vehicle. The CH7 makes China the second
country, followed by the US, to produce HALE combat vehicles with
advanced penetration capabilities. The CH7 has internal weapons
bays, making it capable of launching anti-radiation missiles, airto-ground (ATG) or anti-ship missiles and long -distance precision
guided bombs. Its missions favor high altitude, stealth capacity and
endurance under dangerous conditions such as C4ISR or launching
missiles at HVTs. The CH7 is 10m long and has a wingspan of 22 m.
It weighs 13,000 kg, cruises at 0.5-0.6 Mach and can fly for 15 hours.
The CH7 can intercept radar electronic signals and simultaneously
detect, verify and monitor HVTs such as US command stations,
missile launch sites and navy vessels. (Defense Editor, 2018) See
Figure 10-18.
Russian Okhotnik aka “Hunter Drone”
Just as General Michael Hayden and Roger N. McDermott
predicted in their report, Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities
to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum
(McDermott, September 2017), along comes the Russian Okhotnik
drone. Flying with the fifth generation Su-57, the Okhotnik, or
“Hunter,” drone which is able “to broaden the fighter’s radar
coverage and to provide target acquisition for employing airlaunched weapons.” (Pickrell, 2019)
Figure 10-19 shows the Okhotnik drone flying next to the SU-57,
Russia’s most advanced stealth fighter. The latest flight appears to
confirm suspicions that the drone was designed to fight alongside
and provide critical battlespace information to Russia’s newest
fighters. (Pickrell, 2019)
Figure 10-18 Chinese CH7 – UAV
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Source: (Defense Editor, 2018)
Figure 10-19 Okhotnik drone flying next to the SU-57, Russia’s
most advanced stealth fighter

Source: (Pickrell, 2019)
The Iranian Shahed 129
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The Shahed 129 (Persian for Eyewitness) is an Iranian singleengine MALE (UCAV) designed by Shahed Aviation Industries for
the (IRGC).

The

Shahed

129

is

capable

of

combat

and reconnaissance missions and has an endurance of 24 hours; it is
similar in size, shape and role to the American MQ-1 Predator and
is

widely

considered

the

most

capable

drone

in

Iranian

service. (Taghvaee, 2017) See Figure 10-20.
General characteristics from (Taghvaee, 2017)
• Crew: none
• Capacity: 400 kg payload
• Length: 8 m (26 ft 3 in)
• Wingspan: 16 m (52 ft 6 in)
• Height: 3.1 m (10 ft 2 in)
• Powerplant: 1 × Rotax 914 four-cylinder, four stroke Ac engine
• Propellers: 3-bladed
Performance
• Cruise speed: 150 km/h (93 mph, 81 kn)
• Combat range: 1,700 km (1,100 mi, 920 nm)
• Ferry range: 3,400 km (2,100 mi, 1,800 nm)
• Endurance: 24h
• Service ceiling: 7,300 m (24,000 ft)
Armament
• Bombs: 4 × Sadid-345 PGM
Avionics
Oghab-6 electro-optical/infrared sensor
Laser range finder
Figure 10-20 The Iranian The Shahed 129
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Source: (Taghvaee, 2017)
In June, U.S. Air Force F-15Es shot down two Iranian UAVs in
Syria—both Shahed 129s operated by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps. These were rare incursions between U.S. and Iranian
aircraft in the Middle Eastern country, which Iran has used as a
testing ground for the Shahed, one of the most advanced armed
UAVs in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Air & Space Force (IRGCASF) drone unit. It will continue to be a mainstay of the Iranian fleet
for the foreseeable future. (Taghvaee, 2017)
The Israeli Tactical Heron
The Tactical Heron, joins drones that have “hundreds of
thousands of operation flight hours.” Designed for missions on the
battlefield, the tactical Heron is used by ground troops or coast
guards. The new Heron can fly up to 7.3 km. with payloads of 180
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kg. (Frantzman, 2019) The Heron is used for ISTAR missions. Figure
10-21 shows the Tactical Heron.
Figure 10-21 Israeli Tactical Heron

Source: (IAI, 2019)
“According to IAI, T-Heron is the best of the best of Heron line,
with all its sensors, cameras, intelligence and attack capabilities,
but for the “local” tactical level. Only UAV in the world with the
abilities of super drones but for tactical levels (according to the
ISI). It has a versatile design and is all-weather day and night. It
is 30% smaller than the standard Heron, and most importantly,
cheaper. It’s for the Brigade tactical level, specifically ground and
mechanized forces, and can even be operated by them (without
having to bring specialized drone operators). It can be brought to
its required location with two trucks and can lift off and land back
on very short paved low-level runways. Because it’s mobile and
tactical, it can travel with front-line forces with no logistical long
tail headaches. It can carry multiple payloads, up to 180 KG, and its
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gross weight up to 600 KG. It has a flight time of 24 hours, 300 KM
range, 23000 ft altitude and has a 10-meter wingspan.” (IAI, 2019)
According to Moshe levy, VP of Aircraft division at IAI, “We are
proud to introduce the most recent UAS developed by IAI. Our
T-Heron tactical UAS rounds up the range of operational UAS
solutions IAI offers to all forces on the battlefield: marine, air,
ground, and intelligence. IAI preserves its leadership position in
UAS’s with a continuous stream of solutions for the challenges
posed by the field.” (IAI, 2019)
IAI doesn’t foresee much maturity problems as it has the same
materials and components as the other Heron’s, only in smaller
amounts. (IAI, 2019)
USA Predator C Avenger
The General

Atomics

developmental UCAV built

Avenger (formerly Predator
by General

Atomics

C)

is

a

Aeronautical

Systems for the US military. Its first flight occurred on 4 April 2009.
Unlike the previous MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B)
drones, the Avenger is powered by a turbofan engine, and its design
includes stealth features such as internal weapons storage, and an
S-shaped exhaust for reduced infrared and radar signatures. The
Avenger will support the same weapons as the MQ-9 and carry
the Lynx SAR and a version of the F-35 Lightning II’s electro-optical
targeting system (EOTS), called the Advanced Low-observable
Embedded Reconnaissance Targeting (ALERT) system. The Avenger
will use the same ground support infrastructure as the MQ-1 and
MQ-9, including the GCS and existing communications networks.
(Staff, General Atomics Avenger, 2019)
Predator C Avenger can carry Hellfire missiles and guided bombs
and ammunition. The Predator C Avenger is a remotely piloted
aircraft developed by GA‑ASI. The first flight of the aircraft was
conducted in April 2009. The combat drone has a maximum take-off
weight of 8,255kg.It is capable of carrying multiple sensor payloads
attached to its wing hard-point mountings while its internal
weapons bay can carry precision mutations and large sensors up
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to 1,588kg. The total payload capacity of the aircraft is 2948kg.
Its weapon payload includes Hellfire missiles, guided bomb unit
(GBU)-12/49 laser-guided bombs, GBU-31 GBU-32, GBU-38 38 joint
direct attack munitions (JDMA) and GBU-39 and GBU-16/48 bombs.
The Predator C Avenger offers greater operational and transit
speeds than Predator B aircraft. Powered by Pratt and Whitney
PW545B turbofan engine, the combat drone is capable of reaching
altitudes up to 50,000ft. It has a maximum speed of 400k and
endurance of 20 hours. (Army, The world’s top combat drones, 2019)
See Figure 10-22.
Conclusions
There are five DE systems (DEW, Laser, Microwave, Particle
Beams, Acoustic) which use the EMS to attack and defend against
hostile UAS. Acoustic systems have the secondary advantage that
their resonance frequencies may be used not only to knock out
UASs but also characterize and identify friend or foe (IFF) UASs.
All these EMO technologies have varying success rates against
SWARMS.
Acoustical defenses show promise in they represent a two-for.
Not only can they disrupt the MEMS with explosive sound at
resonance frequencies, but every UAS has a unique acoustical
signature. These acoustic signatures can be cataloged and used for
challenge – response in an Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) algorithm.
The sampling of advanced attack capability UAV from around the
world, at the end of this chapter are targets that have the ability
to fight back – either with ISTAR, missiles, precision guided bombs
(PGB) / (PGM) / missiles or EW countermeasures. They are able to
identify the defender’s transmitters. They can put a world of hurt on
opposing forces.
Figure 10-22 Predator C Avenger
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Source: (Staff, General Atomics Avenger, 2019)
Discussion Questions
• This chapter explores the use of acoustic countermeasures
against UAS. The authors contend that every manufactured
UAS has unique sound detection signatures. Further these can
be libraried and used in a search algorithm to IFF the UAS
group or SWARM. At the DoD 7th Annual Summit, (Nichols R.
K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy Counter
Measures, 2019) the author found that several contractors are
actually doing this and building databases. BUT they refuse to
share their data because it is proprietary. Assuming this
situation cannot be changed, suggest two ways to get around
this problem not involving legal actions. What type of research
project would you propose to meet an 85% detection criteria
that would suffice as an initial IFF database for evaluation?
• Along with attacking the MEMS gyroscopes to disable the UAS
rotor, propose an experiment to use acoustic countermeasures
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on the UAS internals, such as SCADA, payload, navigation,
internal clocks, internal computer, battery, etc. Perhaps loud
noise can disrupt additional UAS features?
• This chapter has discussed sound in the in the extended
hearing ranges from 10 Hz to 20,000 Hz. Many UAS are
designed for higher frequencies, i.e. ultrasonic and hypersonic.
Propose an experiment to test sound disruption effects at the
higher frequencies. (Drones, 2017) Quad Star Drones has some
interesting “takes” on hypersonic flight and Mach 0.8 speeds.
• There was a fascinating story in the 4 November 2019 webissue of Popular Mechanics about drones being launched from
submarines. (Mizokami, 2019) See: https://hmg.h-cdn.co/
videos/missle-rc-illustration-1572620289.mp4 The article is
critical of carrier warfare and suggests that submarine
launched drones would change the way carriers are deployed.
Assignment: read the article. Then you be the designer to tie it all
together. How would you do it?
Much

of

the

tech

needed

to

develop

drone-launching

submarines—such as creating a large submersible or controlling
drones at sea—has already been mastered. When someone ties it
all together, we could see (or rather, not see) a naval event where
carriers from both sides are totally underwater.
Now that you have it tied together and plan to bring this new form
of warfare, now defend against it. What technologies would you use
from this chapter?
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Appendix 10-1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical
Properties

356 | Chapter 10: When the Other Side Fights Back - Cyberwarfare,
Directed Energy Weapons, Acoustics,Integrating C-UAS into Planning

Quantity

Formula

MKS
Cgs Units
(SI)Units

Mass (M)

M

kilogram
gram (g)
(kg)

Time (t)

t

seconds,
s
(s)

Area (A)

A

m2

cm2

Displacement
d
(d)

meter
(m)

centimeter 1m = 102
(cm)
cm

Velocity (v)

v = d/t

m/s

cm/s

1 m/s =
102 cm/s

ft/s

Acceleration
(a)

A = v/t

m/s2

cm/s2

1 m/s2 =
102 cm/s2

ft/s2

F = MA =
Mv/t

kg x m/
s2

g x cm2

1N = 105
dynes

1lbf = 1 lb
x
32.174049
ft -lbs
/s2 =
9.80665
m/s2

Force (F)

Mv =
newton
Momentum (N)

N /m2
Pressure (p)

p = F/ A

Pascal
(Pa)

dyne

dynes
/cm2
microbar
(µbar)

Comments
1kg = 103 g
1kg =
2.2046 lbs

English
Units
pounds
(lbs)
s

1 m2 = 104
cm2

20 µPa = 2
x 10-5 N/
m2
reference
value

ft2
ft

Psi = lbf
/in2
1 N/m2 =
0.000145
psi

1 j = 107
erg/s

Work (W)

Nxm
W =Fd

Joule

dyne x cm
erg

Energy
-capability
to do
Work.
Potential
energy for
a body at
rest and
kinetic
energy for
a body in
motion.

BTU
[British
Thermal
Unit]
1 BTU
=
1055.056
joules
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Power (P)

P = W/t =

Joules/s

erg/s

Fd/t =Fv

watt (w)

watt (w)

1 w = 1 J/s
= 107 erg/
s

I = P/A
I = P / 4?r2
Based on
sphere
radius

Intensity (I)

w/m2

1 watt =
3.412
BTU/hr

10-12 w/
m2

w/cm2

reference
value

Sources: (Entokey, 2019) & (Studios, 2017) & (Nielsen, 2012)
Appendix 10-2 LRAD 1000X, Source: (LRAD Corporation, 2019)
Communicate Even Further with Longer Range AHD
The

LRAD

1000Xi

is

a

power

efficient,

long

distance

communication system designed for applications ranging from
critical infrastructure protection to territorial water, border and
port security, and large vessel and vehicle installations.
Featuring a rugged carbon fiber emitter head integrated with
electronics and amplification, the LRAD 1000Xi comes standard
with an MP3 Control Module for playing recorded messages and
an all-weather microphone for live broadcasts. The MP3 Control
module also enables remote operation of the device from safe
locations.
Superior voice intelligibility and an extended frequency range
ensure broadcasts are clearly heard and understood over wind,
engine and background noise. The LRAD 1000Xi provides a longrange communications capability to issue authoritative voice
commands

and

attention-commanding

deterrent

tones

to

determine intent, safely enhance response capabilities, modify
behavior, and scale the use of force if necessary.
Features
1. Rugged, military tested construction
2. Low power requirements
3. All-weather use
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4. Easy to use
5. Increased coverage with single operator
6. Safer alternative to non-lethal deterrent measures
7. HD Camera (optional)

Directionality, Power Efficiency & Range
1. Highly intelligible communication up to 3,000 meters (1.864
miles)
2. Safely communicates beyond standoff distances to determine
intent
3. Variable beam width for extended coverage
4. Clear, long range, directional communication
5. Establishes instant acoustic standoff perimeter
LRAD 1000Xi Specifications
Acoustic Performance
• Maximum Continuous Output: 153 dB SPL @ 1 meter, Aweighted
• Sound Projection +/- 15° at 1 kHz
• Communications Range: Highly intelligible voice messages
over distances up to 3,000 meters; max range of 1,250 meters
over 88 dB of background noise.
6+ dB above background noise is based on field trials conducted
by independent sources.
Environmental Performance
• Hot Operating Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 501.5,
Procedure II, Design type Hot, 60°C
• Cold Operating Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 502.5,
Procedure II, Design type Basic Cold, -33°C
• Hot Storage Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 501.5,
Procedure I, 70°C
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• Cold Storage Temperature: MIL-STD-810G, Method 502.5,
Procedure I, -40°C
• Operating Humidity: MIL-STD 810G, Method 507.5, Procedure
II – Aggravated Cycle
• Rain: MIL-STD-810G, Method 506.5, Procedure I, Blowing rain
• Salt Fog: MIL-STD-810G, Method 509.5
• Shipboard Vibration: MIL-STD-167-1A
• Shipboard Shock: MIL-S-901D, Class I, Shock grade B
• Random Vibration: MIL-STD-810G, Method 514.6, Wheeled
vehicles
• SRS Shock: MIL-STD-810G, Method 516.6, Procedure I,
(Functional shock)
Tested by National Technical Systems (NTS) following MIL-STD-810G,
MIL-STD-167-1A & MIL-S-901D
Mechanical
• Dimensions: 36” ACOUSTIC PERFORMANCE x 40“ ACOUSTIC
PERFORMANCE x 13” D (91cm x 102cm x 33cm)
• Weight: 87 lbs. without accessories (39.4kg)
• Construction: Molded low smoke composite, 6061 Aluminum,
316 Stainless hardware
Electrical Requirements
• Typical Power Consumption: 720 Watts (With tone)
• Normal Power Consumption: 190 Watts (With voice content)
• Power Input: 90-260VAC 50/60Hz Typical Power with warning
tone. Normal Power Consumption: with voice content, sound
projection is wide and voice boost is off.
Safety
MIL-STD-1474D
MIL-STD-1474D standard establishes acoustical noise limits and
prescribes testing requirements and measurement techniques
for determining conformance to the noise limits specified therein.
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Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
FCC Part 15 class A radiated emissions, CE
Requirements for the control of electromagnetic interference
characteristics of subsystems and equipment.
Endnotes

[1] “Drone” in this document refers to small unmanned aircraft,
remotely piloted or autonomous, fixed-wing or rotary blade,
controlled remotely or use satellite navigation systems, or RTF or
tethered or RC models.
[2] In 2018, the Home Office ran a public consultation, Stop and
search: extending police powers to cover offences relating to
unmanned

aircraft

(drones),

laser

pointers,

and

corrosive

substances. The result was published in 2019
[3] A fascinating study by NATO on Transforming Joint Air and
Space Power via The Journal of the Joint Air Power Competence
Center (JAPCC) available for download at: https://www.japcc.org/
wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J27_screen.pdf
[4] In Chapter 14: Exposing UAS Vulnerabilities via Electronic
Warfare (EW) and Countering with Low Probability Intercept Signals
(LPI), EW, CYBER and LPI in modern communications systems is
covered in detail. (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the
Cyber Domain, 2019)
[5] MC 64/11, 4 Jul. 2018
[6] Student assignment end of Chapter 9.
[7]

SCADA

systems,

functions,

configurations,

and

their

vulnerabilities are covered in detail in (Nichols, et al., Unmanned
Aircraft Systems

in the Cyber Domain,

2019) Chapter 3:

Understanding Hostile Use and Cyber-Vulnerabilities of UAS:
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Components, Autonomy v Automation, Sensors, SAA, SCADA and
Cyber Attack Taxonomy. The purpose of this textbook is to move
forward not rehash materials previously presented. Some Tables in
Chapter 3 have been republished here for convenience. The reader
is reminded that UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN THE CYBER
DOMAIN: PROTECTING USA’S ADVANCED AIR ASSETS, 2nd Edition
by Nichols, R. K., Ryan, J., J.C.H., Mumm, H.C., Lonstein, W.D., Carter,
C., Hood, J.P. is available for FREE at www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/27

[8] In the authors’ ancient textbook (Nichols R. K., The ICSA Guide
to Cryptography, 1999) Cryptology is the study of creating codes
and ciphers (cryptography) and decoding or deciphering codes and
ciphers (cryptanalysis) when the system is not known. There are
far better books available. Consider the classic by guru and onetime

competitor,

Bruce

Schneier,

simply

entitled

Cryptography. (Schneiner, 1996)
[9] The general term for the art and science of concealment ciphers
is steganography. This includes null, ciphers and image / pixel
deceptions (hiding in plain sight or in a massive amount of
storage) (Randall K. Nichols D. J., 2000).
[10] If the reader is really interested in pain and all things Maxwell
(James Clerk), consider the textbook Electromagnetic Waves by
Staelin, et.al. (David H. Staelin, 1998). Prepare for hours of math and
difficult reading.
[11]Fluence – particle density or energy density, used to describe
the output of a radiation field or of a laser beam (Collins-Dictionary,
2019)
[12] Think skeet shooting.
[13] Laser stands for Light amplification through simulated emission
of radiation.
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[14] A collimated beam of light or other electromagnetic radiation
has parallel rays, and therefore will spread minimally as it
propagates. A perfectly collimated light beam, with no divergence,
would not disperse with distance. … Perfectly collimated light is
sometimes said to be focused at infinity. (Wikipedia, Collimated
Definition, 2019)
[15] This effect is referred to as aerosols.
[16] Plasma weapons are very cool and are more sci-fi than reality,
certainly against UAS systems. A plasma weapon is a type of” ray
gun” that fires a stream, bolt(s), pulse or toroid of plasma (i.e. very
hot, very energetic excited matter). The primary damage
mechanism of these fictional weapons is usually thermal transfer; it
typically causes serious burns, and often immediate death of living
creatures, and melts or evaporates other materials. Fictional plasma
weapons are often visually analogous to real-life plasma torches
that cut into materials for industrial use purposes; however, said
torches currently only produce a plasma jet of several inches at
most. (Wikipedia, Plasma Weapons, 2019) Amazon sells a Star Wars
Nerf Captain Plasma Blaster for a mere $34.57 +tax and shipping.
Six-year old’s can now melt down a droid.
[17] Aside from author’s comments in note 19, the ignition of plasmas
at a target surface, and their subsequent propagation as detonation
or combustion waves, can greatly enhance the thermal and
mechanical coupling of a laser to a target, either in a vacuum or air.
[18] Laser material processing is now a major component of the
manufacturing process. Lasers accomplish tasks ranging from
heating for hardening, melting for welding and cladding, and the
removal of material for drilling and cutting. Typical intensities
required for such tasks include heat treating at 103 – 104 W/cm2,
welding and cladding at 105 – 106 W/cm2, and material removal
107 –

109 W/cm2 for

drilling,

cutting,

and

milling. (National

Academies of Sciences, 2018)
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[19] These conclusions may be big jump from real earth to
atmosphere. A better picture of the thermal, mechanical damage,
stimulated Rama scattering (SRS), vaporization, melting as a
function of intensity and pulse width is provided by (Nielsen, 2012)
in Chapter 3, p 191, Figure 3-76. No matter how we dissect the laser
weapon use concepts, UASs are not cost-effective targets for this
cool technology.
[20] Relativistic velocities – Velocities approaching speed of light.
[21] Bremsstrahlung -radiation loss of energy induced by the
acceleration of particles they suffer in collisions in the PB. (Nielsen,
2012)
[22] Another related chapter was Chapter 8: Designing UAS Systems
for Stealth. (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber
Domain, 2nd Edition, 2019)
[23] Refer to Appendix 10-1 for standard acoustical properties and
units.
[24] https://lradx.com/lrad_products/lrad-1000xi/
[25] Use the bottom of the page converter. Basis: Speed of sound c =
λ × f = 343 m/s at 20°C} for 16 m L = 21.4375Hz. This compares to the
Austin value of 20 Hz. For the 2 cm = 0.02 m, the resulting valued
for f = 17650 Hz. This is above the 16,000 Hz limit from Austin. This
might be due to the 20-degree Celsius basis difference. This tells
the UAS designer that the upper end of noise – Stealth acceptability
17,150 Hz.
[26] “An equal-loudness contour is a measure of sound pressure
(Db SPL) over the EMS spectrum, for which a listener perceives a
constant loudness when presented with pure steady tones. The unit
of measurement for loudness levels is the phon and is arrived at by
reference to equal-loudness contours. Two sine waves of differing
frequencies are said to have equal-loudness level measured in
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phons if they are perceived as equally loud by the average young
person without significant hearing impairment.” (Staff, Equal
Loudness Contours, 2016)
[27] “Four important relationships to note are that power is equal
to pressure squared, P = p2, pressure is equal to the square root of
power, p = √ P, intensity is proportional to pressured squared,
I ≈ p2 and pressure is proportional to intensity, p ≈ √I. This
makes it easy to convert between sound intensity and sound
pressure.” (Entokey, 2019) These relations yield a few more to relate
sound pressure, sound intensity and distance r. Given to pressures
p1 and p2 at distance r1 and r2, they are proportional: p2 / p1 = r1 /
r2; and factoring in intensities at I1 and I2, gives I2 / I1 = (r1 /r2)2.
Finally, r2 / r1 = p2 / p1 = √I1 / I2. (TRS S. , 2018)
[28] Decibels (Adamy D. , 2001) (Gelfand S. A., 2009) Sound
magnitudes, intensities, and pressures vary over an enormous
range. We use decibels (dB) to express sound values. Decibels takes
advantages of ratios and logarithms. Ratios are used so that physical
magnitudes can be stated in relation to a reference value that has
meaning to us. The reference point chosen is the softest sound
that can be heard by normal people. The reference value has an
intensity of 10-12 w/m2 (10-16 w/cm2). In terms of sound pressure,
the reference value is: 2 x 10-5 N/m2 or 20 µPa (2 x 10-4 dynes/
cm2). An interesting Geek bar bet is what is the logarithm of all 2:1
ratios, 8:4, 20, 20:10, 100:50, etc.? Even though the distance between
absolute numbers gets wider, 1,4,10, 50…, the logarithms of the 2:1
ratios are the same at 0.3. Another interesting factoid about ratios is
the units generally cancel out.
The general decibel formula in terms of power level (PL) is as
follows (Gelfand, 2004):
PL = 10 log P / Po
Equation 10-4
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Where P = power of the sound measured, and Po is the reference
power to be compared.
The general decibel formula in terms of power level (IL) is as
follows (Gelfand, 2004):
IL = 10 log I / Io
Equation 10-5
Where I = intensity of the sound measured, and Io is the reference
intensity to be compared. Io is given as 10-12 w/m2 .
The general decibel formula for sound pressure level (SPL) is
obtained by replacing all of the intensity values with the
corresponding values of pressure squared because (I ≈ p2).
SPL = 10 log p2 / po2
Equation 10-6
Where p is the measured sound pressure (in N/m2) and po is the
reference sound pressure of
2 x 10-5 N/m2 . A more convenient form of this equation
recognizes that log x2 = 2 log x. (Gelfand, 2004)
SPL = 20 log p / po.
Equation 10-7
Equation 10-7 is the common formula for SPL. A couple of
observations a positive decibel value means that the sound pressure
level is greater than the reference. The decibel value of the
reference is 0 because reference value / reference value = 1 and 10
log 1 = 0. This does not mean no sound; it just means the sound
measured is equal to the reference point. A negative value of
decibels means that the sound magnitude is lower than the
reference. (Gelfand S. A., 2009)
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[29] It is left to the reader to obtain any standard trigonometry text
to see all the parameters of the well-known sine wave.
[30] The formula for the string’s resonant frequency Fo is:
Fo = 1 / 2L x √T /M
Equation 10-8
Where Fo is resonance frequency in Hz, T is Tension, M is Mass, L
= λ /2 and f = c / λ and c = speed of sound. L = length of the string.
(Gelfand, 2004) The strings lowest resonant frequency is f = c / 2
L but Eq 10-8 considers that the speed of sound is different for a
vibrating string than it is for air.
[31] Author’s note although not specified in (Yunmonk Son, 2015),
according to chapter author research and experimentation, the
frequencies turn out to be the resonance frequencies. So agrees
Dr. Kim at KAIST. “You would think that the gyroscopes used in
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) would have been designed to have
resonant frequencies above the audible spectrum – i.e., above 20
kHz – but Kim and his team found that some have not.” (Yunmonk
Son, 2015) In the case of a gyroscope, “you can get it to spit out
very strange outputs, as researcher Yongdae Kim, a professor in the
electrical engineering department of the Korea Advanced Institute
of Science and Technology (KAIST), told ComputerWorld” (Kirk,
2015) An example of resonance frequency and breaking glass can be
found on youtu.be at https://youtu.be/BE827gwnnk4
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Chapter 11: Thinking Like the
Enemy: Seams in the Zone
W.D. LONSTEIN

Student Learning Objectives
The student will gain knowledge of the balance between effective
C-UAS strategy and the many ways that technological and nontechnological attack vectors can be implemented to defeat even the
most robust Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“C-UAS”) tactics
and strategies. Designing and new technology to respond to and
counteract new, and rapidly developing technologies presents a
daunting challenge. The C-UAS student must recognize that they
are placed at an inherent disadvantage if only by the nature of their
mission, responding to and addressing known and unknown threats.
Students Will Be Able To:
Understand the challenges confronting those who research,
design and implement C-UAS systems, tactics, and strategies.
Acquire a historical understanding of C-UAS systems, their
strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned from prior successes
and failures.
Describe how to “think like the enemy” and incorporate the
thought process in the development of C-UAS Technology and
strategy.
Understand the importance of ensuring that the physical security
of C-UAS systems, personnel and data is often the first step in an
attacker’s playbook.
Develop a healthy skepticism of new technologies that claim to be
able to address most or all threats posed to the public, assets, and
personnel by Unmanned Systems.
Establish as a foundational underpinning of any C-UAS analysis
that every technology or strategy has inherent vulnerabilities and so
must have robust and rapid failure response.
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Preliminary Statement
It is assumed those who may read this chapter do so with the
intent of learning to benefit not harm upon innocent citizens and
lawful combatants engaged in conflict under the modern rules of
warfare. Drone and other unmanned automated technology
provides a vehicle to weaponize payloads once thought impossible
to transport and efficiently disperse upon targets. A delicate
balance exists between what is appropriately disclosed and
discussed in the educational realm against supplying information
to those who intend or be inclined to inflict great harm upon
innocents. The prospect of using UAS to efficiently and
economically

deliver

weaponized

chemical,

biological

and

radioactive agents is of constant concern. It would be foolish to
assume that scenarios discussed in this text are incapable of being
independently created by those who seek to inflict harm, yet it is all
of our duty to do our utmost to prevent such a reality.
Although the balance must always tip in favor of using information
for education and defense of freedom-loving nations and citizens,
we must also be mindful that other eyes are reading, and ears are
listening to the information contained in this book. The fact that
this text and its prior works printed by this group of authors and
the works of many others are freely available in various formats
online. To pretend that only those who seek to benefit mankind will
access the information would be folly. While we will be discussing
various scenarios that exploit vulnerabilities in C-UAS systems and
strategies, let us remain vigilant to prospect and re-double our
efforts to ensure that by critical thinking and analysis we remain a
step ahead of adversaries.
Keeping it Simple
To fully examine C-UAS vulnerabilities across the spectrum of
civilian, commercial, homeland security, and military applications
these pages would number in the thousands and the content
become impossible to digest. No matter what the strategy or
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technology, inherent vulnerabilities will always exist. In recognition
of the in-depth information proved by many of the co-authors of
this textbook, we will limit our examination to the civilian-hobbyist
realm. I believe that there are universal truisms of C-UAS
vulnerabilities which can serve as the foundational underpinnings
of the broader study and implementation of effective processes and
technology to mitigate their risk.
Vulnerability evaluation must be a dynamic process since as UAS
technology rapidly evolves, so too must C-UAS strategy and
technology. Students and professionals should develop robust and
continual processes, similar to those common to IT best practices.
Focus points should include, but not be limited to, penetration
testing,

hacking,

physical

access

exploitation,

and

social

engineering attack simulations.
We will examine one multi-part scenario which is quite simple
and use it to explain how C-UAS students and professionals might
address challenges and vulnerabilities one might encounter in a CUAS framework. The scenario and sub-parts will be simplistic and
generic, it is for the reader to expand on the base assumptions
and consider how they might affect their ability to develop C-UAS
strategies, deploy or develop technologies and prepared for
response based upon vulnerabilities which may be inherent therein.
History as a Guide
In the 1930s, before the outbreak of World War II, a system known
as Radio Detecting and Ranging, commonly referred to today by
the acronym RADAR was successfully deployed to detect an aircraft.
This feat was accomplished by Sir Robert Winston Watt in 1935
and by 1937 a network deployment of this technology was deployed
across Britain called Chain Home.
During the early years of WW II, it was a particularly effective
technological advantage for Britain against the air raids of the
German Luftwaffe. (Foley, 2019)
Sadly, the same type of radar system was present on the Hawaiian
island of Oahu on December 7, 1941, known as the Opana Radar
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site. Two lightly trained privates were operating the unit when, just
shortly after 7 am, a return was received which they interpreted as
squadrons of inbound aircraft. They immediately called Fort Shafter
where superiors were stationed to express their concern. They were
allegedly told “don’t worry about it,” if anything it was an
approaching group of B-17’s expected from San Diego. (Bureau, 2019)
Though the technology deployed in both locations was largely the
same, it provides an all too painful reminder that no matter how
good the technology or strategy, there will always be vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities may be human, mechanical, environmental or
even unexplainable, yet their exploitation often has consequences
that are real and deadly. History has witnessed numerous examples
of seemingly impenetrable defenses, even those employing stateof-the-art technology and strategy, failing under attack for a variety
of reasons.
For example, a seemingly impenetrable defense based on lessons
learned during World War I was constructed by France to prevent
similar invasions, most particularly from its then constant adversary
Germany. Sadly, when Germany sought to once again invade France
during WWII, the Maginot line failed. Why? Because an apparent
frontal attack, which in actuality was an intentional distraction
delayed French troops from responding to two larger Axis forces.
One, attacking through Belgium and the Ardennes forest and
another acting as a pincer from the north from Poland. These are
just two historical examples of why defense is never static, and
adversaries are always on the hunt for vulnerabilities in the defenses
of their prey.
Figure 11-1: Opana Radar Site
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Source: (Bureau, 2019)
The latter example has led some in the cybersecurity industry
to caution “Don’t let your cybersecurity become another Maginot
Line.” (Mirza, 2019)
Always be mindful of the truism no matter how perfect the plan
or “foolproof” the strategy or technology risk of failure or
circumvention is a constant. For any C-UAS technology or strategy
to be truly robust, it must assume the inevitability of failure and
therefore incorporate responsive capability.
The threats posed by UAS are broader and far more complex
(and therefore unpredictable) than any other technology mankind
has ever encountered. Acknowledging vulnerabilities are inherent,
and that adversaries will constantly probe any defensive system
for them, failure must be engineered into C-UAS technology and
responsive best practices are of primary importance, not an
afterthought.
Figure 11-2 Battle of Constantinople
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Source: (medievalwarfare.info, 2019)
Improved technology has led to more effective weapons from the
dawn of mankind. See Figure 11-2 Siege of Constantinople in 1453
for all out use of new weapons. Historians have documented such
occurrences as early as 400,000, BC when humans used spears as a
tool of warfare, defense, and hunting. This is a historical continuum
where more mobile, lethal and functional weapons progress over
time. Spears evolved into the atlatl, a type of dart, to the bow
and arrow, the boomerang and eventually the sword. Between 800
and 1300 AD, primarily related to the invention of gunpowder by
the Chinese, led to the cannon, hand cannon, and other forms of
artillery.
Over time, hand weapons, once requiring a match to ignite
gunpowder during the Ming Dynasty between 1368 and 1644
eventually evolved to better and faster ignition technology such as
the matchlock and then the wheel lock. (PBS, 2014) With the dawn
of the modern age rocket technology evolved and forever changed
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warfare in the mid-1700s. Rapid-fire artillery and automatic
machine and handguns developed in the mid-1800. Through the
19th century and two World Wars during the early 20th accelerated
the creation of a broad spectrum of weaponry culminating with
nuclear warfare which debuted in 1945 with the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan. Delivery systems also improved to
where nuclear ordinance could be delivered efficiently, rapidly and
using land and sea-based missiles, aircraft, submarines, surface
vessels, and even space-based platforms. Later laser, acoustic,
stealth, space, and cyber weapons presented a dizzying array of
threats that confront today’s security and defense professionals.
As the millennium came and went vast improvements in using
rapid data and information processing technology led to the
widespread implementation of automated, unmanned intelligent
weapons systems. Drone warfare almost immediately went from
theoretical to and actual and present tool of warfare. (Marshall,
2009)
Unmanned technology has gained rapid acceptance by the
military as well as being deployed in a myriad of civilian uses from
transportation, to logistics and hundreds of other applications in
everyday life. Therein lies the challenge facing C-UAS students and
professionals alike, the need to differentiate and distinguish drones
being used innocently versus with malice. Even the harmless use of
UAS in recreational applications presents a risk to everything from
civilian aviation, governmental functions, critical infrastructure and
even inhabiting one own private domicile. With history as a guide,
we will examine how best to predict and discover risks from this
rapidly evolving, asymmetric technology.
Hiding in Plain Sight; Distinguishing the Attacker from the
Hobbyist
Generally speaking, one of the biggest challenges confronting CUAS professionals lies in the prediction and defending against risks
associated with UAS technology in daily life as well its use as an
attack vector in hostile activity. When considering the multitude
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of possibilities of threats from UAS differentiating between what is
normal versus what is not, it is essential if we are to have any ability
to predict, detect, deter and defend against UAS threats.
Scenario:
A single UAV hovers over an elementary school playground during
recess. (Andrews, 2017) See Figure 11-3 Talking Drone. Children are
loud playing and seemingly happy carnival-style calliope music is
broadcast from above with the voice of Sponge Bob, Square Pants
saying “follow me, kids! Once a sight that would cause alarm, has
now become somewhat “normal” considering the increased
popularity of UAV’s ranging from aerial photography to educational
and other STEM programs.
Figure 11-3: Talking Drone

Source: (Andrews, 2017)
The need to instantly identify the capability, payload, operator,
and mission has become far more complex. The more popular and
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affordable drones become, the more faculty, students, parents, and
authorities will tend to assume such sightings are regular and
innocuous.
Not too long ago, it was a rarity to see multiple jet aircraft flying
overhead. Today, especially near metropolitan areas the sights and
sounds associated with modern have become part of the ambient
environment. Think back to your first day of elementary school.
Everything was new, faces, places, sounds, smells and experiences.
With time environmental familiarity became part of the daily
routine.
Vulnerability Axis 1: Familiarity
From a defense and security perspective familiarity and normality
are major inherent vulnerabilities to any C-UAS deployment. As
automation becomes more ubiquitous in our lives the vulnerability
from attack proportionately increases. This vulnerability can be
largely attributed to a decrease in “Situational Awareness.”
Situational awareness or situation awareness (“SA)” is generally
defined as a perception of environmental elements and events
concerning time or space, the comprehension of their meaning, and
the projection of their future status. (Endsley, 1995)
It is now well accepted that as automation and routine increase
situational awareness (“SA”) decreases. “Situational awareness is
very important, not just for personal security but as a fundamental
building block in collective security.” (STRATFOR, 2012)
Returning to the schoolyard the more students, staff, and
authorities become acclimated to UAV’s in everyday life the less
likely they will perceive them as an abnormality or threat.
Attacker Perspective:
Once again it is important to note that the “Attacker Perspective”
is included in terms of generalities only, not specifics. All of the
concepts, information, and discussion is an open course, not
classified and within the grasp of any reasonably astute person with
or without specialized education or technical expertise. They are
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not intended to be a “How To” tutorial on C-UAS exploits, rather
and general overview of the mindset and considerations an attacker
might consider when considering an attack. The key is for the CUAS student or professional to learn to “think like the enemy” to
be prepared for their attacks and attempts to exploit C-UAS
vulnerabilities.
Using VPNs and other anonymization techniques, research the
most popular consumer UAS in the target region, check blogs, sales
figures advertisements and enforcement information from news,
police websites, the FAA, state and local authorities. Consider
demographics including age of the local population, popularity of
drone hobbyists locally, stores that sell UAV’s and their sales
volumes. Are there farms or other industries that may use UAS in
any capacity such as spraying, surveillance, powerline management,
policing or education? Are there local photographers, surveyors,
appraisers or realtors who advertise a UAS capability online or in
online publications?
Vulnerability Axis 2: Environmental Concealability
A recent trend of many civilian UAV manufacturers in the
introduction of smaller and lighter products. In many ways, their
size, when coupled with distance can easily be mistaken for a bird,
small airplane or simply fit in as another drone in an area. Open
spaces such as farm fields, rivers, parks or other sparsely populated
areas are often places where drone enthusiasts may practice UAV
flight or in the case of farms, may see UAS use for spraying,
surveying crops of other agricultural purposes.
Attacker Perspective:
Research features, payload, speed, altitude and price attributes
of various UAS available to the attacker. Consider the affordability
of mini swarms to various locations to leverage distraction and
confusion. Remotely research line of sight issues or BLOS capability
of UAV including live stream capability to avoid local detection and
enable remote operation. Consider the attacker (s) capability to
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operate remotely and whether local assets are required. Are there
cultural, linguistic or other factors that might enhance risk
detection Consider ornithological and other wildlife factors that
may hinder or aide in stealth operation and avoidance of detection
by the public or C-UAS technology?
Vulnerability Axis 3: Conformity with Regulation.
UAV’s under .55 pounds (250 grams) are currently exempt from
FAA Part 107 registration licensure requirements. According to the
latest FAA guidance:
“Drones being used for commercial purposes under the Part 107
regulations need to be registered with the agency, regardless of
weight. “Only those drones flown under the Exception for Limited
Recreational Operations and weighing less than .55 pounds, or 250
grams, do not require registration.” (Mintz, 2019)
Attacker Perspective:
Researching laws to find UAS which have little or no regulatory
and administrative footprint (i.e. not subject to registration). Learn
nuances, train and develop proficiency in its operation Depending
on type of planned attack research the most effective payload
capable of being delivered (if employing swarm, consider lighter
payload upon multiple UAS’s in order to account for detection, CUAS countermeasures, human and mechanical failure and risk of
environmental factors upon types of agents. (Biologic, radioactive,
chemical, SCADA, even EMP attack or other)
Vulnerability

Axis

4:

Adapting

Appearance

to

Attract

Susceptible Targets:
When the drone allegedly broadcast a message to children on the
playground a message to “follow me” it is a social engineering tool
designed to attract a curious and less skeptical target. The more an
attacker can adopt a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” appearance the less
chance of onlookers expecting any sinister motive. The more begin
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the appearance the less likely to cause alarm and therefore inquiry
by authorities.
Attacker Perspective:
Consider the objective. Locate targets for research which fit
objective and capable of success using practical, affordable and
technological factors as a guide. Scour news for reports of crime,
public discontent with facility operations and staff. Employ satellite
imagery, social media, live stream research to determine any
actionable

intelligence

about

physical

features,

recent

improvement, and planned projects. Check the schedule for dates
and times of operation. Research surround areas for airports, radar
facilities, military bases and assets, times of day with highest and
least traffic. Research local EMS, Police, and Military response times
in the area. Research other federal, state and local law enforcement
assets nearby. Will the use of multiple, swarms or even multiple
swarms be possible to avoid C-UAS detection and disperse risk to
total mission failure? Is there a heavy security presence? Depending
on the type of attack will there be times when targets are out in
the open instead of within a building. What are work shifts, class
or other staffing schedules which can provide predictability and
reduce the chance of detection?
Vulnerability Axis 5: Attraction – Distraction – Stealth:
When coupled with strobing, colored, anti-collision lights, the
allure of the drone becomes even more powerful. The result? A
simple yet effective blending of technology, social engineering, and
legality which theoretically would allow a child predator to hide the
nature of their intention in the open.
This type of attack is nothing new and has supposed origins as far
back as the 12th Century in the age of the Iliad and Odyssey of Greek
Mythology lore. See Figure 11-4 Trojan Horse.
Figure 11-4 Trojan Horse
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Source: (Rischgitz, 2019)
The Trojan horse was a seemingly “normal” occurrence in this
myth as a form of boasting by Odysseus who was renowned for his
architectural and construction prowess. (Remember its mythology
so please suspend belief.) What was not expected, just like a hidden
payload in a UAV today was a lethal brigade of the best warriors of
the time, hidden within the hollow belly of the horse. (Maro, 2019)
Current UAS technology allows the average citizen, terrorists and
military forces globally the ability to achieve a stealth attack
capability simply by blending in, operating relatively quietly and
out of the field of normal ground focused visual attention. Today’s
Trojan horse is compact, remotely operated, stealthy and capable
of acting with overwhelming force in large numbers creating lethal
swarms.
Attacker Perspective:
Which normal activities in and around the target are capable of
providing cover to the attack vector. For example, in loud industrial
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areas, there is usually more ambient noise and therefore rotor
“whir” is less likely to be heard and therefore make detection less
likely? Are there time, color, feature or other forms of concealing
the UAS in the open to minimize the risk of detection? The greater
the distance from the launch site increases the risk of the UAS
being observed and therefore remediated. Consideration of signal
emanation from the controller’s location will also play a role in
the risk of detection by C-UAS technology. Some UAS use multiple
forms of communication for operational control. Can the UAV be
rebranded to make it look more like a toy or hobby vehicle with
bright colors or even relevant images to lessen suspicion and delay
reporting?
Vulnerability Avis 6: A Studious Attacker
According to translation from the epic military strategy work,
“The Art of War”, its author Sun Tzu is reputed to have written
“The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his
temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but
few calculations beforehand.” (Sun-Tzu, 1964) C-UAS students must
always assume that an attacker who seeks to inflict harm or worse
using UAS must have done significant research and preparation
before commencing an attack. It would make little sense for such
an attacker to simply fly a drone to a target and attempt to inflict
damage. Students must assume that an attacker is not going to
remotely pilot a UAS to a location they are unfamiliar with.
Familiarity comes with study, research, even spies. Since so much
information is available online one of the most concerning
vulnerabilities inherent in all C-UAS deployments is ease of access
to almost any information. Students must, therefore, assume an
attacker is familiar with the target, the C-UAS systems if any which
is in place as well as the size, nature, and location of any possible
defensive and/or responsive force.
Attacker Perspective:
As we have discussed almost any type of information is available
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online. That which may not be available may be able to be acquired
by compromising information systems (hacking), cultivating and
recruiting spies or informants or engaging in cyber, in-person or
even UAS reconnaissance of the target. A well prepared and
research attack is created by patiently securing information without
leaving an actual or digital footprint. Scouring budgets, work orders,
new stories, building permits, business filings, and police blotter
records are but a few of the areas the diligent attacker can acquire
to prepare themselves to exploit C-UAS vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability: More Than a Seam – A Gaping-hole
Almost every roadway across the globe is subject to maximum
speed restrictions it would seem that eventually full compliance
would be achieved through education enforcement and penalties.
Figure 11-5 Drone Enforcement. Nothing can be farther from the
truth.
According to a 2018 study by the British Home Office, 2.2 million
speeding tickets were issued in 2017, a 2.4% increase from the prior
year and a 26% increase from 2011, all while automated speed
enforcement technology was increasing in scope and coverage.
(Office, 2018)
Figure 11- 5: Drone Enforcement
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Source: (French, 2018)
If drivers disobey a heavily monitored and enforced activity like
driving, what is the likelihood that UAS operators, with little to no
method to detect and enforce violations, will choose to comply? The
takeaway when it comes to predicting vulnerabilities in any C-UAS
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deployment is to expect that many operators will not comply with
the law. Whether innocent or intentional it does not matter since
the interface of civilian or other UAS everyday activities can result
in serious, if not tragic results.
An extensive review of public and court records search to fully
grasp the vigor with which authorities are enforcing violations of
UAS regulations in the United States. Not surprisingly I was hardpressed to find more than a handful of prosecutions, and when
they occurred the penalties enforced were warnings. (French, 2018)
This begs a critical question, is there even an enforcement arm of
the FAA or other law enforcement agencies capable of enforcing
current UAS regulations? While many of the vast majority of
operators will choose to comply with the law to the extent, they
understand it, the fact that detection and enforcement are virtually
non-existent is a fact that will not be overlooked by an attacker and
is there a major vulnerability confronting any C-UAS professional.
The Information Age – A Tool for Attackers
According to a report issued by the General Accounting Office on
October 17, 2019, three recommendations were made to the Ranking
Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
“GAO has three recommendations, including that FAA: (1) develop
an approach to communicate to local law enforcement agencies
expectations for their role in UAS investigations, and (2) identify
and obtain data needed to evaluate FAA’s small UAS compliance
and enforcement activities, as the UAS environment evolves. FAA
concurred with the recommendations.” (GAO, 2019)
Facially, the GAO recommendations suggest the FAA’s current
strategy to regulate civilian UAS activity is one of the evaluation
and development of tools and processes all while studying the best
methods to enforce compliance with laws and regulations. The
current UAS enforcement regime is a vulnerability in and of itself. As
of October 2019, it appears that little or no coordinated monitoring,
response, and enforcement mechanism is in place to address the
growing risk of UAS attacks.
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The United States Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) issued
a “Law Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS
Operations”, on August 14, 2018. According to the report, the FAA
uses the acronym D-R-O-N-E to instruct State and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies on how best respond to a suspected case of
illegal or dangerous UAS operation within their jurisdictions: (GAO,
2019)
Ø DIRECT: attention outward and upward, attempt to locate and
identify individuals operating the UAS.
Ø REPORT: the incident to the FAA Regional Operations Center
(ROC).
Ø OBSERVE: the UAS and maintain visibility of the device.
Ø NOTICE FEATURES: Identify the type of device, whether it is
fixed wing or multi-rotor, its size, shape, color, and payload, such as
video equipment, and the activity of the device.
Ø EXECUTE appropriate action. Follow your policies and
procedures for handling an investigation and securing a safe
environment for the public and first responders.” (FAA, Law
Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operation
– Version 5, 2018)
Criminals, terrorists, hostile nations and other bad actors can
find and search the exact reports we have referenced above. To
assume they are not using this information in planning UAS attacks
is likely a dangerous if not deadly mistake. Even were the systems
for monitoring and enforcing illegal UAS activity to fully exist, the
sheer number of UAS operating legally or illegally will make preattack intervention a longshot. The solution? Create the best C-UAS
technology and strategy possible but make responsive capability
equally if not more robust.
Rapid Advancements in Technology -Amplified Vulnerability
In July 2018, a supplementary letter was issued updating a letter
sent by the FAA Office of Airports Safety and Standards in October
2016, discussing the evaluation process for C-UAS technology
deployments at major airports in the United States. Of prime
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importance was the following admonition which every C-UAS
student, professional or educator must never lose sight of. “An
additional and critical component of this finding is that technology
rapidly becomes obsolete upon installation as UAS technology is
rapidly changing.” (FAA, Airport Safety Media, 2018) To minimize
the challenge from C-UAS vulnerabilities being exploited would not
only be against the lessons taught to us by history but, also to ignore
the reality of human ingenuity when it comes to circumventing the
technology. The longer new technology remains in the market, the
more motivated attacker can probe it for weakness, look to disable,
circumvent, confuse or reverse engineer. The challenge facing CUAS professionals is one of the endless cycle of point-counterpoint.
As this chapter is being written rest assured somewhere in the
world motivated attackers are probing systems for vulnerabilities
and likely examining ways to equip UAS with Anti- C-UAS
technology. If the future of C-UAS is to be one of efficacy and
reliability, all engaged in this noble work must take heed of the
warning given by Albert Einstein to President Harry Truman. “I
know not with what weapons World War III will be fought,” Albert
Einstein warned President Truman, “but World War IV will be fought
with sticks and stones.” As quoted by Rosa Brooks who continued:
Certainly,

history

technological

offers

plentiful

“measure,

examples

of

countermeasure,

escalating
counter-

countermeasure”. (Brooks, 2013)
Conclusions
While it is impossible to predict the future, what is possible to
look to the past. Students must keep this in mind going as they
embark on careers in this exciting, important and ever-changing
field. If there is one takeaway that will benefit any current or future
C-UAS technology it that no matter what the defensive technology
or strategy, it is always best to “be prepared” for any contingency.
In a field where only perfection will ensure safety sobriety and
preparedness dictates that perfection will never be achievable and
professionals and the public alike must be cognizant of this reality.
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Questions:
1. Do you believe that an all-encompassing C-UAS system of
technology and strategy will ever be a reality?

2. List 3 steps you would take to proactively discover possible CUAS vulnerabilities both from a technological and strategic
standpoint?

3. If you were responsible for crafting a C-UAS strategy and
deploying technology what would be your top three objectives
when beginning the process?

4. Do you believe civilian use of UAS not matter the size should
be regulated as an inherently dangerous technology much like
handgun laws?
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Chapter 12: C-UAS
Regulation, Legislation, &
Litigation from a Global
Perspective
W.D. LONSTEIN

Student Learning Objectives
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“C-UAS”) have opened the
latest example of the dynamic interface between technology and
law. It is the strong suggestion of the author that students access
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, as a launch point
for this chapter. Many of the fundamental principles and
considerations discussed concerning law and UAS will serve as a
primer to this chapter’s discussion of Counter UAS regulation and
jurisprudence. (Nichols, et al., 2019) With the rapid development
and implementation of automation and artificial intelligence (“AI”),
including Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”), legal systems globally
will be forced to balance public safety with the many benefits to
everyday life. Legal scholars and legislators have wrestled with the
friction between technology and law centuries. Students will be
exposed to historical, examples of the techno-legal balance and
asked to consider how best to as apply general principles to the
challenges posed by C-UAS technology and its implementation
globally.
Once Completed Students Should:
Have a broad perspective on the global variances and gaps within
C-UAS law globally.
• Consider the impact of the ability to operate UAS remotely and
Chapter 12: C-UAS Regulation,
Legislation, & Litigation from a Global

the possibility C-UAS activity may cause legal ramifications
beyond the jurisdiction where it occurs.
• Examine whether a particular C-UAS technology such as
Kinetic, non-kinetic, passive, active, laser, acoustic, jamming,
and spoofing, might be subject to direct or indirect, regulation,
and possible liability.
• Consider the sufficiency of the current statutory framework
and jurisprudential precedent as it pertains to C-UAS design,
deployment, or operation.
• Appreciate the likelihood of conflicting civilian and military CUAS regulations impacting a particular deployment,
technology, or location.

Current C-UAS Regulatory Landscape
The current state of C-UAS jurisprudence is in its infancy with
widely divergent regulatory landscapes around the globe. From a
general perspective, most nations prohibit an individual or private
company’s right to a “self-help” C-UAS policy (i.e., the prohibition of
shooting down a drone at all with kinetic or non-kinetic measures).
Much the same as is the case within the United States,
internationally, private C-UAS activity is strictly prohibited unless
conducted under the auspices of the military or police function.
Students might ask why there is no right for a person (s) to protect
their physical safety, property, pets, farm animals, and privacy from
the threats posed by unwanted drones. The answer, though less
than satisfactory to many, is that there may be many unintended
consequences from self-help C-UAS activity. What if police were
seeking a poacher of animals in the forest next to the farm? Now
the facts implicate damage to police property, interferes with legal
police activity, not to mention creates risks to others caused by the
crash of the drone once disabled.
At first glance, it might seem that such a policy runs contrary to
individual and property rights (Figure 12-1), especially if the drone is
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flown over private property or otherwise being flown dangerously
or recklessly in public the prohibitions are grounded in logic.
Figure 12-1 Angry Farmer Spoof

Source: (Junkin Media , 2016)
A global survey of current C-UAS regulations reveals near
uniformity in most nations, prohibiting any C-UAS activity taken by
any entity other than the National Security Apparatus, Civil Aviation
Authorities, and military. Most notably and understandably, “selfhelp” C-UAS, such as that depicted in Figure 12-1, may seem a simple
and understandable reaction to an apparent privacy invasion or
aerial trespass. The challenge for C-UAS practitioners is when
dealing with perceived threats from an aerial trespasser, shooting it
out of the sky can have serious consequences.
Let’s assume the farmer in Figure 12-1 is actually in Scranton,
Pennsylvania, instead of the United Kingdom. What are the
ramifications of a landowner, seeing a drone fly over his land at
low altitude, deciding to use a shotgun to shoot it out of the sky?
Applying current C-UAS law to this scenario reveals a confusing
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and uncertain landscape for confronting what is sure to become a
more common occurrence Figure 12-3 traces the growing spectrum
of Federal C-UAS regulation in the United States.[1] In addition to
federal laws that prohibit “self-help” C-UAS activity, international
laws, state laws, agency regulations, rules, and precedential court
decisions can subject the farmer to significant criminal or civil
consequences. Depending on the action
taken, and for our purposes, we will use the farmer with the
shotgun that may result in criminal or civil liability under a complex
interaction of various federal, state, and local laws.
Figure 12-2 Global C-UAS Legal Implication Matrix

Source: (West, 2019)
Back to our farmer, not only is he subject criminal liability under
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an array of federal laws and regulations, but he may have also run
afoul of numerous state, local laws as well as subject himself to civil
liability. A civil action is one brought by an injured or aggrieved
party for monetary damages against the party who allegedly caused
the loss. In the case of the farmer, a lawsuit might be filed by an
injured party, including the drone owner, the drone operator, and
even the person who may have hired the operator to perform a
specific mission or task.
When the force of gravity added to the scenario, the situation
gains complexity. According to Michael Hamann, there are many
risks attendant to these kinetic countermeasures. The payload, if
harmful, may well be dispersed throughout the crash area as well
the impact of a plastic rotary falling from the sky has caused a
crash test dummy to receive a powerful effect ranging from 9 footpounds and 233 foot-pounds, depending on the angle and speed of
the falling drone. (Michael Hamann, 2018), citing (FAA UAS Center of
Excellence, 2017)
To further complicate things, if the farmer successfully shot down
the drone, and it landed on the head of his neighbor who
succumbed to the injuries, he sustained an additional set of legal
consequences will unfold. For example, the heirs of the deceased
neighbors might seek to bring claims for civil damages, including
but not limited to wrongful death and negligence. Criminal charges
may result from the illegal shooting and the killing of the neighbor.
Tables 12-3 – 12-5, below demonstrate the complexity of
implications from the United States, as well as other nations,
relating to C-UAS activity.
TABLE 12-1: UNITED STATES FEDERAL LAW
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Federal Law or
Regulation

FAA
Reauthorization
Act of 2018

Countermeasure

Prohibition or
Rule

Penalty

N/A

Limits C-UAS
authority to DHS,
DOJ & U.S. Coast
Guard and
requires
consultation with
Department of
Defense

N/A
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47 U.S.C. § 301
Radio Transmitter
License Required
47 U.S.C. § 302
Illegal to own
sell, import, or
operate radio
signal “jamming”
technology.

Title 47 U.S.C. §
301 et., Seq.

Radio
Interference
Signal Disruption

47 U.S.C. § 320
Allows FCC to
require any radio
station which in
its opinion may
interfere with
distress signal of
ships be required
to have a licensed
operator listening
for distress
signals.

47 U.S.
Code § 502
not more
than $500 for
each and
every day
during which
such offense
occurs

47 U.S.C. § 325
Prohibits False,
fraudulent or
unauthorized
distress or other
re-broadcast of
radio signals.
47 U.S.C. § 333
Prohibits willful
or malicious
interference with
radio
communications.
47 U.S.C. § 605
Unlawful
interception of
radio transmission
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18 U.S.C. § 1362
18 U.S.C.
Chapter 119

Interface with
Government
Communications

Jamming,
Interference
Spoofing &
similar
18 U.S.C. § 1367
with
countermeasures
Interference
government &
with Satellite
satellite
Communications
communications

18 U.S.C. § 32

Fines and
imprisonment
of not more
than 10 years

Destruction of
Aircraft or
Facilities

Destruction of
aircraft –

Fines and/or
imprisonment
of not more
than 20 years.

18 USC § 2510,
2511

18 U.S.C. § 2511
“Spoofing” a GPS
or other
Interception of
controlling signal
Wire
or
Communications
communication.

Fines up $
250,000 and
imprisonment
of not more
than 10 years

Wiretap Act

Source: (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018)
TABLE 12-2: STATE LAWS IN CALIFORNIA & NEW YORK
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State Law
or
Countermeasure Prohibition or Rule
Regulation

Penalty
Class D
Felony

NY Penal Law § 145.05:
Criminal Mischief in the
Second Degree:
Intentionally damage
someone else’s property
in an amount that
exceeds $ 1,500.00

New York
Penal Law

Shooting Drone
with Shotgun

NY Penal Law §
145.05: Criminal
Mischief in the Second
Degree:
Intentionally damage
someone else’s property
in an amount between $
250.00 and $ 1,500.00

Fine &
Imprisonment
of up to 5
years
imprisonment

Class E
Felony
Fine &
Imprisonment
of up to 4
years
imprisonment

Class E
Felony
Fine &
NY Penal Law § 265.35
Imprisonment
(2) Unlawfully
discharging a firearm at of up to 4
years
an aircraft.
imprisonment
Civil Liability

Monetary
Damages
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Misdemeanor
or Felony
depending on
facts

Penal Code 246.3 PC
1.

Shooting Drone
with Shotgun

California
Penal
Code

2.
Willfully
discharge a firearm, in
a grossly negligent
manner, which could
result in someone’s
injury or death

Misdemean
or – 1 Year in
jail – Fine up
to $ 1,000
Felony – 16
months – 4
years in jail.
Fine up to $
10,000

Misdemean
or
6 – 12
Maliciously and
Months
willfully fire a firearm at:
imprisonment
An occupied
aircraft**[2]
Felony
3– 7 years
Penal Code 594 PC
imprisonment
Vandalism:
Maliciously commits any
Fine up to $
of the following acts
10,000
with respect to any real
Damage
or personal property
over $ 400.00
not his or her own:
Fine up to $
(2) Damages;
10,000.00
(3) Destroys
1 Year
County Jail
Crime of Carrying a
Loaded Firearm in
Damage up
Public
to $ 10,000.00
Fine up to $
Civil Liability
50,000.00
Penal Code 246 PC

Fine up to $
10,000.00
1 Year
County Jail
Monetary
Damages

TABLE 12-3: GLOBAL LEGAL EXAMPLES[3]
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Country

Countermeasure Prohibition or Rule
Wireless Telegraphy Act
2006

United
Kingdom

GPS Jamming or
signal
interference

UK Public General Acts,
2006 c. 36, Part 2
Chapter 4
Unauthorized use etc.
of wireless telegraphy
station or apparatus

Penalty
Fine of up to £
250,000; and
5% Gross
Revenue
Imprisonme
nt up to 2
years

Wireless Telegraphy Act
2006

Misleading
messages
(spoofing),
Interception

Computer
Hacking

Shooting UAV
with illegal
weapon

UK Public General Acts,
2006 c. 36, Part 2
Chapter 4
A person commits an
offence if, by means of
wireless telegraphy, he
sends or attempts to
send a message to
which this section
applies.
(a) is false or
misleading; and (b) is
likely to prejudice the
efficiency of a safety of
life service or to
endanger the safety of a
person or of a ship,
aircraft or vehicle.

Fine of up to £
250,000; and
5% Gross
Revenue
Imprisonme
nt up to 2
years

Computer Misuse Act of Up to 2 years
1990
Imprisonment
and up to £
5,000 Fine

Section 5(2A)(c) of the
Firearms Act 1968

·
For
possession,
purchase or
acquisition –
10 years
imprisonment.
·
For
manufacture,
sale of
transfer – Life
imprisonment.
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Chapter 27, Part 1 (16)
Firearms Act of 1968
Possession of firearm
with intent to endanger
life or cause serious
injury to property
Chapter 27, Part 1 (18)
Firearms Act of 1968
Carrying firearm with
criminal intent
Chapter 27, Part 1 (19)
Firearms Act of 1968
Carrying a Firearm in
a Public Place

·
6
months – 4
years
imprisonment

Chapter 27, Part 1 (20)
Firearms Act of 1968
Trespassing with a
Firearm

Criminal Damage Act
1971 Chapter 48 Part 1
(1), (2)

Damaging or
attempting to
damage a UAV

Destroying or damaging
property
Criminal Damage Act
1971 Chapter 48 Part 3
(a), (b)
Possessing anything
with intent to destroy
or damage property

Chapter 27. Crimes
Against Traffic Safety
and the Operation of
Transport Vehicles
Russian
Using a weapon
Federation to destroy a UAV

Article 263. Violation of
the Rules for Traffic
Safety and Operation of
the Railway, Air,
Sea and Inland Water
Transportation
Systems, as Well as of
the Underground
Railroad

·

·
100,000
– 300,000
Rubles Up to 4
Years in
prison or 2
years in labor
camp.
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Article 267. Putting out
of Commission
Transport Vehicles or
Communications
1. Destruction, damage,
or putting out of
commission transport
vehicles, warning
devices,
communications or
communications
facilities, or any other
transport equipment,
and likewise
blocking transport
communications, if
these acts have
involved, by negligence,
the infliction of
grave injury to human
health, or the infliction
of large damage
Article 271.1. Breaking
the Rules for Using the
Airspace of the Russian
Federation

Using GPS
Jamming, Radio
interference of
other disabling
of computer
systems or
hacking

100,000 –
300,000
Rubles Up to 4
Years in
prison or 2
years in labor
camp.

Up to 7 years
imprisonment

Chapter 28. Crimes in
fine up to 200
the Sphere of Computer thousand
Information
rubles, , or
with restraint
of liberty for a
Article 272. Illegal
term of up to
Access to Computer
two years, or
Information
with
1. Illegal access to
compulsory
legally protected
labor for a
computer information,
if this deed has involved term of up to
two years, or
the
destruction, blocking, with
modification or copying deprivation of
liberty for the
of computer
same term.
information
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Article 273. Creation,
Use, and Dissemination
of Harmful Computer
Programs
1. Creation,
dissemination or use of
computer programs or
another computer
information, which
are knowingly intended
for unsanctioned
destruction, blocking,
modification
or copying of
computer information
or for balancing-out of
computer information
security
facilities –
Article 281. Sabotage 1.
Perpetration of an
explosion, arson, or of
any other action aimed
at the destruction or
damage of enterprises,
structures, transport
infrastructure facilities
and transport vehicles,
or vital supply facilities
for the population, with
the aim of subverting
the economic security
or the defense capacity
of the Russian
Federation

fine up to 200
thousand
rubles, , or
with restraint
of liberty for a
term of up to
two years, or
with
compulsory
labor for a
term of up to
two years, or
with
deprivation of
liberty for the
same term.

Punishable by
deprivation of
liberty for a
term of ten to
15 years

1 Crimes (Aviation) Act
1991 –No. 139, 1991

Australia

Damaging or
Shooting A
Drone

Compilation No.
257 Destruction of
aircraft
(1) A person must not
intentionally destroy a
Division 3 aircraft.
Dangerous Use of
Firearms Section 93 H
(2) of the Crimes Act of
1900

Penalty:
Imprisonment
for 14 years.

10 Years
Imprisonment
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Endangering safety of
aircraft—general
(1) A person who, while
on board a Division 3
aircraft, does an act,
reckless as to whether
the act will endanger
the safety of the
aircraft, commits an
offence.
section 195 of the
Crimes Act 1900 THE
OFFENCE OF
MALICIOUS DAMAGE
The offence of
Malicious Damage is
contained in section 195
of the Crimes Act 1900

Prohibition relating to
RNSS jamming devices
GPS Jamming

Radio Signal
Interference

Under section 190 of
the Act, the ACMA
declares that:
Use of Non-approved
Radio
Transmission devices

Penalty:
Imprisonment
for 10 years

Penalties for
breaching the
rules can be a
fine of up to
$1.05 million
or up to 5
years in
prison
Fines of up to
$25,200 up to
two years in
prison

Sources: (Federal Aviation Administration Office of Airports Safety
and Standards, 2016) (Secretary of State for the Home Department,
2019) (Russian Federation, 1996) (United Nations, 2019) (United
Nations, 2019)

CAN C-UAS BE REGULATED? THE C-UAS FABLE
The current paucity of global C-UAS regulation is not only a
product of the fact that UAS legislation is still in its formative stages,
but it is also equally a result of the speed with which UAS, and
consequently C-UAS technology is developing.
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When considering whether and to what extent to regulate C-UAS
technology, I turn to one of my favorite legal fables where the moral
of the story is that when legislating, less can be more, particularly
apropos when considering C-UAS regulation, more specifically
micro-drones, and swarms.
In an attempt to eliminate a problem with pesky flies, the local
town decides to deploy a solution to make life more pleasant for
its residents. Although there are many more possible solutions, the
village elders provide the three which they feel to be representative
of different levels of risk vs. reward.
Choice 1:
Provide each household a fly swatter to give them a tool to stop
flies coming into their homes.
Result:
Somewhat useful, but in the long run, not a solution that will
eliminate the nuisance.
Unintended Consequence:
Sore elbow, broken items in the home, the species survives intact.
Figure 12-3 Cockroaches and Nuclear Bombs
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Source: (Daftardar, Depressed Man Meme, 2019) & (Daftardar, Can
Cockroaches Really Survive A Nuclear Explosion?, 2015)
Choice 2:
Use aerial or water sprayed dispersion of pesticides.
Result:
Most flies eliminated, no method to contain ingestion by
unintended targets or limit environmental pollution in a safe &
effective manner.
Unintended Consequence:
May cause side effects to the population of humans, pets, farm
animals, plant life, crops, air purity, and water. Causing a cascading
series of complications ranging from remediating the environmental
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damage to treating generations of diseased humans, animals, and
plants.
Choice 3:
Deploy a unique acoustic wing-speed signature detection
technology for the species of fly native to the region where the
village

is

situated.

Once

confirmed,

a

radio

frequency

countermeasure would cause the fly to die from brain injury within
one minute.
Result:
Current species of native flies mostly eliminated.
Unintended Consequence:
Flies evolve where their wing-speed changes, and their acoustic
sensitivity and brains become immune to the technology.
Additionally, aircraft, radios, GPS, and other technologies adversely
affected, causing mass disruptions to daily life.

Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm
The Latin phrase “Primum non Nocere” – First Do No Harm,
borrowed from the field of medicine seems to be a worthy objective
for C-UAS legislation. C-UAS covers a broad spectrum of kinetic and
non-kinetic measures taken to destroy, disable, confuse, hijack, or
otherwise interfere with the intended operation of an Unmanned
Aerial System. A C-UAS tactic might be as simple as throwing a
stone at a drone or as complex as introducing malware into its
operating systems and everything in between. My talented coauthors more than amply discuss these technologies and tactics
in other chapters of this text. For our purposes, it is necessary to
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determine (1) whether C-UAS regulation on a globally functional
basis is possible? (2) If it was possible, how would such law impact
the rights of individuals, technology companies, the respective
national security interests of each nation, individual security rights
and cultural differences between countries around the globe; and
(3) how are inevitable conflicts in law resolved given the inherently
international nature of UAS and C-UAS technology?
While the United States and other nations are currently studying
the issue, as of late November 2019, it is safe to summarize the
current global C-UAS specific legislation landscape as nonexistent. (Jason Snead, 2018) Since UAS technology is currently
being used in both military and civilian applications worldwide,
NGO’s such as the United Nations (“UN”) and individual nations are
to create effective C-UAS regulation, some degree of commonality
must exist.
What

is

meant

by

commonality?

For

our

examination,

commonality means uniform foundational principles that must be
recognized globally. Much like a Geneva Conventions for warfare,
this policy is best run by an NGO, the most logical being the UN.
Unfortunately, history teaches than UN enforcement is inherently
challenging due to having 193 member states, each with separate
values, cultures, religions, political and economic systems. (United
Nations, 2019) Add the all too common realities of formal and
informal military conflict, and it becomes a certainty that nations
will interpret the regulations in a manner that supports its
objectives. Accordingly, a uniform global C-UAS law does not appear
to present a viable option. However, the Geneva Conventions,
Hague Conventions, War Crimes, Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing,
International Humanitarian laws and adjudication thereof by the UN
War Crimes Tribunal should be amended to include UAS and CUAS activity warfare specifically. (International Committee of the
Red Cross, 2016) (United Nations, 2019)
When technology becomes widely available and less expensive,
not to mention remotely operable, it becomes attractive to those
with nefarious intent. Add the capability to deliver biologic,
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chemical, and nuclear payloads, and the potential to be used as
a Weapon of Mass Destruction by non-state actors becomes a
frightening reality. (Office of the President of the United States,
2018)
Most nations eschew C-UAS specific legislation instead of
choosing to provide-UAS authority to military, civil aviation, and
homeland security functions and relying upon existing criminal
statutes and aviation rules and regulations to control widespread CUAS activity. The Federal Aviation Administration issued one of the
most recent pronouncements on the subject on August 14, 2018. In
short, the Law Enforcement Guidance letter discussed the primacy
of the Federal Governments’ role in any C-UAS activity in the United
States with state and local Law Enforcement being invaluable
partners in ensuring safe drone operation. According to the
guidance letter, Law Enforcement’s role in C-UAS activity should be
in accord with the process described by the acronym D-R-O-N-E:

• Direct attention outward and upward, attempt to locate and
identify individuals operating the UAS. Look at windows/
balconies/rooftops. Law enforcement is in the best position to
locate the suspected operator of the aircraft, and any
participants or personnel supporting the operation.

• Report the incident to the FAA Regional Operations Center
(ROC). Follow-up assistance can be obtained through FAA Law
Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) special agents.
Immediate notification of an incident, accident, or other
suspected violation to one of the FAA ROCs, located around
the country, is valuable to the timely initiation of the FAA’s
investigation. These centers are manned 24-hours a day, seven
days a week, with personnel trained to contact appropriate
duty personnel during non-business hours when there has
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been an incident, accident, or other matter that requires
timely response by FAA employees.

• Observe the UAS and maintain visibility of the device. Note
that the battery life of a UAS is typically 20 to 30 minutes. Look
for damaged property or injured individuals. Local law
enforcement is in the best position to identify potential
witnesses and conduct initial interviews, documenting what
they observed while the event is still fresh in their minds.
Administrative proceedings often involve very technical issues;
therefore, we expect our own aviation safety inspectors will
need to interview most witnesses. During any witness
interviews, use of fixed landmarks depicted on maps, diagrams,
or photographs, immeasurably help in fixing the position of the
aircraft, and such landmarks should be used to describe lateral
distances and altitude above the ground, structures or people
(e.g., below the third floor of Building X; below the top of the
oak tree located at Y; or any similar details that give reference
points for lay witnesses). We are mindful that in many
jurisdictions, state law may prohibit the transmission of
witness statements to third parties, including the FAA.
However, capturing the names and contact information of
witnesses to provide to the FAA will also be extremely helpful.

• Notice features. Identify the type of device, whether it is fixed
wing or multi-rotor, its size, shape, color, and payload, such as
video equipment, and the activity of the device. Pictures taken
in close proximity to the event are often helpful in describing
light and weather conditions, any damage or injuries, and the
number and density of people, particularly at public events or
in densely populated areas.
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• Execute appropriate action. Follow your policies and
procedures for handling an investigation and securing a safe
environment for the public and first responders.

• It must be noted, any investigations conducted by LEAs should
be in accordance with local or state authorities, as the FAA’s
statutes and regulations do not permit their use as a basis for
LEAs to conduct investigations. (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2018)

In order to reinforce current C-UAS restrictions, a recent FAA
Law Enforcement Guidance letter cites specific Federal laws and
regulations which are implicated when an unauthorized person
engages in C-UAS activity in the United States. (Figure 12-4)
By way of comparison, the United Kingdom allows Law
Enforcement a broader use of C-UAS technology and tactics
including DTI (Detect Track and Identify) technology, and effector
technology which can disable hostile drones. In a recent Counter
Unmanned Aircraft presentation given to Parliament in October
2019, the British Home Department established a multifold strategy
for C-UAS preparation and capability.
The stated objective of the plan is:
1. 1. Developing a comprehensive understanding of the evolving
risks posed by the malicious and illegal use of drones;

2. Taking a ‘full spectrum’ approach to deter, detect and disrupt
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the misuse of drones;

3. Building strong relationships with industry to ensure their
products meet the highest security standards and,

4. Empowering the police and other operational responders
through access to counter-drone capabilities and effective
legislation, training and guidance.(Secretary of State for the
Home Department, 2019)

Figure 12-4: FAA Law Enforcement Guidance
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Source: (Federal Aviation Administration, 2018)
The current UK C-UAS policy differs from that of the United
States in that it provides for a more active C-UAS role given to Law
Enforcement agencies:
“The police are able to legally deploy a range of DTI and counterdrone effector systems. We will develop options for the creation of a
UK national counter-drone capability that will reduce our domestic
reliance on defence capability to respond to the most challenging
drone security incidents and will allow the police to protect national
iconic events, or support crisis response. We will identify the most
appropriate equipment and resource to procure and deliver this
capability.” (Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2019)
While current C-UAS regulations and enforcement regimes vary
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significantly, given time and study, it is likely that more certainly will
come to C-UAS practice. The challenge facing C-UAS practitioners
will be multi-fold. Off the shelf obsolescence, Counter- CounterUAS technology will inevitably be incorporated into many UAS just
as chaff, flares, jamming, DIRCM (Directed Infrared Counter
Measures), and other technologies rapidly developed to counteract
anti-aircraft technology from the dawn of military aviation up to
today.
Students must account for the reality that a measurecountermeasure dynamic will present challenges to any scheme of
C-UAS legislation or regulation. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
those who enact C-UAS laws to avoid the temptation of focusing
upon specific technologies or tactics instead of focusing upon the
establishment of general principal legislation.
For example, a regulation that proscribes C-UAS technology or
tactics which are likely to endanger the public nationwide is far
more flexible than a statute that prohibits the use of C-UAS
technology in or near cities with a population over 100,000.
The principle of legislative generality was affirmed by the
Government of Victoria, Australia when it issued the following
guidance:
“Regulation of specific activities, industries or professional groups
is a last-resort option. Preference will be given to promoting
industry self-regulation and best practice, including codes of
conduct, assessing whether existing broader legislation (State or
Commonwealth) applies to particular cases, using other nonlegislative methods (e.g. government provision of information) to
address concerns. (DTF 2005, p. 1–7) (Consumer Affairs Victoria,
2006)
Regulating technology can have many unintended consequences,
which were articulated by Christopher Fonzone and Kate
Heinzelman in a 2018 opinion piece regarding legislating Artificial
Intelligence.
“Decisions made today may have substantial ripple effects that
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legislators could easily miss on the development of AI technology
down the road. Who could have possibly imagined the full
implications of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
when it was enacted in 1996? Or the effect of the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act’s warrant requirement for emails less
than 180 days old in 1986? Early legislative enactments about new
technologies tend to persist.” (Christopher Fonzone, 2018)
There are no clear answers when it comes to ethics, technology,
warfare, terrorism, and crime. C-UAS Students, Practitioners, and
Regulators would be wise to remember that job 1 in public safety and
national defense is first not to harm those you seek to protect.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS – Self Defense
Recently Hollywood has been capturing the imagination of
audiences globally with thrillers involving UAS attacks by traditional
and non-traditional combatants, terrorists, and other bad actors.
The 2019 film, “Angel Has Fallen” takes quite a bit of license,
however, is undoubtedly demonstrative of how UAS technology, in
the hands of a bad actor, could wreak havoc on society. (Waugh,
2019) The use of mobile launched mini-drone swarm technology
presents a growing threat to all society. Let’s hope it’s a case of art
imitating imagination instead of creativity imitating life.
Figure 12-5: Angel Has Fallen
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Source: (Waugh, 2019)
Films including Star Trek, War Games, Star Wars, Runaway, and
Terminator are a few examples of films that examine AI, Automation,
Unmanned technology, and the attendant risks they pose when
falling into the wrong hands or become out of control due to a fault
or defect. In a world where weapons of war have been finding their
way off the battlefield and onto the streets, we must be prepared
and assume the reality that UAS technology will also be a prime
target for the black-market profiteers. Even worse, UAS technology
designed for the hobbyist, farming or other non-military functions
is currently flooding the market at low prices. This new affordability
begs the question, if technology falls into the hands of those who
present asymmetric threats, and can appear to be part of everyday
life, is it ethical for the government to prohibit individuals from
engaging in self-defense? Isaac Asimov, the noted writer, and
scientist first introduced and right of self-defense against
automated

technology

(“robots”)

in

the

short

story

Runaround published in 1942.
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Figure 12-6: Asimov’s 3 Laws for Robots

Source: (Asimov, 1942)
To allow for an orderly introduction of robotics into our lives,
Asimov, a visionary futurist, created the “The Laws for Robots.”

1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction,
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allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings,
except where such orders would conflict with the First Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
He later introduced a zeroth law which stated:

1. A robot may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow
humanity to come to harm. (MIT Technology Review, 2014)

Subsequently, other scholars examined Asimov’s three laws in the
context of the drone age, where remotely piloted or autonomous
aircraft are now capable of inflicting harm to humans on a massive
scale. Ulrike Barthelmess, Koblenz Ulrich Furbach expanded upon
this concept when they wrote in a paper discussing whether
Asimov’s laws of robotics in 2014:
“But we also should mention that there do exist autonomous
vehicles and robots designed per se to harm humans. Military robots
or autonomous drones are aiming explicitly at violating Asimov’s
laws. What we desperately need are legal and ethical rules for the
commitment of robots. We can see this from the debate around
drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemeni Somali. According to the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism there is a kind of covert drone war in those
countries. Drones are used to strike against targets in countries,
without being officially in war according to the international law
of armed conflict. More or less autonomously operating drones are
destroying targets i.e. humans, which are associated with terrorism.
And as can easily be imagined there is a significant number of
civilians killed or injured as collateral damage. We want to argue that
a similar procedure would not so readily be accepted by the world
public, if instead of drones manned aircrafts would be used.

It
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seems as if there is much lower acceptance threshold to use robots
instead of regular military forces for illegal or covert warfare.
Besides of moral and ethical considerations, this raises a lot of
legal questions. Is it legal to strike targets with unmanned drones
in a country which is not in a formal state of war with the owner
of drones? Is it legal for a third-party country to support such an
action, e.g. by delivering data for military reconnaissance or by
hosting the pilots of the drones? In the context of this discussion
it would be more likely to answer the question from the title as
follows: It is not allowed to build and to use robots which violate
Asimov’s first law.” (Barthelmess, 2014)
Currently, it is hard to establish whether a drone flying overhead
is benign or a threat to the safety of those below. The stealthy
nature and ability to deliver payloads, surveil or interrupt activities
of normal daily life drones that pose a threat can often appear as
harmless as a hobbyist learning to fly the gift they received for their
birthday. With literally millions of drones flying daily, the reality
is that no law enforcement strategy, much less C-UAS military
deployment, can reasonably be relied upon to 100% protect military,
domestic, and individuals from the risks posed by UAS technology.
Students are strongly urged to read the 2015 article in the
Connecticut Law Review entitled “Self-Defense against Robots and
Drones.” Although it is now four years later and the UAS industry
continues to grow exponentially in the military, commercial and
civilian applications alike, the subject of self-defense against drones
lies at the heart of C-UAS regulation. The authors correctly observe
that absent a reliable system that the everyday citizen can use to
determine whether a UAV is a friend or foe, individuals must have, at
least to a certain degree, the right of self-defense. (Colangelo, 2015)
Conclusions
While there will be no shortage of pain points in the creation of
a robust yet flexible C-UAS legislative and jurisprudential scheme,
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students should consider the reality that no matter how broad the
policy may be, a motivated attacker will always find a way to exploit
it. One need look no further than to constant friction between those
who want to make certain classes of firearms illegal, and those
who feel the right is a natural inheritance in countries such as the
United States. Both make valid arguments yet were either side to
prevail; those who are intent on harming will find a way to legally
or illegally acquire a weapon. As we head further into the age of
ubiquitous automation, there will be no shortage of debates about
how best to regulate the legal and prevent the illegal use of the
technology. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered a speech in 1963
when he discussed the challenge of legislating morality, as opposed
to regulating behavior:
“Religion and education must play a great role in changing the
heart. But we must go on to say that while it may be true that
morality cannot be legislated, behavior can be regulated. It may be
true that the law cannot change the heart, but it can restrain the
heartless. It may be true that the law cannot make a man love me,
but it can keep him from lynching me and I think that is pretty
important, also.” (Dr. Martin Luther King, 1963)
Those who seek to engage in a career in the UAS / C-UAS field
will undoubtedly have to confront this challenge regularly. Whether
you are creating CUAS technology, deploying that technology, or
designing strategies, the result of what you do will inevitably have
a long-lasting consequence to humanity. Risk, reward, cost, and
morality are but a few of the factors you will have to balance while
the speed of new technology will make the ground beneath your
feet feel like a treadmill moving 100 miles per hour.
No matter how good the technology, strategy, or defense, a
motivated actor will find a way to exploit vulnerabilities inherent
within it. So too is the case when legislating and regulating C-UAS
activity. Every exigency, contingency, circumstance, and location
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will challenge the applicability of the law, not to mention possible
provide a means for malevolent actors to exploit it to inflict great
harm legally. Laws can inhibit the development of technologies that
may offer more safety, certainty, and clarity to the field of UAS / CUAS jurisprudence, and so knee-jerk, reactionary rules can do more
harm than good. The best course of action? Think for today but
be flexible enough to understand the consequence tomorrow. No
law can be perfect, particularly when it comes to technology in its
infancy.
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER:

1. If the farmer in Figure 12-1 shot down the drone flying near his
farm, only to find the payload was a vial of liquid with a timer
attached. Thankfully the buckshot from the shotgun and the
fall to earth did not damage the vial ort timer. The farmer
immediately calls authorities who respond and disarm the
timer. They rush the drone away to a secure facility where they
discover that vial contained an aerosolized form of the Ebola
virus. But for the farmer’s action, thousands may have died.
Should he be charged with violating the various statutes listed
in Figures 12-3 – 12-5 above?

2. Would your opinion change if the buckshot damaged the vial
and let the virus escape into the atmosphere? What if the
target location was 20 miles away with a dense population
while the population within 5 miles of his farm was under 100?

3. Imagine the drone launcher from “Angel has fallen,” as depicted
in Figure 12-7, was pulling up to a remote area within proximity
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of Camp David, Maryland. Further, assume that a C-UAS
hobbyist, uncertain of the law, was nearby and coincidentally
testing a new C-UAS technology using magnetized plasma
energy. Despite excellent efficacy, its components are militarygrade and, therefore, illegal for a citizen to possess.
Understanding the fact that Camp David is near and not seeing
any indicia of Secret Service or other lawful entities on the
launcher vehicle, he deploys the plasma energy weapon,
disables the swarm, and saves the president, his family, and
those in protection party. Should the hobbyist be treated as a
criminal or a Good Samaritan?

4. What if the scenario in number 3 above was the same, and the
president was safe; however, the plasma energy cause three
helicopters overhead to lose computer-assisted guidance,
power and control surface function resulting in all three
crashing and the lives of 16 agents were lost. Should the
hobbyist be held criminally responsible?
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[1] It is notable that beginning on 2016 Title 49 of the U.S. Code was
amended to establish a pilot program for C-UAS mitigation at and
around airports and critical infrastructure.
[2] The issue of whether a UAV qualifies as an “occupied aircraft” is
currently unclear
[3] The survey of laws listed in tables 12-1, 12-2 and 12-3 are by no
means complete in terms of applicable laws within the respective
jurisdictions listed or the overall global C-UAS regulatory
framework.
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